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PREFACE 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
‘Always do that which you could not do, in order that you  
may learn how to do it’ (Pablo Picasso) 
 
 
 
Getting to know the tricks of the social science trade was definitely one of the 
considerations, leading to the creation of this book. Alongside learning and discovering 
new things, each new experience brings its own laws and practices, and new and 
fascinating people. Many of them made sure that I did not regret my decision taken at the 
time to change the course of my life. Even so, there have been moments at which I saw 
this Ph.D. project as an unassailable challenge, simply because I had not reckoned with 
the fact that circumstances beyond my control would interfere with my new commitment, 
and repeatedly induce changes in priorities. As a consequence, one of the many things I 
came to realize during the past four years is that being creative includes the capacity to 
settle in and adjust, or to let go of things. In spite of, or thanks to this awareness, winding 
up this research project remained one of my priorities.  
Getting involved with various aspects of university life has been a valuable experience, 
and I consider myself fortunate that my supervisor, Kees van Kersbergen, gave me the 
opportunity to participate in the ‘Transposition of EU Directives’ programme, the 
umbrella programme under which this research was conducted. I am grateful to Kees for 
sharing his knowledge and insights, and for his constructive, clear, and concise 
commentary throughout the process. Likewise, I am grateful to Markus Haverland, my 
daily supervisor, whose great patience and non-stop support encouraged me to persist and 
complete this project. Apart from appreciating his helpful recommendations, I highly 
value his integrity.  
Next, I would like to give my special thanks to the other members and former members 
of the Transposition program, Antoaneta Dimitrova, Michael Kaeding, and Bernard 
Steunenberg (all Leiden University), Sara Berglund, Ieva Gange, and Frans van Waarden 
(Utrecht University), Ellen Mastenbroek (currently working at the Radboud University 
Nijmegen), and Mark Rhinard (currently working at the Swedish Institute of International 
Affairs), for their commitment, constructive comments and lively discussions. I also 
enjoyed working with Dimitar Toshkov and Frank Häge (Leiden University), and the 
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other Ph.D. students I met in Leiden. I very much appreciated their useful suggestions, 
and it was a pleasure joining the yearly Ph.D. weekends. I am most grateful to the Public 
Administration Department of Leiden University for the workplace accommodation 
during the past two years, all the more because that is how I got to know Caspar van den 
Berg and Caelesta Poppelaars, who warmly welcomed me in their midst. Caspar and 
Caelesta, it was (and still is) great to spend time with you and share life’s joys (and 
sorrows).  
I also had the pleasure of spending two years in Nijmegen in the Political Science 
Department. It did not take long to feel home in the pleasant and friendly atmosphere, 
typical of the southern region. I am thankful to Bob Lieshout and his team for welcoming 
me into their dynamic, but also caring and sharing, environment.  
Special thanks go to Monique Leyenaar and Kees Niemöller. Their honesty and great 
pleasure in life are stimulating and refreshing.  Likewise, I enjoyed the open and sincere 
discussions with Gerry van der Kamp, Mirjam Kars (currently working at Delft 
University of Technology), Karin Bockmeulen, Helma Peters, Wilma Theunissen, and 
Jan van Nuys.  
It was a joy to meet and work with Ieva Gange, whose persistence combined with her 
ability to put things into perspective, made her a special colleague, and these days, an 
appreciated friend. Finally, my thanks go to the NIG lecturers and course members for 
their inspiring company and discussions.  
So many words left unspoken, this book is my way of expressing my great respect for 
Marie Romeijn-Stam, my beloved and splendid mother, who fights her own silent battle, 
and my late father, Jacobus Romeijn, who is always in my heart.  
My dear sister Tonnie Netten and my friends, especially Astrid Zwarts and Piet 
Vogelesang, I would like to thank for their moral support and their non-complaining 
about me ‘being busy’. And ofcourse, there is Roy, with whom I share this very special 
bond. Although individual projects often stand in the way of us meeting each other, I 
cherish the many happy moments we have spent together since we met.  
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 1 INTRODUCTION   
 
 
‘The Internal Market has been a tremendous force for economic and social good. But 
much of its potential is being wasted: it's as if we are driving a Ferrari in second gear’ 
(Frits Bolkestein) 
 
 
This book reports on the results of a comparative inquiry into the impact of institutions 
on EU social policy implementation. Wishing to contribute to a better theoretical 
understanding of EU policy implementation practices, this inquiry recognizes both the 
effects of conditions altering over time and the peculiarities of policy issues, in order to 
establish the reliability of dominant explanations for varying levels of compliance.  
Whether qualitative or quantitative, cross-country analyses performed thus far, yield 
dissimilar outcomes. This may be partly because qualitative studies draw on a few 
specific transposition cases and therefore barely allow for a valid comparison. 
Quantitative implementation researchers, on the other hand, base their conclusions on 
ready-made official data. Another common weakness of quantitative enquiries is their 
lack of preciseness and consistency in the operationalization of institutional key 
variables. Yet, it is quite conceivable that the amount of potential - yet not necessarily 
robust - institutional explanations for varying levels of compliance build up for 
additional reasons. Most importantly, a sheer fascination for cross-national variances 
means that significant deviations across policy issues remain unnoticed. Likewise, by 
looking at cross-country differences alone, compliance scholars ignore the fact that 
conditions shaping a country’s transposition behaviour today are not necessarily the 
same conditions that were influential in the past.  
This study recognizes that the dependent and independent variables deserve a more 
refined treatment than hitherto given. Seeking to separate the sheep from the goats, it 
carries through sharp distinctions between implementation cases. Its analyses draw on a 
newly built dataset. It features the actual transposition data of five member states - The 
Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain and Greece - since the early 1960s in a 
single, yet diverse field of European policy - i.e. social policy. The member states’ 
changeable performance in this area of policy substantiates the claim that different levels 
of compliance within countries are considerable, and go beyond cross-country 
variations. The question whether major institutional arguments are capable of providing 
Chapter 1 
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general explanations for the observed variance, is answered in the negative. Firstly, the 
outcomes do not confirm the expectation that veto players delay the transposition 
process. Rather than opposition from veto players, it is generous deadlines and the 
incidence of changes in government that significantly reduce the pace of legal 
adaptation. These conditions, however, only obstruct implementation if the directive to be 
transposed is completely new. In addition, these conditions delay the implementation of 
health and safety regulations, but have no impact whatsoever on the implementation rate 
of more general social provisions.  
Effective accelerators of the process are social learning, the deterrent effect of EU 
sanctions, and a goodness-of-fit between national and European policies. However, 
social learning and the avoidance of sanctions only explain variations in the 
transposition rate of health and safety directives. Social learning makes a difference 
when implementation involves amending health and safety directives, whereas sanction 
avoidance reduces the seriousness of overdue transposition of both new and amending 
health and safety directives. Notably, the implementation pace of directives relating to 
general social issues remains unaffected by these factors.  
Finally, the degradation of the historical ‘goodness-of-fit’ appears undeserved. The 
existence of national legislation, which harmonizes with European social policies, 
changes domestic performance for the better in all social policy categories alike. What 
the outcomes indicate is that the European venture is an ongoing process stirred up by 
dynamics that operate in tandem. Socialization and strategic adaption bring about a 
change in priorities, yet with more vigour in the 1990s than in earlier days, and, above 
all, in policies where the EU is omnipresent.  
 
1.1 Europe: common ground for disparity 
At the time of writing, the European Community celebrates its 50th anniversary. Since its 
establishment, this solid expression of a long fostered ideal guaranteeing peace through 
cooperation, has successfully strengthened its raison d’être. Taking off with only six 
members in 1957, the current European Union (EU) relies on the support of 27 states, 
who, through their accession to the EU, have entrusted some of their authority to 
European institutions. Empowered by successive Treaties, either the European 
Commission, or the Council, or the Council and Parliament1 enact common laws, the 
scope of which has gradually broadened. Today, provisions of which members believe 
that their effect goes well beyond national borders, cover a wide range of policy issues2. 
Introduction 
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Most of these policies come under the Internal Market strategy. This programme pursues 
further economic growth, competitiveness, and employment in Europe through the 
removal of the remainder of barriers and by further streamlining the common rules. This 
strategy was agreed upon in the late 1980s (SEA 1986), formalized with the signing of 
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, and has expanded ever since, so much that around 98 per 
cent3 of all European directives fall under its scope.  
For the Internal Market to be effective, it hinges on the proper and timely transposition of 
EU policy into the national legal systems of the member states. National governments 
that fail to fulfil their transposition duty, seriously thwart the ‘coherence and unity of the 
process of European construction’ (Declaration on the Implementation of Community 
law¸ annex 19 to TEU 1992), a reason why the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is 
rigorous in penalizing late transposition.  
Nonetheless, it is precisely on that score where the success rate of the European venture 
was and still is highly questionable, even though successive Internal Market updates lead 
one to believe that national legislative authorities are more compliant nowadays than they 
were in the past. However, once converted into absolute terms, the Internal Market scores 
give little rise to optimism. The following graphs aptly illustrate this point. 
 
Fig. 1.1 Average transposition deficits - EU Internal Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Source: Internal Market scoreboards 1997-2006 
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by then -.  Except for May 2004, when ten new member states joined the Union, the 
statistics hint at a drastic moderation of deficit scores. However, concluding that non-
compliance gradually becomes less of a problem, would be unjustified. In absolute terms, 
member states’ underperformance remains the same, simply because, year on year, the 
volume of Internal Market legislation increases, and new member states join the Union. 
That is why, for instance, the May 2003 deficit score of 2.4 per cent (relating to 15 EU 
member states, and 1530 directives in force) equals 558 overdue notifications, whereas 
the June 2006 deficit percentage of 1.9 (relating to 25 EU member states, and 1620 
directives in force) is the result of 772 cases not being notified to the Commission.  
 
 
Fig. 1.2   Fragmentation factor - EU Internal Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                      Source: Internal Market scoreboard 15, 2006 
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Henkin 1979, Börzel 2001). On the contrary, EU statistics echo major deadline 
violations. However, they are not sufficiently accurate for scholarly analysis. Periodical 
Commission scores do not register how member states perform in the long run. Nor do 
Commission scores lay bare how serious any occurring transposition deficits actually are. 
Instead, official scores report the state of implementation at the time of monitoring. 
Hence, these scores relate to a constantly changing body of EU directives of which the 
status is updated with each successive report period. That is, each new monitor update 
includes new directives. These may result in new overdue transposition cases which add 
up to the deficit scores, or replace previously overdue cases if these are settled by then.  
Until now, only few scholars (Mastenbroek 2003; Kaeding 2006; Berglund, Gange and 
Van Waarden 2006) were suspicious of the official statistics and chose to examine the 
transposition rate of individual directives that the countries of inquiry had to transpose 
over a given period.  Their findings demonstrate high - around 60 per cent on average - 
proportions of overdue cases.   
Studies on the effect of the EU on its members, including those relying on Commission 
data (e.g. Weiler 1988; Mendrinou 1996; Tallberg 1999, 2002; Mbaye 2001), generally 
recognize compliance failures as significant and systematic. That is why the question as 
to why some countries under-achieve in translating agreed common policies into national 
operational policy has been taking control over the European research agenda since the 
early 1990s. Notwithstanding this scholarly fascination for implementation failures and a 
shared belief in the explanatory power of institutions, the management of EU legislation 
at the national level has so far been poorly documented and understood. Scholars’ strong 
craving for small-N comparative designs, favoring thoroughness at the expense of 
generalization, causes the field to be lacking in solid, theoretical insights.  
In contrast to scholars (e.g. Duina 1999; Caporaso and Jupille 2001) who establish how 
domestic institutional structures and routines complicate the process of domestic legal 
adaptation to European standards, others describe cases in which member states smoothly 
adjust their system to European demands, in spite of substantial institutional disparities 
between the member states and the path they used to follow. To explain these cases, the 
latter authors draw attention to institutional mechanisms, either arising from the rational 
choice train of thought (e.g. Haverland 2000; Treib 2003; Steunenberg 2004), from a 
sociological view on institutions (e.g. Dimitrakopoulos 2001), or from both (e.g. Knill 
and Lenschow 1998; Börzel 2000; Börzel and Risse 2003; Falkner 2005).  
Just like historical institutionalists uphold their own institutional version, rational choice 
and sociological scholars also have distinctive views on how institutions shape behaviour. 
Chapter 1 
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Within rational choice, institutions serve as rules of the game. These rules constrain 
actors’ individual maximizing, preference-driven behaviour, and enable stable and 
predictable decision-making (Peters, 1999). A fairly broad perspective on what an 
institution is, and how it affects its members, follows from the sociological perspective. 
Aside from explicit organizational rules and procedures, institutions include ideas, 
paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge (March and Olsen 1989). Hence, among 
sociologists, institutions include the more tacit, organizational norms on the basis of 
which members can act appropriately.   
Quantitative scholars seeking to detect more general trends have been checking up on the 
explanatory power of institutional theories. So far, they show a chief interest in cross-
country comparisons and macro-institutional variables, keeping analytical meaningful 
features of implementation cases beyond their scope of inquiry. Statisticians often content 
themselves with ready-made official data, a limited time scale, and pay no heed to policy-
specific patterns, so that sample bias may be a major cause for the spread of conflicting 
outcomes. Equally problematic is the lack of preciseness and consistency in the way 
scholars measure institutional key concepts, thereby leaving the field with tracks of 
unrivalled outcomes. This is especially true of the testing of propositions flowing from 
rational choice. The latter viewpoint on institutions tempted scholars to employ indicators 
that differ widely. The indicators used, vary from assumed preferences based on 
economic costs and benefits, party ideologies, to veto power at the national level (e.g. 
parliamentary involvement, government constellation), or at the European level (qualified 
majority voting versus unanimity voting). The effect of socialization on transposition 
behaviour has been advanced only recently. However, the applied measurement - 
duration of a country’s membership -  (see e.g. Mbaye 2001) is so far rather broad, and 
ignores the preconditions on which socialization is likely to alter behaviour. Another 
tendency, which may add to the theoretical confusion, is to blend new institutional 
theories together. Among scholars who seek to tune theory to the complex reality are 
Zürn and Checkel (2005), who developed a hybrid approach to institutional behaviour. 
They believe that rational considerations - like the costs of sanctions - may bring about 
appropriate behaviour. By adjusting their preferences to their deeds, actors tend to resolve 
the internal conflict that arises from actions and preferences being at variance. In these 
cases, appropriate behaviour precedes internalization of norms of appropriateness.  
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1.2 The research question  
On the whole, empirical research into varying levels of compliance leads to an 
accumulation of plausible accounts, of which the explanatory strength is often confined 
to the research sample under discussion. To change course, we need factual and inclusive 
renditions of national implementation practices in diverse policy areas, so as to establish 
whether, and how much, conditions that scholars hitherto neglected - like conditions that 
vary along with the policy area, or conditions that vary along with the spirit of times - 
may improve our understanding of dissimilar implementation behaviour.  
This research seeks to contribute to this understanding. It is part of a large-scale academic 
research programme, of which the main aim is to test systematically theoretical 
explanations for the time it takes member states to implement European directives into 
their national systems. Spearheaded by four PhD projects, the umbrella programme is 
concerned with cross-sector comparisons among five member states. My inquiry adds to 
this programme by analyzing how member states dealt with their transposition duties in 
the area of European social policies. In view of the continuous legislative activity in this 
policy field, the body of social directives is sufficiently diverse to compare, along with 
cross-country outcomes, variations across time and across policy issues. Adopting a 
critical stance towards the capacity of institutions being able to explain diverging 
transposition patterns, the main question this research seeks to answer is: Do major new 
institutional theories provide general explanations for varying levels of compliance with 
European policies? This question can be divided into the following subquestions: 
 
 How much do implementation records vary across time and across social 
policies? 
 
 Are ‘new institutionalisms’ capable of explaining these variations? 
 
In seeking answers to these questions, this research relies on a newly constructed dataset, 
of which the accuracy and dimensions go far beyond the commonly used Commission 
data. Unlike the official scores, this database lists transposition cases on the basis of all 
European social directives - including those that are no longer in operation - that have 
been enacted since 1957, the year the Community was established. Next, the database 
includes the actual transposition date of each transposition case. These data are accurate 
to a day, and permit separation of major transposition deficits from minor ones. The 
database, moreover, maps long-term developments, and draws a distinction between 
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policy issues within a single - yet theoretically diverse - policy area, namely social policy. 
Its long history and diversity is of consequence, since these qualities provide the context 
in which distinctive behavioural patterns may manifest themselves.  
Theoretically, this inquiry follows the pronounced institutional edge opened up by 
compliance scholars. It focuses especially, but not exclusively, on the rational choice 
theory of veto players, and the sociological perspective on social learning, so as to 
establish how much these leading viewpoints on institutions contribute to our 
understanding of regulatory compliance. Together with historical institutionalism 
(goodness-of-fit), these institutional perspectives play a prominent role in European and 
compliance research. Consequently, they are a major source for the current confusion 
over the robustness of dominant explanatory factors. To establish the value of new 
institutionalism in this field of research, it is important that the hypotheses to be tested are 
closely related to the basic assumptions that follow from the prime logics of these 
theories, as these logics also allow scholars to adopt a broad variety of interpretations, 
which fail to reflect the true nature of each distinctive institutional set of arguments. In 
other words, at this stage it is more important to evaluate the value of prevailing 
explanations than to open up a discussion on novel causal relationships.   
 
1.3 Official data and their shortcomings 
Since the mid 1990’s scholars have been highly productive in providing explanations for 
member states’ varying responses to the load of common legislation imposed on them. 
Although many scholars gave preference to a qualitative research design, quantitative 
researchers did not take a back seat. Unfortunately, the data that scholars utilize to detect 
variations, weakens the additional value of the greater part of quantitative inquiries into 
transposition. This is because - while taking stock of transposition scores - comparative 
quantitative researchers (e.g. Mendrinou 1996; Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998; Börzel 
2001; Mbaye 2001; Tallberg 2002; Giuliani 2003; Sverdrup 2004; Koutalakis 2004) 
generally rely on official transposition monitors and/or infringement statistics, as 
collecting exact data on transposition is a laborious undertaking.4 However, for reasons 
outlined below, Commission statistics do not constitute a proper groundwork for 
academic comparative inquiries into compliance. 
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1.3.1 Transposition deficits  
Unlike regulations,5 of which the EC Treaty rules that they are entirely binding and that 
their provisions are directly applicable in all member states, directives must - prior to 
their actual application and enforcement - be transposed into national law (Article 249 
EC Treaty). That is, domestic legal authorities must implement general legislative 
measures through which the directive’s articles are implemented into the national legal 
system. A signal to start taking such measures is the announcement of the directive’s 
adoption (Prechal 1995). Before a directive can generate its desired legal, economic, and 
social effects, member states have to transpose its provisions into national laws. Vitally, 
member states must transpose directives completely and correctly, and within the time 
limit set. If not, the Commission is authorized to take measures against the defaulting 
member state(s). In addition, article 211 of the EC Treaty stipulates that it is the 
Commission’s responsibility to monitor member states’ transposition rates. Two 
scoreboards exist that provide periodical information on member states’ application of 
Community law. Publication of these scores is believed to benefit the pace of 
transposition since the scoreboards establish a control point and put pressure on the 
laggards (European Commission, COM(2002)725 final).  
One scoreboard is kept by the Internal Market DG and is concerned solely with Internal 
Market directives, that is, all directives of which the Treaty defines that they act on the 
functioning of the Internal Market.6 Its deficit percentages refer to the proportion of 
Internal Market directives from which the Commission established that the member state 
concerned did not (fully) implement a directive; either because the state failed to notify 
its implementation measures, or because the Commission decided - after examination of 
the national notification - that its implementation measures do not suffice. A major 
weakness of the Internal Market scoreboards is that they only include effective directives; 
deficits with regard to directives that are no longer in force, remain beyond their scope.  
Another scoreboard is the one supervised by the Secretariat General (SG) of the 
Commission. Its scores refer to both Community directives in force and those no longer 
operative. These scoreboards simply reflect the number of national laws notified to the 
Commission.7 Because national notifications remain free from scrutiny at the 
Commission’s SG, the transposition rates of the latter scoreboards include incorrect or 
incomplete transposition cases.  
A more crucial failure of the two scoreboards is that their deficit percentages and 
transposition rates tell us little about the occurrence of non-compliance in the long run, 
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nor about the magnitude of deadline violations. This is because the official, periodical, 
rates are just a random indication of the state of implementation at the time of 
monitoring. That is, the Commission’s periodical deficit scores apply to a constantly 
changing body of directives. Transposition cases that inflated the earlier deficit score may 
be settled between two monitors, and replaced by new transposition cases outrunning the 
implementation deadline. Scholars who rely on these official transposition rates alone 
(Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998), or combine them with infringement data (Giuliani 2003), 
base their findings on defective statistics. The transposition deficit rates published by the 
Commission show the percentage of directives not yet communicated as having been 
transposed, in relation to the total number of Internal Market directives which should 
have been transposed by the deadline. From analyses of the official deficit rates of each 
member state we are unable to pronounce upon the level of compliance of a country, for 
the official rates do not distinguish minor deficits from serious ones. Besides, considering 
the amount of valid Internal Market directives (1620 as of 1 June 2006), the calculation 
method used by the Commission generates little variation between the transposition 
records of the member states. 
Mastenbroek (2003) was the first to prove that the Commission’s partial appraisals lead 
to an overly optimistic picture of implementation achievements. Her evaluation of how 
long it took Dutch ministries to transpose over 200 directives adopted between 1995 and 
1998 demonstrates that Dutch ministries were late in transposing almost 60 per cent of 
these directives, that is, after their respective deadlines. The severity of deadline 
violations varies, but may extend to several years.8 Such a high percentage of overdue 
transposition cases contrasts sharply with the Commission’s evaluation of member states’ 
transposition performance. The European Commission scoreboards suggest that member 
states’ deficit scores (ranging from 2.9 per cent in 1997 to 1.5 per cent in 2006 for The 
Netherlands) are negligible.  
 
1.3.2 Infringements 
If a member state fails to comply, and this failure attracts the Commission’s attention, the 
latter may start an infringement procedure against the member state.  
Infringement procedures may eventually be decided upon in the Court of Justice (Article 
226 - ex. Art. 169, CTEC). Reasoning that legislative transposition not necessarily equals 
compliance, many quantitative compliance scholars base their conclusions on these 
infringement data (for example, Mendrinou 1996; Mbaye 2001; Börzel 2001; Tallberg 
2002; Giuliani 2003; Sverdrup 2004; Koutalakis 2004). However, in common with 
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official deficit data, infringements take in just part of the transposition cases, so that 
infringement statistics generate biased sample selections. Infringements exclusively 
involve problematical transposition cases. Hence, studies relying on infringements rule 
out timely and correct transposition cases. Even if scholars intend to focus on problematic 
cases, unnoticed cases of non-compliance remain beyond their scope. In order to 
recognize cases of non-conformity, the Commission depends heavily on complaints and 
information from third parties, i.e. citizens, media, European Parliament. If these parties 
do not have any problems with incorrect or late transposition, compliance failures will 
escape infringement proceedings. Besides, even if the Commission decides to initiate an 
infringement, non-compliance does not necessarily cause an infringement. This is 
because two stages precede the stage of the Commission issuing a reasoned opinion; the 
stage scholars often use as their key variable. In these early stages, the Commission will 
try to come to a settlement with the member state. If negotiations develop satisfactorily, 
further proceedings against the member state will be called off (Craig and De Búrca 
2003). Notably, from among the total number of infringement proceedings started 
between 1978 and 2000, only 38 per cent reached the stage of reasoned opinions 
(Tallberg 2002).   
 
1.4  Principal explanations for non-compliance 
The main perspective, deriving from comparative politics and applied to the EU is new 
institutionalism. That is why institutions - i.e. formal rules, compliance procedures, and 
standard operating practices through which relationships in human society and 
organizations are structured (Hall 1986) -, and their influence on political action, occupy 
a prominent role in compliance research. Most scholars, except for Peters,9 distinguish 
three main new institutional perspectives - sociological, historical and rational choice -, 
each of them representing a distinctive logic of political behaviour.  
Since March and Olsen (1984) renovated the fundamentals of institutional theory, the 
puzzle of how institutions shape member states’ responses to obligations imposed on 
them by the EU has been a source of inspiration (see e.g. Knill and Lenschow 1998; 
Haverland 2000; Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2000; Héritier 2001; Börzel and Risse 2003; 
Börzel 2000, 2001, 2002; Mastenbroek 2003, 2005; Falkner et al. 2005). Among small-N 
studies dealing with implementation of EU policies, some emphasis is found on 
environmental policies, but also specific segments in social policies have been subject to 
in-depth research. Examples are those performed in the area of equal treatment (Ostner 
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and Lewis 1995; Duina 1999; Caporaso and Jupille 2001), health and safety at the 
workplace (Eichener 1995), and European Work Councils (Geyer and Springer 1998). 
Among them, a vast majority hypothesizes - and validates - that policy and/or polity 
misfits between European demands and national traditions affect the outcome. Again 
other qualitative inquiries into implementation outcomes in social policies (Van der 
Vleuten 2001), and environmental policies (e.g. Haverland 2000; Börzel 2000, 2003, 
Falkner et. al. 2005) cast doubt on the decisiveness of the misfit thesis. Instead, these 
scholars produce proof of other major institutional factors playing an equally important 
role.  
More general trends were researched by scholars who examined member states’ varying 
performance through quantitative analyses (e.g. Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998; Mbaye 
2001; Tallberg 2002; Giuliani 2003). However, just as little as case studies were 
successful in providing uncontested answers, so were large-N analyses incapable of 
unanimously corroborating either one of the new institutional theories. Most likely, and 
alongside the use of biased datasets, the sometimes glaring contradictions between the 
research outcomes have their origins in inconsistencies in the construction of independent 
variables. Even though each of the main new institutionalisms adopt different points of 
view as to the nature of institutional behaviour, their respective mechanisms tempted 
scholars to consider a wide variety of broad indicators, so much so that it is not always 
clear which theory lies at the heart of the hypothesis tested.  
 
1.5 Variance between and within countries 
So far, implementation research has been dominated by cross-country comparisons. As a 
consequence, scholars in this field are inclined to overly concentrate on macro 
institutional factors, so that conditions which are likely to vary within the countries 
remain beyond their scope. A limited sensitivity to the occurrence of diversity within the 
member states, may lead to purposive sampling and outcomes that are not accurate or 
reliable enough for making inferences about the nature of the total population itself 
(Babbie 1995).  
Vitally, compliance scholars have so far tended to overlook the fact that context 
circumscribes causality. For instance, as time goes by, conditions shaping key actors’ 
behaviour may change. Furthermore, it seems adequate to factor in that different policy 
areas - and within these areas, disparate policy issues - involve different behavioural 
logics. In sum, understanding member states’ responses to implementation duties, 
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requires appreciation of both the time dimension, and the policy dimension. Whether and 
how much these aspects add to our understanding of administrative and political 
behaviour, can be examined by researching a long-standing policy area, the key 
provisions of which are sufficiently diverse to allow for distinctions on theoretical 
grounds.  
 
1.6 An alternative approach to transposition 
 
1.6.1 European social policies  
To adopt a more accurate and reliable sample strategy than the one cross-country 
comparative analysts adopt, this research’s focus is on variations across time and across 
policy issues.  
European social policy has a long history, since the need to harmonize the social systems 
of the member states was already felt in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Besides, European 
social policies involve a wide variety of issues. Social areas addressed in the Treaty were 
concerned in particular with the improvement of working conditions and standards of 
living for workers, so that European social policies were sufficiently compatible with the 
economic goals of the Treaty. To be exact, article 118 entrusts the Commission with the 
task of promoting ‘without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaty and in 
conformity with its general objectives, close co-operation between member states in the 
social field’. These fields would particularly relate to employment, labour law and 
working conditions, vocational training, social security, prevention of occupational 
accidents and diseases, occupational hygiene, the right of association, and collective 
bargaining between employers and workers. Article 119 of the Treaty stipulates that 
member states should apply the equal pay principle, irrespective of gender, whereas 
article 121 refers to the implementation of common measures as regards social security 
for migrant workers (Treaty Establishing the European Community 1957). Member 
states’ eagerness to endorse laws in this area varied dramatically, and periodical shifts 
from strong scepticism to sheer optimism typify the governments’ attitude towards 
Europe’s social dimension (Nielsen and Szyszczak 1997; Hantrais 2000; Hervey 1998). 
Nonetheless, the adoption of directives in this workforce-oriented - yet diverse - area has 
gradually increased. Taking all social policies as its starting point, this research allows for 
a more profound understanding of varying levels of compliance than do past inquiries 
into this policy field. That is, the dataset is sufficiently inclusive to compare next to 
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cross-country outcomes, variations across time and policy issues. The vast amount of 
directives (over 100) that have been enacted between 1957 and 2004 allows for such 
quantitative comparisons.  
Both the long history of social policy and the heterogeneity of this policy field ensure that 
distinctive transposition patterns will be brought to light, not only across countries, but 
also across time, and across policy issues, the hallmarks of which are clearly theoretical.  
Firstly, a common desire among the member states to harmonize occupational health and 
safety regulations has generated an unremitting flow of directives, thereby committing 
employers in the member states to adapt conditions in the workplace to EU standards. 
Regulatory activity in social policies such as equal treatment, workers’ rights, and 
working time has been far less pretentious. The degree of stringent regulations within 
policy areas is interesting in light of the sociological, rational choice, and historical 
institutionalism, the three new institutional perspectives which are at the centre of this 
research.   
Sociological institutionalists, who emphasize the importance of socialization and social 
learning, would say that these mechanisms are more effective amongst officials dealing 
with occupational health and safety regulation, than amongst officials dealing with 
policies where Europe’s interference is less intensely felt. Likewise, historical 
institionalists - arguing that a misfit between European policies and national policies 
slows down the transposition process - would expect that the persistency of policy misfits 
between European provisions and national law depends on Europe’s assertiveness. This is 
more the case in areas where European harmonisation has been given continuous priority, 
with the result that the flow of European legislation inevitably ends up dominating 
domestic law, and policy misfits cease to exist. Secondly, the nature and scope of 
European social provisions is another meaningful distinction likely to affect the power of 
explanatory variables emanating from rational choice. For rational choice scholars, who 
explain political behaviour in terms of policy preferences and/or veto power, it is of 
interest that, as compared to general social provisions, health and safety provisions not 
only involve less key players, but also are least subject to conflicts of interest. This is 
because health and safety directives are most of all concerned with technical - workplace 
related - issues, while the remainder of social directives affects more general labour 
conditions, the effect of which goes well beyond the working environment alone.  
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1.6.2 The member states  
Full transposition records of five member states will be compared. These member states 
include The Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Greece. These 
countries vary in theoretically meaningful features. That is, the transposition records of 
these countries ensure sufficient variation in key macro institutional variables - veto 
players, conditions for socialization - derived from the theories central to this research. 
Crucially, the characteristics of the countries of inquiry do not bias the outcomes of the 
explanatory variables. Other member states may secure similar variations in these macro 
institutional variables. However, given this research’s quantitative approach, it is 
important that the transposition burden of the countries is sufficiently high. This applies 
to the founder member states, and from among the new members, applies also to the 
United Kingdom, Greece, and Spain. Together with Portugal and Ireland, the latter 
countries entered the Union at a relatively early stage. Therefore, the body of 
transposition cases they generate is comparatively high. In addition, analyzing these 
countries allow me to contribute to the umbrella research programme. 
 
1.6.3 Solid data 
This research is more accurate and precise in constructing the dependent variable than 
other quantitative studies. As an essential first step towards a true appreciation of the 
seriousness of transposition deficits, and the precise nature of variations, the research 
provides factual comparative statistics on transposition duration and the occurrence and 
magnitude of deadline violations. Given the limitations of official EU deficit and 
infringement statistics, these statistics draw on the gathering of new data that allow for a 
more rigorous measure of compliance. With this, it follows Mastenbroek, who measures 
transposition deficits in terms of transposition delays, referred to in the present study as 
overdue transposition. In addition to overdue transposition, this research introduces a 
more objective measure to implementation behaviour, namely transposition duration. 
Scores on this variable may provide evidence that the transposition process itself 
develops regularities, independent of the time European legislative authorities consider 
appropriate for transposition.  
 
1.6.4 Research method 
In order to answer the central research question this research adopts a quantitative 
method of inquiry. Rather than adding new predictors to the potential explanatory factors 
advanced in earlier work, it seeks to establish the robustness and generalizability of major 
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institutional explanations. A qualitative method is not good at providing generalizable 
conclusions. In addition, a qualitative method is unfit for a simultaneous analysis of 
transposition behaviour in many dimensions. Making comparisons across countries, 
across time, and across policy issues requires a dataset that offers sufficient variation and 
is sufficiently large to permit the drawing of distinctions between theoretically 
meaningful subpopulations.  
Hypotheses - among them two key hypotheses - will be tested using multiple regression 
analysis. The two key hypotheses rest on the assumptions of two opposing approaches 
within the institutional school of thought - the rational choice perspective, and the 
sociological perspective. The former perspective assumes that the time used for 
transposition increases with the number of veto players involved in the process. The 
sociological perspective assumes that learning through interaction among key players 
would be beneficial for their transposition performance.   
These hypotheses are sufficiently clear so as to provide the behavioural logics that are the 
result of prevailing, institutional theories, and to explore their association with 
compliance, which, so far, has not been at all clear. 
In addition, the theoretical model considers the occurrence of policy misfits, the principal 
delaying factor arising from historical institutionalism, as one of the control variables. On 
the assumption that rational behaviour may bring about norm following behaviour, the 
model also considers a mixed approach to institutions. By way of testing the individual 
strenght of these explanatory variables, the research anticipates their simultaneous 
occurrence, but also prepares for their explanatory power being conditional upon 
contextual factors such as decade and policy issue. Hence, the research employs a 
strategy that takes the results of cross-national studies seriously. In addition, it anticipates 
variations across policies and across time. Taking these dimensions - which vary within 
rather than between countries - seriously into account may help us to refine our 
understanding of the causal relationship between institutions and implementation.  
 
1.7   Outline of the book  
The structure of this book is as follows. Chapter 2 starts with a discussion of past 
inquiries into national responsiveness to legislative obligations as a result of a country’s 
EU membership. Chapter 3 proceeds with the theoretical framework on which the 
analyses are built. It includes, alongside the three main new institutionalisms, major 
control variables. Chapter 4 continues by dealing with the operationalization of 
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explanatory key concepts. Chapter 5 justifies the research design and accounts for the 
choices made in conducting this inquiry. Chapter 6 proceeds with a detailed description 
of member states’ transposition performance. Alongside cross-country comparisons, the 
chapter isolates health and safety directives from other social provisions, and new 
provisions from amendments. The chapter, moreover, evaluates changes across time. In 
order to examine the power of leading explanations for observed variations, Chapter 7 
deals with the outcomes of regression analyses. Apart from the overall results, the chapter 
sets apart groups of transposition cases in order to establish how robust and general the 
explanatory factors are. The final chapter, Chapter 8, provides a summary of the research, 
wraps up the main conclusions resulting from the analyses, and puts forward suggestions 
for future research.  
 
Endnotes
                                                     
 
 
1 The procedure, by which the European Parliament and the Council enact legislation together, dates from 
the introduction of the co-decision procedure under the 1992 Treaty of the European Union, also known as 
the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU 1992).   
2 See http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/repert/index.htm for the directory of Community legislation. 
3 The Internal Market Directorate General provided this information in 2004. 
4 Exceptions are Mastenbroek (2003, 2005), Kaeding (2006), and Berglund, Gange, and Van Waarden 
(2006).  
5 EU institutions generally are free to decide whether to legislate by means of regulations or directives. 
Exceptions are freedom of establishment, liberalization of specific services, approximation of national 
provisions affecting the establishment or functioning of the common market, harmonization of national 
systems granting aid for export to third countries, working conditions (see Arts. 44, 46(2), 52, 94, 96, 
132(1), and 137(2) of the consolidated version of the EC Treaty 2002). Directives have a preference in 
policies where complex and voluminous national law has to be adapted to European provisions. Leaving 
member states the choice of form and methods, a directive can bring about the necessary changes while 
respecting the national legal systems (Prechal 1995; Craig and De Búrca 2003).  
6 Examples of areas considered not to affect the Internal Market are habitat, fauna and flora, animal 
protection (‘wild birds’), bathing water, statistical surveys, export credits/insurance.  
7 This information is made available in two formats: by member state, and by sector (http://europa. 
eu.int/comm/ secretariat_general/sgb/droit_com/index_en.htm). 
8 Similar high deficit percentages arise from later analyses comparing transposition of transport directives 
(Kaeding 2005), and utilities, and food legislation (Berglund, Gange, and Van Waarden 2005) in five 
member states. Invariably, the proportion of overdue transposition approximates 60 percent of all cases. 
9   In his 1999 publication Peters distinguishes at least six different new institutional versions. 
  
2 INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO EU COMPLIANCE 
 
 
‘If there were only one truth, you couldn’t paint a hundred canvases 
on the same theme’ (Pablo Picasso) 
 
 
 
The ambituous European Internal Market strategy led to high regulatory activity, and its 
mounting legislative burden enforced on the member states, stimulated compliance 
scholars to embark upon EU related implementation research. Scholarly attention was 
above all focused on the transposition of European directives,1 which is a first, yet 
decisive stage in the implementation process. Only then national authorities and 
addressees can actually enforce and apply European law. The switch from domestic to 
European policymaking and implementation resulted in a vast amount of qualitative 
inquiries into various policy fields. Most scholars, nonetheless, were expressly focusing 
on environmental and social policies, as also the 1986 Single European Act extended 
Community powers in these policy areas. At the centre of interest within social policies 
were member states’ responses to equal treatment (Ostner and Lewis 1995; Hoskyns 
1996; Armstrong and Bulmer 1998; Duina 1999; Caporaso and Jupille 2001; Van der 
Vleuten 2001). In addition, implementation of health and safety measures at the 
workplace (Gier 1991; Eichener 1995; Dotan and Van Waarden 2002), and European 
Work Councils (Geyer and Springer 1998) were subject to careful scholarly investigation.   
As opposed to initial EU studies, emphasizing the importance of legislative transparency 
at the European level, and administrative efficiency at the domestic level (e.g. Pressman 
and Wildavsky, 1973), later inquiries called attention to the role of parliaments and 
interest groups (Azzi 1985, Siedentopf and Ziller 1988). Since the 1990s, institutions and 
their impact on the process have dominated the European research agenda. Consequently, 
the findings of a vast production of comparative analyses on EU compliance are 
supportive of one institutional perspective over the other.  
The main purpose of this chapter is to show the variety of research findings, most of them 
boiling down to a new institutionalist explanation for diverse implementation behaviour. 
Section 2.1 discusses how institutions re-established their position in comparative 
politics. Sections 2.2 through 2.4 demonstrate how the one approach to institutions gains 
in importance, meanwhile downgrading the explanatory power of its institutional 
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counterpart. While the focus of these former sections is on the array of outcomes arising 
from qualitative inquiries (Duina 1999; Knill and Lenschow 1998, 2000; Haverland 
2000; Caporaso and Jupille 2001; Van der Vleuten 2001; Dimitrakopoulos 2001; Börzel 
2003; Falkner et al. 2005), Section 2.5 examines the contribution of quantitative studies 
into compliance (Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998; Mbaye 2001; Tallberg 2002; Giuliani 
2003; Mastenbroek 2003, 2005; Sverdrup 2004). The final section (2.6) lists the chapter’s 
main findings. 
 
2.1 New institutionalism 
Until the mid 1990s, literature on the European Union was dominated by International 
Relations accounts on the cause and direction of European integration as a process, of 
which the upward development was far less straightforward (see e.g. Urwin 2003; 
Wallace et al. 2005; Bach and George 2006) than the previous chapter suggests. 
Maintaining that the EU should be examined as a more or less stable system rather than a 
political process, it was Hix (1994) who argued in favour of a comparative politics 
approach to the EU, and excited scholars’ interest in explaining the combined action 
between the EU and the member states.  
The main perspective, deriving from comparative politics, and applied to the EU is new 
institutionalism. This theoretical convergence applies to small-N studies (e.g. Ostner and 
Lewis 1995; Duina 1999; Knill and Lenschow 1998, 2000; Haverland 2000; Börzel 2000, 
2003; Caporaso and Jupille 2001), and large-N studies alike (Lampinen and Uusikylä 
1998; Mbaye 2001; Giuliani 2004; Tallberg 2002). The appreciation of institutions 
amongst integration scholars is not completely new, however. Scharpf’s (1985, 1988) 
detection of the joint-decision trap, generating sub-optimal policy outcomes in systems 
with multiple levels of political authority, unanimity decision rules, and a status quo 
default option, coincided with March and Olsen’s 1984 publication, re-establishing the 
importance of institutions in political science. As opposed to old institutionalism, which 
was, above all, interested in the legal and administrative structures of formal institutions, 
the new version portrays institutions as ‘the formal rules, compliance procedures, and 
standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various 
units of the polity and economy’ (Hall 1986, p. 19). Its core assumption is that 
institutions affect outcomes, although different scholars perceive the influence of 
institutions on social action in seemingly incompatible ways. Most scholars distinguish 
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three main institutional perspectives - sociological, historical and rational choice 
institutionalism -. Each perspective stands for a distinctive logic of political behaviour.  
 
Table 2.1 Dimensions of institutional explanations 
 Historical Sociological Rational choice 
Logic of action Path dependency Appropriateness Consequentiality 
Actors’ 
preferences(1) 
Endogenous Endogenous Exogenous 
Choices guided 
by 
Domestic institutions 
(legislative tradition), 
crisis’ 
European norms Domestic preferences 
Temporal 
dimension 
institutional 
effects(2) 
Long term Long term Short term 
Transposition 
outcome in 
terms of 
timeliness 
If no misfit between 
directive provisions 
and national 
traditions, directive 
will be transposed 
timely 
If socialized, lead 
ministry strives to 
perform according to 
(all) EU norms, 
including timely 
transposition 
If the number of veto 
points or veto players 
is relatively small, 
timely transposition 
is more likely to 
occur 
(1) and (2)  derived from Aspinwall and Schneider (2001) 
 
 
A comparison of the characteristic features of new institutionalisms (table 2.1) shows that 
each of them provides quite different images about the logic of action, and the sources 
that guide their preferences, and decisions.   
The focus of historical institutionalism is on the ways in which prior commitments and 
institutional and policy stickiness condition further action. This logic - referred to as path 
dependency - limits the scope of what is feasible and causes actors to redefine their 
interests (Pierson 1996; Bulmer 1997; Schneider and Aspinwall 2001). New demands, 
like those following from EU directives, bring about adaptation pressures on a member 
state’s institutions and policy, and member states’ response to these pressures depends on 
the degree of misfit between domestic traditions and a directive’s provisions. In terms of 
transposition speed, the generally applied proposition is that the higher the degree of 
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misfit between the directive’s requirements and the national policy tradition, the more 
arduous the directive’s implementation. The corollary is that, in case of a low degree of 
misfit, member states are likely to adjust their legislation before the deadline, and in 
accordance with European demands.  
Rational choice is another leading approach to institutions. Its logic of consequentiality 
results in alternative propositions as regards transposition outcomes. Rational choice 
scholars see policy outcomes as a product of veto players looking after their own 
interests. Institutions are now perceived as a set of rules that actors create and use 
strategically for the achievement of their fixed - exogenous, determined prior to 
participation - set of preferences (Schneider and Aspinwall 2001; Peters 1999). If applied 
in the domain of transposition, the latter theory expects that the more legislative stages a 
proposal for a policy change has to pass, the longer transposition will take. Dominant 
rational choice perspectives are the veto players theory (e.g. Steunenberg 2004, 2005; 
Tsebelis 2002), and the theory of veto points (e.g. Haverland 2000).  
 
A third approach that literature frequently refers to is sociological institutionalism, of 
which the guiding principle is the logic of appropriateness. Appropriate or exemplary 
norms - which encompass cognitive as well as normative components - are structured by 
institutions, internalized by the members of these institutions, and subsequently 
institutions shape policy decisions and their subsequent outcomes (March and Olsen 
1995, pp. 30-31). In the realm of transposition, this theoretical perspective suggests that 
national actors internalize EU norms as normal, and right, through processes of social 
learning and persuasion (Checkel 2001, pp. 26-27). This results in timely norm 
compliance, ‘without or, in spite of, calculating the return they expect from alternative 
choices’ (March and Olsen 1998, p. 21).  
 
2.2 Domestic traditions and routines 
Typically, many studies into EU law compliance were guided by the assumption that the 
challenge European law poses to domestic institutional structures and routines would 
obstruct adaptation to European standards. Given that studying the interplay between 
Europe and its members is a complex task, especially if one seeks to establish the 
compatibility of European demands with national traditions and routines, most scholars 
chose to approach the issue of non-compliance through small-N comparative research 
programmes. Due to the conflicting outcomes of successive studies, a general belief in 
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the explanatory power of historical institutional logics faded in time. Adherents of the 
historical approach, like Duina, show that directives, despite their apparent technical 
content, have challenged national institutions and the fundamental values of at least some 
of the member states. For that reason implementation yields different outcomes. He 
illustrates his thesis by means of in-depth examination of the fate of two directives, 
including the Equal Pay Directive2 (75/117EEC) in France, Italy and the United Kingdom 
(Duina 1999). Likewise, Caporaso and Jupille (2001) assess the goodness-of-fit3 between 
Europe and domestic provisions. Their focus is on the adaptation of France and the 
United Kingdom to the EU equal pay and equal treatment legislation. Adaptational 
pressure, they assure, does not smoothly translate into national structural change. Instead, 
pre-existing institutions and practices4 mediate these pressures and influence structural 
outcomes. These authors conclude that the impact of European change on domestic 
structures is not due primarily to agency problems, to time limitations, or to unintended 
consequences. European policies and institutions run up against domestic structures, 
often creating confusion and conflict. The resulting process of adaptation is highly 
political, an outcome broadly supportive of historical institutionalism.  
More cautious statements about the power of historical traits follow from inquiries by, 
amongst others, Knill and Lenschow (1998), Van Vleuten (2001), Börzel (2000, 2003). 
Knill and Lenschow submit that new regulatory demands, which fail to match existing 
institutional arrangements at the national level, are more likely to meet resistance than 
demands that make a good fit. Nonetheless, the latter authors could explain only few of 
the cases they researched by an exclusive focus on the ‘goodness-of-fit’. The remainder 
of the cases called for additional actor-based explanations. Transposition responsible 
actors, they argue, assess European demands ‘in the light of existing domestic rules and 
standard operating procedures which provide meaning to them’ (Knill and Lenschow 
1998, p. 7). Hence, national traditions affect both their strategies and their preferences. 
The degree of adaptation pressure increases with the extent to which challenged 
administrative arrangements are institutionally rooted. They distinguish different 
‘adaptation paths’. Minor adjustments following from EU requirements exert low 
adaptation pressure, and are smoothly implemented as an effect of socialization.  In cases 
of moderate adaptation pressure, rational choice is more capable of explaining varying 
adaptation results. If European demands require fundamental institutional changes, 
national resistance to administrative reform is to be expected.  
On the grounds of environmental policy implementation in Germany and Spain, Börzel 
(2000, 2003) is confident that a policy misfit is a necessary condition for failures to 
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comply with European law. However, even if policy makers and/or target groups 
consider the policy misfit significant, and the costs of compliance as too high, pressure 
from below (mobilization of public opinion), and pressure from above (the Commission, 
and the threat of penalties by the latter) are major factors that induce compliance.  
Reasoning the other way around, whilst looking at France, Germany, The Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom and their adaptation to European gender equal treatment 
provisions, Van der Vleuten (2001) concludes that despite their huge costs and 
inconvenience, member states accept these policies, due to lack of political dynamics at 
the domestic level, and lack of coalition potential at the European level.  
 
2.3 Political resistance 
Concurrent research in this and other policy fields more rigorously throws doubt on the 
value of historical institutionalism to transposition, by producing proof of rational choice 
mechanisms playing an equally important role.  
Haverland’s comparison of policy and regulatory changes in the United Kingdom, 
Germany and The Netherlands as a consequence of European packaging waste policies, 
shows that, irrespective of the seriousness of misfits between European demands and 
national traditions, it is the number of institutional veto points that shape the rate and 
quality of EU policy implementation (Haverland 2000).  
Unlike institutional veto points which refer to all legally required steps in the decision-
making process, the veto players’ theory focus is on the preference configuration among 
actors on whose agreement a change of the (legislative) status quo depends. Steunenberg 
(2004), for instance, substantiates the explanatory power of the latter theory on the basis 
of the tobacco products directive (2001/37/EC).  Its late transposition was a result of 
conflicting interests between the Dutch government and the governing parties, and the 
need to implement the directive’s requirements through new, instead of lower-level, 
transposing instruments.  
Also Treib (2003) argues that the misfit-thesis has a limited explanatory power. Instead, 
he stresses that it is the governments’ preferences - defined by the party politics of the 
governing party - influencing a country’s attitude towards the transposition of EU 
directives. Likewise, the general outcomes of the extensive comparative programme5 
realized by the project group headed by Falkner (2005) challenge the misfit thesis’ 
expectation. Only 22 per cent out of 90 cases they analyzed, fully confirm the (legal) 
misfit thesis, while 40 per cent of all cases contradict its explanatory power.6 Decisive for 
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policy implementation outcomes is the style in which a nation handles European 
legislative demands. Their ‘three worlds of compliance’ assumes the veto player 
argument to prove its relevance in, among others, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain and 
the United Kingdom - countries which the authors classify under ‘a world of domestic 
politics’ - a realm in which political interests prevail over cultural aspects. Among the six 
countries grouped under their ‘world of neglect‘, is Greece. Typically, countries 
belonging to the latter group do not pursue compliance with European law. Their 
bureaucratic systems are inefficient, overloaded and non-attentive. In these countries non-
compliance is the rule rather than the exception, no matter what the ‘fit’.  
 
2.4 Norms and socialization 
Falkner’s findings - at least those relating to Greece - are supported by Dimitrakopoulos 
(2001). Key characteristics of the Greek central government, such as the lack of 
coordination at the political and administrative level, and politicization of the 
administrative system, complicate compliance. However, governments improve their 
performance through learning and steering, although this significantly depends on 
political willingness to use available resources, and the occurrence of critical events 
justifying the use of new techniques. The means by which the Commission can exercise 
its power (in this example the Commission withheld funding) largely depend on the 
policy area. Dimitrakopolous believes that changes spill over from one subfield to 
another within the same policy area. When the Commission used conditional funding to 
encourage the implementation of public works directives in Greece, the Greek 
government introduced new techniques to improve the implementation practices in the 
public works sector. The use of these techniques was not confined to the latter sector but 
spread out to the supplies sector, despite the fact that in this sector the Commission lacks 
incentives (conditional funding).  
Recent efforts to link sociological institutionalism to diverging levels of EU law 
compliance lead up to norm-based explanatory frameworks (e.g. Beach 2005; Dimitrova 
and Rhinard 2005). The typology of norms launched by Dimitrova and Rhinard (2005) 
elaborates on Hall’s types of ideational change (1993). They make a distinction between 
first-, second- and third-order norms. First-order norms like health and safety norms, 
typically address specific groups of actors, while second-order norms (e.g. environmental 
norms) affect the wider political community. Third-order norms (e.g. gender equality) are 
even more general and deeply rooted in society. Conflict between different types of 
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norms may generate ambiguities, which in turn engender time-consuming debates among 
more actors, including those high in rank (Dimitrova and Rhinard 2005). Accordingly, it 
is likely that directives merely touching on first-order norms will be transposed faster 
than directives touching on norms of a higher order. This is because transposition of the 
latter may involve more resistance. An analysis of the transposition process of the anti-
discrimination directives (Council Directive 2000/43/EC and Council Directive 
2000/78/EC) in Slovakia illustrates their point. Dimitrova and Rhinard suggest that 
persuasion and socialization eventually lead to a norm change, even when a norm is 
incompatible with higher order norms. 
 
2.5  Large-N studies 
Case study findings have been most helpful to scholars who sought to identify more 
general trends by means of large-N studies. Although quantitative analyses broadened the 
empirical and theoretical scope, most of them (except Mastenbroek 2003, 2005) 
continued to search for cross-country differences, rather than for differential, and 
changing practices within the member states. These studies, moreover, are similar in that 
a vast majority (except Mastenbroek) draws on samples arising from Commission data. 
Nonetheless, the findings of these studies are as diverse as the statements following from 
small-N studies.  
Lampinen and Uusikala (1998), while drawing on the Commission’s 1990-1995 
implementation data7, find that from among four explanatory variables,8 political culture 
and the design of political institutions in the member states have the most significant 
impact on member states’ implementation behaviour. With reference to Easton (1965) 
they conceptualize political culture as a set of beliefs, ideas, and activities that together 
influence a system’s political input and performance (1998). Countries that combine a 
high level of trust and political stability (reflecting a country’s willingness) with efficient 
and flexible political institutions (reflecting a country’s ability to implement) are most 
successful in implementing European policies.  
Mbaye (2001) distils from ECJ cases (1971-1993) all cases that reflect a failure to fulfil 
Treaty obligations. Nine out of twelve explanatory variables she puts to the test are 
insignificant, including veto players, and the use of qualified majority voting. Only three 
factors - bureaucratic efficiency, bargaining power in the Council and elite learning - turn 
out to have a significant beneficial effect on implementation.  
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Sverdrup (2004) uses EU data on infringement proceedings (1995-2002) to establish that 
administrative ability accounts for much of the variation in compliance. States that score 
high on government effectiveness indicators have few disputes and settle infringements 
in an early stage. Similar to Falkner et al. (2005), Sverdrup (2004) speaks of a good-
compliance culture in the Nordic countries. Giuliani (2004) combines deficit and 
infringement statistics of the Commission to establish that veto players play a significant 
role in improving member states coping capacity. Only coordination capacity and 
networking activity seem capable of overcoming the shortcomings of the macro 
institutional architecture of a member state.  
By way of exception, Mastenbroek analyzed actual transposition delays (in days) in The 
Netherlands through survival analysis. She shows that - next to the goodness-of-fit - other 
factors substantially enhance the conditional probability of transposition. These are the 
legal instrument used, the lead ministry, the EU-decision making procedure, and finally 
the mere passage of time and the deadline approaching nearer (Mastenbroek 2003).  
 
2.6  Institutional predictors: how robust are they  
A major difficulty that goes with European compliance studies is the confusion they 
generate over leading explanatory factors. In part, this is an effect of scholars’ preference 
for small-N studies, which in the main are incapable of giving general outcomes. Equally 
problematical is that many large-N studies in this field of research suffer from a similar 
limitation. Alongside technical or statistical differences between them (e.g. Lampinen 
and Uusikylä’s regression analysis applies to only 11 cases) comparative quantitative 
studies on member states’ level of compliance usually build on disparate and weak 
operationalizations of key factors. Therefore, the results of these studies frequently lack 
credibility. 
Firstly, for measuring member states’ rate of compliance a vast majority of scholars 
either rely on the Commission’s transposition scores or on infringements reported by the 
Commission. The demerits of these scores received ample treatment in Chapter 1. A 
similar lack of precision and consistency typifies the measurement of independent 
variables. The need to cut explanatory concepts down to the bone induced compliance 
scholars to develop a wide variety of single indicators, which fail to seize the complex 
nature of the theory that lies behind it. The tendency to oversimplify a theory’s key 
mechanisms is especially evident amongst scholars who derive propositions from rational 
choice. Exemplary is the widespread expectation in the context of European social 
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policies that left-wing governments promote swift transposition, whereas right-wing 
governments would delay the process (e.g. Treib 2003; Linos 2004). Given that 
harmonizing European social policies is in the interest of both employees and employers, 
left-right preference scales not only oversimplify but also misconceive political parties’ 
preferences. Likewise, left-right wing positions on European integration in general (e.g. 
Linos 2004) are rather narrow reflections of political preferences. Others predict that 
politicians base their preferences on public opinion so as to enhance their re-election 
prospects. If citizens support EU membership, governments find it easier to implement 
European provisions (e.g. Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998; Mbaye 2001). Alternative 
proxies for rational players’ preferences are the assumed economic costs and benefits for 
a country (e.g. Linos 2004).  More commonly, rational choice propositions stress the 
importance of veto power, either at the national level (e.g. parliamentary involvement, 
government constellation), or at the European level (e.g. qualified majority voting vis-à-
vis unanimity voting). For example, the probability that member states comply with a 
directive is likely to increase if they adopt the directive under unanimity rule. This is 
because unanimity voting would enable national authorities to negotiate and bring the 
directive’s provisions close to their own ideal point (Fearon 1998; Mbaye 2001).  
Although there are good examples of careful quantitative approaches to the (re-) 
socialization capacity of Council working parties and how they affect national 
bureaucrats who participate in them (e.g. Beyers 2002; Trondal 2002), quantitative 
inquiries into the effect of socialization on EU law implementation are less accurate and 
precise. Mbaye (2001), for instance, operationalizes socialization through the duration of 
a country’s membership. However, by looking at this factor alone, Mbaye ignores 
additional necessary conditions for socialization such as the intensity of interaction (e.g. 
Trondal 2002).  
Acccurate operationalization of the historical institutional misfit thesis is complicated, 
which is partly due to the lack of consistency of the theory itself. The literature on 
historical institutionalism is confusing. Hall and Taylor (1996), for instance, make a 
distinction between the historical calculus approach, and the historical cultural approach. 
The calculus approach assumes that actors are driven by instrumental, strategic behaviour 
and define their preferences exogenously from institutions. In the cultural approach actors 
are embedded in a world of institutions and their preferences are endogenous. Actors 
attain their goals by behaving in accordance with established routines or familiar patterns 
of behaviour. Peters (1999) argues that ‘path dependency’ does not necessarily occur in a 
straightforward way, since institutional rules and structures can cause a reaction to the 
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problems they themselves have caused. If the initial choices prove to be inadequate, 
institutions must find means of adaptation or will cease to exist. The above nuances make 
it difficult to get hold of this theory’s logic. Besides, a systematic and profound 
operationalization of the misfit thesis, as accomplished by Falkner et al. (2005), who 
aggregate data on policy misfits, polity misfits, and economic costs of a directive for each 
member state, is not feasible if the dataset is made up of a huge number of cases. Policy 
misfits require the establishment of significant misfits between the directive’s contents 
and national law. Polity misfits feature the incompatibility of European administrative 
demands and domestic administrative routines while the costs reflect the economic 
consequences for the parties who are addressed by the directive. Given that directives 
often address various policy issues and may include a multitude of administrative 
demands, it is inevitable that quantitative researchers content themselves with broad 
indicators. Hence, some emphasize the importance of polity misfits (Knill and Lenschow 
1998), while others test the impact of policy misfits (e.g. Mastenbroek 2003; Kaeding 
2006), or the economic costs going with the implementation of a directive (Linos 2004). 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The conflicting statements arising from case studies of implementation, give ample cause 
for questioning the generalizability of outcomes. Notwithstanding the profundity case 
study research allows for, their scope is limited. That is, their outcomes are case-specific 
and more general trends remain invisible. At the same time, quantitative analysts’ 
common reliance on official statistics and their lack of conceptual consistency has 
resulted in a patchwork of possible - yet not necessarily robust - theoretical accounts for 
varying levels of compliance. Rather than convincingly substantiating the relationship 
between institutional logics and compliance, they produce results that merely give 
institutional explanations the benefit of the doubt. 
Crucially, large-N studies would gain from more consistent and precise 
operationalizations of their key dependent and independent variables. In addition, by 
giving priority to cross-country variations, it remains unnoticed how member states’ 
dealing with European policies changes over time. Mapping and explaining these changes 
widens the scope of EU implementation research because they allow us to gain an insight 
into how Europe acts on the member states on top of insights into member states’ 
occasional management of transposition obligations. Subsequently, several outcomes 
(e.g. Dimitrakopoulos 2001; Mastenbroek 2003) discussed in this chapter suggest that 
Institutional approaches to EU compliance 
 
29 
 
differentiation between policies and/or policy issues is useful. In order to produce some 
order out of the present theoretical confusion, close examination of differences within the 
countries seems more fruitful than adding new explanatory variables to the puzzle again. 
Next, and along with recognizing the nature and course of varying levels of compliance, 
it is of major importance to appreciate and keep apart the complex logics of dissimilar 
new institutional strands.  
 
Endnotes
                                                     
 
 
1 Only few scholars went into the final stages of implementation, i.e. the enforcement and application of 
European law at the domestic level (e.g. Azzi 1988; Lipsky 1980; Walters 2002; Versluis 2003). 
2 The second directive is the Sulphur Dioxide and suspended Particulates (Smoke) in the Air.  
3 Here the fit is ‘good’ when substantive equality (e.g. pay equality between men and women) in the 
member states satisfies the expectations and requirements of European policy ‘equal’  ‘pay’, ‘treatment’, 
‘work’, and ‘value’. Another indicator concerns the extent to which domestic procedures (avenues for 
legal recourse to perceived victims of discrimination, job-evaluation schemes facilitating the comparison 
of the value of different jobs and provisions) satisfy the requirements of European law.  
4 As regards the mediating factors, Caporaso and Jupille retain a strict institutional focus on public agencies 
and legal arenas and state-society relations.  
5 The analyses of Falkner et al (2005) concern the implementation of six labour law directives in fifteen 
Member States. 
6 The authors ranked the remainder (38 per cent) of their cases under ‘medium adaptational pressure’. For 
these cases the misfit thesis does not provide clear expectations. 
7 The Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law contains statistics about the 
implementation ratios of directives and the infringement of treaties in each member state. 
8 Lampinen and Uusikylä distinguish four main independent variables: political institutions, degree of 
corporatism, citizens’ support for the EU, and political culture in the member states. 
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
‘Without theory, practice is but routine born of habit’  
(Louis Pasteur) 
 
 
 
Central to this chapter is the issue of how competing behavioural logics flowing from 
new institutionalism contribute to our understanding of varying compliance patterns. 
Unlike scholars who assume unchanging nationwide implementation styles, this 
research’s point of departure is that the way in which countries deal with European 
demands is subject to additional factors. Firstly, internal and external developments may 
induce changes in actors’ management of transposition. Institutions may warrant some 
stability over time. This is not to say that institutions never change. Considering the 
ongoing process of Europeanization, and national systems being overhelmed by 
Community law, a gradual transformation of national institutions is inevitable, even if 
features typical of a country shape these transformations (Cowles et al. 2001).     
Secondly, the way in which national authorities deal with transposition duties is likely to 
depend on policy type and the novelty and scope of provisions set in a directive. 
Mastenbroek, for example, concludes on the basis of EU implementation practices in The 
Netherlands that the ministry charged with the task of transposing a directive, is one of 
the key explanatory factors for performance variance. Ministries with a clear-cut division 
of responsibilities between negotiators and lawyers, coordinate the transposition process 
less well than the ministries that lack such a strict division (Mastenbroek 2003, 2007).    
In order to systematically test the power of new institutional explanations, this chapter 
presents a theoretical framework which relates the most intense opponents within the 
institutional school of thought - the rational choice, and sociological perspectives - to the 
speed of transposition, and to the magnitude of deadline violations. In addition, the model 
considers the occurrence of policy misfits, which is the principal delaying factor arising 
from historical institutionalism, as one of the key control variables.  
Common expectation is that institutions shape policy outcomes - in this research, defined 
as national-level policy changes dictated by European directives. The legislative 
authorities of the EU generally have considerable choice whether to legislate by means of 
regulations or directives.1 The bringing into play of directives is particularly marked in 
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areas where the member states already have complex and substantial provisions. Having 
respect for national styles, directives leave member states the choice of form and methods 
to transpose into their national law a directive’s essential provisions (Prechal 1995). 
Nonetheless, the ends to be met are set out in considerable detail,2 while decisions of the 
European Court of Justice enforced the consequences of this instrument (Craig and De 
Burca 2003, pp. 114-115). To achieve the objectives set out in the directive, member 
states usually need to change existing law. The signal to prepare for transposition is the 
announcement of the directive’s adoption (Prechal 1995).  
The following sections formulate expectations as to how rational actors (Section 3.1), and 
socialized actors (Section 3.2) would respond to their transposition duty. From each 
perspective a proposition will be derived, followed by the conceptualization of their 
respective explanatory elements. Supplementary to the two rival theories, the analytical 
framework controls for two alternative institutional perspectives. The first control 
variable approximates the historical institutional misfit thesis. In early case studies the 
occurrence of either polity or policy misfit often came to the fore as a major explanation 
for non-compliance, but today the explanatory power of this factor is highly disputed (see 
for example Falkner et al. 2005). Considering the limited time span of the greater part of 
comparative inquiries, and the long term perspective taken in this inquiry, this research 
examines whether scholars’ scepticism about the impact of historical institutional 
constraints is justified. A second control variable, formally labelled strategic calculation - 
but in the next chapters referred to as strategic adaption -, flows from a rather hybrid 
view on institutions. It is a product of the present tendency to merge new institutional 
theories. The theory’s main argument is that, even if driven by rational considerations, 
like, for instance, high fines for countries disregarding their Treaty obligations, strategic 
behaviour may under specific circumstances end in norm following behaviour. Section 
3.4 sets down the propositions flowing from these alternative perspectives to institutions.  
 
3.1 Rational choice and its logic of consequentialism  
According to rational choice institutionalism, policy outcomes are the result of both a 
country’s institutional setting and the preferences of political actors whose agreement 
with the policy change is legally required. The fundamental principle of rational choice 
institutionalism is that choices of political actors rest on rational considerations. Policy 
choices are said to be rational if they are in accord with actors’ preferences and beliefs 
(Shepsle and Bonchek 1997, p. 19). Hence, given their beliefs, political actors would 
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block a directive’s transposition if the policy change dictated by it does not correspond 
with their preferences.  
Beliefs refer to the actors’ sense of how the decision-making process works, and which 
instrument or behaviour they judge most appropriate to get what they want. Beliefs may 
come from a variety of sources. Unlike traditional rational choice theory, which states 
that the origin of beliefs need not to be resolved, the rational choice institutional 
perspective adds the assumption that actors’ beliefs are grounded in the institutions in 
which they take part. It is expected that the institutional rules of the game constrain 
actors’ individual maximizing, preference-driven behaviour and enable stable and 
predictable decision-making (Peters, 1999).   
Within the rational choice line of reasoning, institutions are nothing more than formal 
institutions that result from a country’s political system. These institutions involve 
coordination structures and decision rules. They function as a source for an actor’s 
beliefs, and provide information about his or her behavioural options considering the 
available instruments. Institutions - which are assumed to persist with some degree of 
stability over time - involve interactions based on specified relationships between groups 
of individuals. 
Preferences refer to the wants of political actors as regards the final policy outcome. 
Unlike beliefs, preferences are taken as ‘exogenous’, that is, actors defined them prior to 
their participation in the institutions, of which this research seeks to establish how they 
affect transposition speed. The rational choice line of thought is not fascinated by the 
source of these preferences. Preferences are dealt with as ‘given’, irrespective of their 
origin. They may be grounded on material considerations like, for instance, perceived 
adjustment costs, or they may draw on immaterial considerations such as religious values, 
moral precepts, common interests, or ideological dispositions. It follows that preferences 
vary with an actor’s identity. A final remark relates to the steadiness of preferences, that 
is, rational choice takes up preferences as being constant (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997, pp. 
16-17), or, in other words, preferences are not assumed to change much in the short term.  
Now that the basic principles of rational choice institutionalism have been defined, the 
remainder of this section will be concerned with the transformation of these principles 
into testable hypotheses. The section proceeds as follows. Firstly, it starts with a 
discussion of the theoretical angle that offers, in my view, the best approach to adopt, 
considering its appreciation of both actors’ beliefs, and their preferences. Subsequently, 
the chapter presents propositions that follow from this theoretical perspective, and 
specifies the newly introduced concepts.  
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3.1.1 Rational choice and veto power   
Bearing in mind that rational choice scholars assume preferences to vary with the identity 
of actors, while institutions are more or less stable, this section draws on the rational-
choice perspective on veto power. This perspective assumes that veto power distribution 
in political institutions affects policy outcomes, including the pace at which legislative 
authorities transpose directives into their national legal systems. The importance of veto 
power, expressed by way of veto points or veto players, gained recognition in both 
comparative politics, and EU studies. As opposed to veto point theory, of which the main 
argument is that the more stages in the decision-making process on which agreement is 
legally required for a policy change, the more likely it is that the process suffers delays 
(see, for instance, Haverland 2000), veto players theories include an extra dimension, i.e. 
the preferences of veto players as regards the final policy outcome. This view on veto 
power predicts that, if many veto players have substantially different interests, it will be 
difficult for them to agree on a change of the domestic status quo policy. That is why 
policy makers, whose proposals need the consent of many veto players, very often have 
to acquiesce with mere incremental policy changes (Tsebelis 2002).  
How does the latter expectation relate to transposition speed? After all, by becoming an 
EU member, national governments agree to accept the obligations that follow from the 
EC Treaty and the laws made under it. Negligence in fulfilling these obligations may 
result in the European Commission starting an infringement procedure against a member 
state on the basis of the Treaty (Article 226 - ex Article 169, CTEC), which could end in 
a financial penalty (Article 228 - ex Article 171, CTEC). Aside from enforcement, an 
additional motive for a member state to comply comes from, for instance, Garrett 
(1995).3 Governments believe that in the long run they profit from the EU legal system 
going with a well-functioning Internal Market. These long-term gains eventually go 
beyond governments’ short-term incentives not to comply.  
On the strength of these arguments, I assume that member states consider a directive’s 
transposition as a duty they have to deal with sooner or later. As a consequence, they will 
reconcile themselves to a change of the status quo on domestic policy. Based on these 
arguments, and provided that adoption of a directive’s provisions calls for a change of 
member states’ status quo policies, this research does not adopt a dependent variable for 
any likelihood of there being a directive’s transposition. Instead, the proposition drawn 
from rational choice will be concerned with the relationship between veto power and 
transposition speed.  
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3.1.1.1 Theory of veto players 
Among those engaged in theory development on the effects of veto power distribution in 
political institutions (for example Lijphart 1984, 1999; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; 
Colomer 1996; Schmidt 1996; Fuchs 2000), the theory developed by Tsebelis (2002) is 
commonly accepted as the most prominent perspective on veto players affecting policy 
outputs. Through his systematic approach, Tsebelis seeks to offer a unified theory on 
political institutions that can be applied to a wide variety of political systems. His theory 
moves beyond analyses that presume a relationship between a single characteristic of a 
political system, and policy outcomes, which he criticizes for being underdeveloped and 
unfit to produce consistent results. This is because these analyses fail to reckon with the 
complexity and interaction effects of political institutions. Tsebelis insists that 
consistency can be achieved by defining generally applicable conditions under which 
actors co-determine policy outcomes, and under which circumstances they do not. It is 
the main elements of this theoretical perspective on veto players that I choose to test.  
Each political system features a specific configuration of veto players. Veto players are to 
be understood as individual or collective actors who have the authority to block proposed 
legislative changes. Their veto power either follows from a country’s constitution 
(institutional veto players), or from a country’s political system (partisan veto players) 
(Tsebelis 2002, p. 19). Most importantly, it is not the number of veto players by itself, but 
the presence and magnitude of differences in preferences - in the work of Tsebelis 
conceptualised as ‘ideologies’ - that affect the set of outcomes to replace the status quo. If 
this set of outcomes (the win-set of the status quo) is small, the decision-making process 
fails to yield an outcome that strongly deviates from a member states’ existing policy.  
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The above spatial models illustrate Tsebelis’ propositions. In figure 3.1 the preferred 
policy of veto player A as regards, for example, workers’ protection through working 
time regulation, corresponds to point 1 in the centre of the circle. The four points (P, X, 
Y, and Z) elsewhere in this policy space represent substitute - though less preferred - 
policies. Veto player A is indifferent between points X and Y,4 but prefers P to either of 
them. This is because policy alternative P is closest to the policy he prefers most. 
Similarly, veto player A prefers X and Y over Z: again, because the alternative policy 
represented by X and Y is closer to the most preferred policy than the alternative Z is. 
Starting from this illustration of a single veto player’s preferences, the next discussion 
moves on to a model featuring three veto players so as to demonstrate how disparate 
policy preferences hinder initiatives to alter existing policies.   
Figure 3.2 stands for a system with three veto players A, B, and C who decide by 
unanimity (Tsebelis 2002, p. 22). The small circles are the so-called circular indifference 
curves; they symbolize the policy space of the respective veto players. SQ1 and SQ2 each 
represent a different position of the status quo. The core (the shaded area in the graph) 
stands for the set of points with an empty win-set, that is, the points that cannot be 
defeated by any other point if we apply the decision-making rule, which is, in this 
particular case, the unanimity rule. To detect the win-set of SQ1, the indifference curves 
of A, B and C that pass through SQ1 have to be drawn. This results in an intersection, 
which is the zigzagged area in figure 2. It shows that a limited capacity to moving away 
from existing policies is a consequence of the involvement of many veto players with 
significant ideological distances in the decision-making process. The larger the 
ideological distance between the most extreme veto players, the more likely it is that a 
change to the status quo will be difficult to realize. It follows that country-specific 
institutional arrangements cannot be directly decoded into statements about the number 
of veto players. This is because it is only the actors who embody extreme ideologies as 
regards the proposed policy change that count. Actors who are centrally located can be 
ignored, while additional veto players whose ideological position fits in the unanimity core 
of existing veto players will be absorbed (Tsebelis, 2002). 
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Fig. 3.3  Winset and core of a system with four veto players; player D absorbed 
 
 
 
  
 
 
    
   Source: Tsebelis (2002, p. 28) 
 
Figure 3.3 illustrates a decision making process in which one of the veto players is 
absorbed. To the three earlier introduced veto players (see figure 3.2), one additional veto 
player (D) has been added. Since D’s ideal point (most preferred policy) is located inside 
the unanimity core of A, B, and C, he does not affect the win-set of A, B, and C, 
regardless of where the status quo is. Only if D would fall beyond the unanimity core of 
A, B, and C, the unanimity core is expanded, and may, depending on the SQ position, 
restrict the win-set of the status quo (Tsebelis 2002, p. 28).  
Tsebelis assigns a special role to the agenda setter, that is, the political actor who makes 
the proposal for a policy change to other actors who, for their part, can accept or reject 
the proposal. If the policy process involves just one veto player, this single veto player is 
also the agenda setter providing for him some leeway to decide on the selection of 
outcomes. But even if more veto players have a voice in the process, the agenda setter is 
assumed to have an important re-distributive advantage over others, because he is the one 
who can select the point he prefers from the whole win-set of the others. The advantages 
of the agenda setter increase if his preferred policy is located centrally among the 
preferred policy of existing veto players. The advantage of agenda setting declines with 
the number of veto players or with increased ideological distances between them. This is 
because the win-set of the status quo becomes smaller, or, in other words, because the 
policy stability increases (Tsebelis 2002, pp. 33-37).  
Relating these principles to the day-to-day transposition practice, calls for a precise 
conception of identity, interaction and power distribution between individual and/or 
collective veto players in the five member states. From country reports (Berglund 2004, 
Gange 2004, Kaeding 2004, Mastenbroek 2003, Romeijn 2004, Steunenberg et al. 2005) 
some generalities emerge. Firstly, in the five countries of inquiry the central government 
is authorized to transpose EU law into national legislation by way of the powers national 
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parliaments delegated to them. Secondly, in each of the five countries the lead ministry, 
that is the ministry which has jurisdiction over the policy area in question, is entitled to 
issue a first transposition proposal. It is this ministry that specifies, by virtue of its 
resources and expertise as regards the directive’s basic elements, the required policy 
change. Most often the adoption of this proposal takes the approval of additional national 
authorities. Whether or not his proposal requires the consent of additional veto players 
depends on the type of legislation used for a directive’s transposition. Unless the national 
system rules that the provision may be issued on behalf of more than one ministry, the 
general format found in the member states rules that lower level instruments such as 
ministerial orders, do not require approval of additional parties. Conversely, in the event 
of transposition through government decrees or law, additional players potentially do 
have a role. Government decrees generally require the approval of the cabinet, while laws 
need the consent of both the cabinet and the parliament. 
A final consideration that may add to a further refinement of the explanatory power of 
veto players is a country’s degree of decentralisation. That is, Tsebelis argues, when both 
bicameralism and qualified majorities bring about an increased number of veto players. 
Since these conditions are often found in federal states, the latter generally have more 
veto players than unitary ones (Tsebelis 2002, p. 141).  
With reference to the beliefs and preferences of the key players, assumptions may be 
made. The beliefs of the potential veto players are assumed to be anchored in their formal 
functions and responsibilities. As for their preferences, key actors are not assumed to 
pursue their individual interests, but instead articulate the preferences of the political 
party they represent in government, or parliament. The preferences of key actors will be 
inferred from detailed and long-term data on parties’ preferences made available by Budge 
et al. (2001). The programmatic data variables these authors provide, involve policy 
positions of parties across countries on the basis of quantitative content analyses of election 
programmes.  
 
3.1.1.2 Rational choice hypothesis  
The testing of Tsebelis’s theory requires the construction of a composite measure of 
which the scores rely on a chain of decisive factors that together define which actors are 
factual veto players. Typically, these factors include country-specific legislative 
instruments, national practices as regards their drafting and ratification, and the assumed 
(political party) preferences of additional veto players vis-à-vis those of the agenda setter 
with regard to the directive. Even though deciding on the number of veto players is a 
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multifaceted task, the hypothesis that follows from Tsebelis’s assumptions is 
straightforward:  
 
RCI-1  
Provided that a directive requires a change in the status quo with respect to national 
policy, the greater the amount of veto players in the transposition process, the more time 
transposition takes, and the more likely it is that transposition will be overdue. 
 
Corollary:  
The smaller the amount of veto players in the transposition process, the less time 
transposition takes, and the less likely it is that it will be overdue. 
 
The proposition’s assumed relationship between veto power and speed of transposition 
follows from mechanisms hypothesized in the work of Tsebelis. On the one hand, 
Tsebelis predicts that a large number of veto players prevents significant changes in the 
status quo. Elsewhere, Tsebelis states that the difficulty in enforcing a significant change 
in the status quo increases with the number of veto players (Tsebelis 2002, p. 37), 
The latter moderate proposition towards changes of the status quo seems more acceptable 
in the realm of transposition. This is because, on balance, member states are co-
responsible for the development and functioning of the Internal Market programme. 
They, moreover, have the duty to implement EU directives by virtue of their EU 
membership, and risk costly penalties if they don’t. Hence, by virtue of their EU 
membership, member states must transpose a directive sooner or later, and because of 
that, they need to adjust national legislation. These legislative adjustments will change 
the domestic status quo. Hence, in the event of transposition, it is not so much a question 
of whether the national status quo will change, because eventually it will change. The 
point at issue is the time it takes member states to achieve this. Veto players’ theory 
assumes that the time it takes to change the status quo varies with the number of veto 
players. This is because political actors will use their veto power to bring the new 
(transposing) policies up for debate, and they may even try to have it amended if it is not 
in accordance with their preferences.  
 
3.1.1.3 Changing the status quo  
This research assumes that the transposition of a directive generally calls for a change in 
the status quo with respect to domestic policy. So in order to achieve this, the agenda 
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setter prepares a proposal. In the event of transposition, the agenda setter is the minister 
heading the lead ministry in transposition. The latter ministry has the resources and 
expertise as regards the directive’s basic provisions, and has jurisdiction over the policy 
area addressed by the directive in question. The lead ministry issues a first transposition 
proposal, by specifying the policy change it considers necessary. It is assumed that this 
transposition proposal meets the objectives set in the directive, so that transposition does 
not cause the Commission to start an infringement procedure against the member state due 
to non-conformity.  
Strictly speaking, it is the directive’s provisions, compared to the national status quo that 
are conclusive as to the nature and extent of changes. Since EU directives leave member 
states some room to manoeuvre in pursuing the appropriate means to transpose them, I 
assume that the agenda setter determines what changes to the status quo arise from a 
directive. Only if the agenda setter decides that a directive’s transposition does not 
require new legislative instruments, is the domestic status quo not challenged. Such 
transposition cases merely refer to national legal instruments of which the enforcement 
date precedes the directive’s adoption date. Accordingly, for these transposition cases the 
veto players’ theory fails to offer predictions as regards transposition speed. A decision to 
leave national legislation as it is may be justified, or not. France, for example, insisted 
that existing French provisions provided pregnant women sufficient or even better 
protection than the European directive on pregnancy leave. It took some years before 
France gave in to European pressure to align its legislation with the requirements of the 
directive (Falkner et al. 2004; European Commission 2003). 
 
3.1.1.4 Formal veto players 
Recent EU compliance studies also include, alongside the formal veto players, actors who 
are informally authorized to block decisions. Steunenberg, for example, suggests that, in 
the realm of EU decision-making, national administrations and national parliaments are 
on a more or less equal footing. National administrations involved in a directive’s 
formulation may even be more important than national parliaments, because the former 
are more familiair with EU policy than national parliaments are (Steunenberg, 2004, p. 
4). However, inclusion of veto players who lack formal authority to block changes in the 
status quo seems inopportune if the aim is to test the veto players’ theory quantitatively. 
This is because unlike the role of formal veto players in the process, the responsibilities 
and potential power of informal veto players are unknown. Likewise, and more 
importantly, the preferences of informal players remain unknown, and it is precisely this 
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factor that defines whether or not a veto player affects the size of the win-set of the status 
quo. Hence, even if governments delegate legislative competences to civil servants, I 
follow Tsebelis, who assumes that the policy outcomes civil servants pursue are 
acceptable to the members of government (Tsebelis 2002, p. 138).  
In sum, I define a potential veto player in the legislative game as any formal collective 
actor whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo. Hence, the power to 
veto is restricted to collective actors whose right to reject adjustments to existing policies 
is laid down in the constitution (or in statutes, if a country has no written constitution, 
like in the United Kingdom). Among collective actors, the research considers political 
parties in government, and political parties in parliament as potential veto players, 
provided that the legislative instrument(s) used for transposition requires their approval. 
This is generally not the case, if transposition can be achieved by means of a ministerial 
order. This low level instrument does not require approval of additional parties, and the 
minister heading the lead ministry (agenda setter) will be the only veto player, unless the 
national system rules that the provision can be issued on behalf of more than one 
ministry.  If not, the ministers heading these additional departments subsequently come 
into play, and the preferences of the parties they represent will be compared with those of 
the agenda setter.  
The agenda setter is the first veto player in the process, and his preferences are consistent 
with the preferences of the political party he represents. Accordingly, each transposition 
case involves at least one veto player, i.e. the agenda setter.  Additional veto players are 
players in government and/or parliament whose consent is necessary for the enactment of 
the legislation used for transposition, and whose preferences not only do diverge 
substantially from the preferences adhered to by the agenda setter, but also diverge most 
strongly from the agenda setter’s preferences, if weighted against the preferences of 
other players. To explain this, reference is made to the earlier discussed absorption rule: it 
is only actors who embody extreme ideologies as regards the proposed policy change that 
count as a veto player. Actors whose preference is centrally located can be ignored, 
whereas additional veto players whose ideological position fits in the unanimity core of 
existing veto players will be absorbed. 
Likewise, the impact of additional signatories - that is potential veto players different 
from members of government and/or parliament - will be evaluated on the basis of their 
assumed party political preferences. Whether a potential veto player adds to the factual 
number of veto players, depends on the ideological distance between the parties’ 
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preferences they adhere to, and the parties’ preferences represented by the first veto 
player in the process, that is, the agenda setter.  
As regards the nature of party political preferences, the focus of this research is on policy 
preferences, that is, preferences that are conceptualized as ideological positions of 
political parties with respect to policy-specific requirements in the directive. Rational 
choice scholars usually qualify preferences as being fixed. However, the altering nature of 
specific policy preferences together with the substantial period of time covered by this 
research calls for an appreciation of policy preferences changing over time.  
 
3.1.1.5 Veto players and their political scenery 
Tsebelis maintains that it depends primarily on the composition of governments whether 
or not coalition parties in government, or, in case of law, opposition parties in parliament, 
are sufficiently powerful to veto legislation. While single party governments often have 
full discretion in changing the status quo, multiparty governments generally do not. They 
are only capable of making incremental changes. He differentiates between minimum 
winning coalitions, minority governments and oversized governments. In minimum 
winning coalitions, each party in government is a potential veto player and the 
preferences of parliament do not deviate from government proposals, as long as parties 
have a hold over their parliamentary members. In minority governments, the agenda 
setting party cannot force through its will without other parties’ support. Accordingly, 
preferential positions of these parties will not be ignored. In oversized governments the 
agenda setting party can afford to ignore the preferences of other parties, as long as they 
attain parliamentary majority without their votes.  
 
Table 3.1 Most occurring government configurations (1975-2004)5 
  NL DE UK ES EL 
Single 
party 
Minority    ■  
Majority   ■ ■ ■ 
Multiparty Minimum 
winning 
■ ■    
Oversized ■ ■    
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Table 3.1 summarizes the type of governments that typically emerge in the five member 
states (for detailed government configurations, see annex 1).6 With the exception of the 
United Kingdom (plurality system), and Germany (additional member system), the 
member states use the proportional representation (PR) system to elect members of the 
Lower Chamber. Attaching priority to the concept of proportionality, PR systems assure 
that the votes cast for parties accurately transform into seats in parliament. Nonetheless, it 
is only in The Netherlands where the PR system warrants proportionality, generally 
bringing about minimum winning coalitions, except for the periods 1981 and 1989-2001 
when oversized governments ruled the country.  
It is owing to the electoral systems applied in Greece and Spain that the PR system 
produces single party governments. This is because the distributive formula these 
countries use for the division of seats in parliament, favour large parties over small ones. 
In Spain the Lower Chamber elections in 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, and 2004 produced 
single party minority governments. In all other periods either the PSOE (Socialist Party), 
or the PP (Conservative Party) occupy a majority of seats in parliament. Also in Greece it 
is either New Democracy (Conservatives) or PASOK (Socialists) making up the 
country’s single party (majority) governments. In the United Kingdom single party 
majority governments7 are a consequence of the plurality system.8 In Germany, to close 
with, the additional member method of seats allocation guarantees proportional 
representation and produces multiparty, and - with the exception of 1972-1989, and 2002-
2004 - oversized governments (Gallagher et al 2001).  
In sum, considering the government configurations in the countries of inquiry, 
application of Tsebelis’ argument would remove most variation between the member 
states. This is because the most frequently occurring configurations rule out the role of 
parliament. However, as explained in Section 3.1.1.2, this research is not so much 
concerned with veto players preventing significant changes. Instead, I expect that 
changes will be carried through sooner or later, and it is the relationship between veto 
power and the speed of implementing policy changes which is the central issue. In this 
context the aptness of Tsebelis’ assumptions about government-parliament relationship is at 
least questionable, and the reason why I refrain from adopting Tsebelis’ government 
configuration propositions.  
 
3.1.2 Government changes 
Until now governments have been portrayed as fixed bodies. In reality, however, during 
the transposition process one or more government changes may have taken place, bearing 
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in mind also the sometimes lengthy transposition time granted in a directive. On that 
subject Tsebelis states: ‘The variable that matters for the veto players’ theory is the 
partisan composition of government. Therefore, two successive governments with 
identical composition should be counted as a single government, even if they are 
separated by an election, which changes the size of the different parties in government’ 
(Tsebelis 2002, p. 168). Thus, theoretically, government changes add to the number of 
factual veto players, provided that ideologies of new governing parties significantly differ 
from ideologies of the governing parties that were replaced, but only in cases that 
implementation was not realized before the government change. Nonetheless, I choose 
not to confuse the effect of veto players with the effect of governmental change. 
Considering veto players’ theory emphasis on ideological distances (and less so on the 
precise nature of party’s ideologies), serious misinterpretation of the effects of 
government changes may be the result. Firstly, highly diverging ideologies between 
subsequent governments may entail diametrically opposed transposition outcomes. If the 
outgoing government is replaced by a government that radically opposes a directive’s 
provisions, transposition will most likely be overdue. However, overdue transposition is 
less likely to occur (or may be less severe), if the new government agrees with the 
directive’s provisions, while the outgoing government did not. Secondly, whether or not 
government changes delay the transposition process, largely depends on the timing. The 
earlier in the transposition process the new government is installed, the more likely its 
influence on policy outcomes. However, given the length of time this research takes up, 
the exact timing of a government change in relation to the decision stage in the 
transposition process cannot be tracked down. Government changes may thus bias the 
outcomes of the veto players’ theory, as also stagnation in transposition may be caused 
by indecision and hesitance among actors other than veto players, who are uncertain 
about how to proceed in times of government changes. Briefly, it is expected that 
government changes negatively affect the speed of transposition, although theoretically, 
the cause and direction of their impact is not at all clear, hence  
 
RCI-2   
Under the assumption that ideologies of new governing parties significantly differ from 
ideologies of the governing parties that were replaced, government changes during the 
transposition process are likely to adversely affect transposition speed, and the more 
probable that transposition will be overdue.  
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3.2 Sociological Institutionalism and its Logic of  Appropriateness  
As against its new institutional rivals, sociological institutionalism most accurately 
echoes the ‘thick’ institutional perspective March and Olsen allude to in their 1984 
appeal to restore the role of institutions in political science. Its perspective on what an 
institution is, and how it affects its members, is fairly broad. Institutions include 
organizational routines, procedures, roles, conventions, strategies, structures, and 
technologies. They, furthermore, include ideas, paradigms, codes, cultures, and 
knowledge (March and Olsen 1989). Hence, apart from explicit organizational rules that 
define ‘who is entitled to do what, when and how’, the concept also refers to the more 
tacit, deep-rooted organizational norms from which members can tell how they ought to 
behave. It is precisely these implicit, prescriptive norms, and their assumed effect on 
individual behaviour that sets apart the sociological perspective from the rational choice 
one.   
Basically, the sociological institutional approach assumes that political and social 
institutions define the norms of appropriate behaviour, and transmit these norms to their 
members. Rather than appraising the outcomes of various behavioural options, actors 
choose to comply with socially constructed norms of appropriateness. This is why 
sociological institutionalism is closely associated with social constructivism. Both 
sociological institutionalism and social constructivism emphasize how actors’ identities 
and interests are being modelled by processes of interaction, and not modelled prior to 
their interaction (Smith 1991, p. 244).  
Unlike the concept suggests, a norm of appropriateness is not normative in itself.  What 
kind of behaviour an actor perceives as appropriate is largely culture-specific, and 
situation-bound (March and Olsen 1989). In everyday reality, individuals participate in 
various societal and political organizations. Accordingly - having internalized a variety of 
norms, and having developed multiple identities - actors command a vast repertoire of 
norms of appropriate behaviour (March and Olsen 2004). Even if actors are inclined to 
codify the various norms they internalized, they repeatedly run into incompatibilities 
(March and Olsen 1989). This is why compliance with any specific norm is not 
automatic. Neither is norm internalization inevitable, unidirectional, arranged, or 
irreversible (Weaver and Rockman 1993). 
The process through which organizations transmit to their members, norms that define 
what is natural, just, and legitimate, is referred to as socialization, generally defined as 
the process that causes individuals to conform to the norms and rules of a given 
community (Dawson and Prewitt 1969; Checkel 2005; Hooghe 2005). However, norms 
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are difficult to measure, and socialization leading to norm obedience is a relatively 
complicated cognitive process, involving reasoned thinking. It is partly due to the 
complexity and intangibility of the social dynamics that the penetration of these ideas 
into political science took a long time, even if ideas of institutions socializing their 
members are deep-rooted and widely spread. However commonsensical the socialization 
concept may be, scholars who seek to clarify the mechanisms at work, so as to show how 
they affect political behaviour and policy outcomes, are confronted with a difficult, 
methodological challenge. Firstly, because socialization is a long-term process, and does 
not produce immediate effects. Aside from that, an emphasis on methodological 
individualism in the 1970s and 1980s brought about a disproportional fascination for 
utility maximizing behaviour, and prevented research on normative incentives from 
expanding (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Progress has been made, however. Both 
sociological institutionalism and social constructivism have been diligent in examining 
how, and to what degree, social construction processes produce norms of appropriateness 
(Hooghe 1998; Checkel 1999; Beyers 2002; Beyers and Trondal 2003; Egeberg 1999). 
By confronting theory with day-to-day practices these authors have demonstrated that 
portraying the behaviour of actors as norm obedient is only the first step towards 
hypothesising how European norms may lead to sustained compliance based on the 
internalization of these norms. That is, simply assuming that EU institutions are capable 
of engendering norms of appropriateness, and automatically transferring these norms to 
national officials directly involved in the implementation of European law, is not 
convincing. Instead, the testing of the relationship between the logic of appropriateness 
and transposition speed, requires a more profound examination of processes and scope 
conditions that may encourage actors to prioritize European norms over earlier 
behavioural standards.  
Before discussing these processes and scope conditions, the concept of a norm of 
appropriateness will be briefly examined in order to clarify why this key concept is less 
suitable in accounting for variances in transposition duration or overdue transposition.  
   
3.2.1 Norms of appropriateness 
When documenting different categories of norms across disciplines, a common 
distinction is the one between regulative and constitutive norms. The first category 
organizes and constrains behaviour, while the latter type brings into being new actors, 
interests, or categories of action (Searle 1995; Katzenstein 1996; Ruggie 1998; also 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). These formal rules are to be distinguished from the type of 
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norms in which sociological institutionalism and social constructivism have a joint 
interest, i.e. evaluative or prescriptive norms. These norms embody a notion of inter-
subjective ought-ness and shared moral evaluation, which demarcates them from 
alternative types of norms. They involve standards of appropriate behaviour. Where 
social constructivists label these behavioural standards norms, sociological 
institutionalists label them institutions. Even if both concepts refer to the same 
behavioural rules, the norm definition refers to single standards of behaviour, whereas 
institutions refer to a set of integrated behavioural rules (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). 
To be more precise, norms are generally defined as a standard of appropriate behaviour 
for actors with a given identity. Institutions, for their part, are defined as relatively stable 
collections of practices and rules (March and Olsen 1998). This distinction is important, 
if one seeks to apply a norm-based approach. That is, if not carefully used, scholars run 
the risk of downplaying an institution as a norm, and failing to recognize the collection of 
norms, rules and practices that structure the institution (Finnemore 1996). 
Similar caution must be applied in compliance research dealing with EU directives, as if 
each directive represents one single norm. Most often, they do not. To give an example, 
directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004, 
settles the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the member states. Hence, the directive is concerned with a 
fundamental norm that follows from the internal market, that is, free movement. The 
directive also refers to various other norms. The directive defines, for instance, who are 
to be considered as family members, and who are not, and insists on a registration duty to 
register his or her presence within the territory of the host member state. These and other 
secondary norms in the directive cannot be deduced from a directive’s title. This means 
that scholars who hypothesize that different norms lead to varying transposition outcomes 
need to systematically analyse each directive, and separate each norm addressed in it.9 
Obviously, for large-N studies a word-by-word analysis of all directives is not feasible. 
Aside from feasibility considerations, the relationship between a directive’s norms and 
transposition speed is not at all clear. Firstly, if a member state is determined to fully 
integrate the directive norm into its national legislation, adaptation and enactment of 
transposing legislation is then likely to be more time-consuming, than are superficial 
adjustments. Besides, even if a directive is transposed in time, one can never tell whether 
a norm transfer actually took place.  
Given the pitfalls of norm-oriented approaches, this research focuses on the process of 
socialization, rather than on national responses to specific European norms. Socialization 
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mechanisms, and the scope conditions that go with it, will be discussed in the next 
section.  
 
3.2.2 European socialization: processes and mechanisms 
It is especially social constructivist research into the transfer of international norms to the 
domestic arena which best approximates the process of EU directives’ transposition. 
Drawing on current findings with regard to international group dynamics, the following is a 
discussion of distinctive causal mechanisms and scope conditions which take effect in the 
process through which European institutions may provide standards for appropriate 
behaviour. 
Among social constructivists, it is above all Checkel (1999), who made up for the alleged 
lack of precise arguments and hypotheses in earlier times (e.g. Moravcsik 1999). 
Checkel’s propositions build on two interrelated mechanisms and contain detailed scope 
conditions under which socialization is likely to occur. A first mechanism, which he 
labels social learning, is defined as a route whereby actors, through interaction with 
broader institutional contexts (norms or discursive structures) acquire new interests and 
preferences - without evident material incentives (Checkel 1999).  
Persuasion/argumentation is subsequently the mechanism through which social learning 
is likely to take place. The process is a voluntary and cognitive one, involving convincing 
argumentation and open and honest debate (Checkel, 1999, 2002).10 Adapting to recent 
insights, Checkel refines these two mechanisms, which he now labels role playing, and 
normative suasion. In case of role playing actors take up certain roles because they are 
appropriate in that particular setting. These roles are triggered by group environments, in 
which individual behaviour is governed by routine. The role playing mechanism by itself, 
does not involve reflective internalization of norms. It is only through normative suasion, 
that agents actively and reflectively internalize new understandings of appropriateness. 
Arguments and attempts at persuasion - talking - may change an actor’s most basic 
characteristics. In other words, normative suasion induces actors to internalize arguments 
that make them behave appropriately (Checkel 2005, pp. 808-812).  
Elaborating on his earlier work, Checkel speaks of a logic of consequences adjusting into 
one of appropriateness, rather than using a strict norm language. Sharing Habermas’s 
ideas of communicative rationality, he distances himself from the theoretical ideal types 
(Checkel 2001a, 2001b; see also March and Olsen 1989). This blending together of rival 
mechanisms, does not affect the core of the sociological logic. That is, the series of 
mechanisms are precise in defining situations in which actors are likely to adapt to new 
Chapter 3 
 
48 
 
norms, thereby replacing alternative behavioural standards. The very nature of actors’ 
previous standards, that is, whether or not they were ruled by earlier norms of 
appropriateness - does not affect the sociological character of the mechanisms nor does it 
affect any accompanying scope conditions.  
 
3.2.3 Socialization hypothesis 
So as to establish the explanatory component of the sociological institutional proposition, 
the socialization mechanisms discussed in Section 3.2.2 serve as a point of departure. 
Both role playing and suasion find their roots in organization theory and cognitive social 
psychology. It is the latter mechanism that most truly reflects the process towards norm 
internalization. Yet, instead, there are several motives that can be used to elaborate the 
role playing model.  
Within the comparative framework of my research, the mere concentration on scope 
conditions under which normative suasion may occur is not helpful. This is because the 
norm suasion perspective largely relies on tacit variables at the individual level. If an 
actor perceives his environment as novel, and if his prior values are consistent with the 
socializing agency’s message, he is likely to be more amenable to new norms. Data on an 
actor’s perception and prior values can be acquired through a survey. However, a survey 
necessarily is confined to a small population and recent practices. As a consequence, 
significant variations over time would remain unexplained.  
The role playing model, on the other hand, relies on scope conditions that sufficiently 
vary over time. It assumes that actors are more likely to internalize new role conceptions 
in line with group norms when they find themselves in settings where contact is long, 
sustained, and intense. Moreover, the role playing adequately captures the process I am 
interested in.  
That is, even if norm internalization may not be a direct result of role playing 
mechanisms, research on role playing demonstrates that prolonged exposure and 
communication in European institutions eventually activate a feeling of loyalty between 
the group members and promotes socialization dynamics (Checkel 2005). If applied to 
the process of transposition, the scope conditions for role playing allow for the following 
proposition:  
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SI-1  
The more national bureaucrats responsible for transposition are exposed to socialization 
agencies in Brussels, the more likely it is that a directive will be swiftly and timely 
transposed.  
 
Corollary:  
The less national bureaucrats responsible for transposition are exposed to socialization 
agencies in Brussels, the less likely it is that a directive will be swiftly and timely 
transposed.  
 
The above hypothesis builds on the assumption that the time needed for transposition is 
an effect of the interaction among domestic key actors who regularly meet in Brussels. Its 
starting-point is that the EU is an environment with significant socializing capacity. As a 
result of prolonged and intensive meetings in Brussels, national officials adopt role 
conceptions that create a sense of loyalty and commitment. They will perceive the EU as 
an institution which primarily seeks to formulate common, European, policy solutions 
(Beyers 2005). Their role conception provides for a loyalty towards EU norms. Whether 
or not these key actors exert influence on the speed of transposition largely depends on 
the EU institutions in which they participate, and on their role in transposition on the 
home front. In each country, and in each department, the process may be organized 
differently. If the organization of transposition is sufficiently flexible, allowing officials 
to plan transposition both at the domestic office, and to negotiate over directives in 
Brussels, these officials are assumed to contribute to a directive’s timely transposition. 
The question as to what extent national officials choose to comply with these norms 
‘without, or, in spite of, calculating the return they expect from alternative choices’ 
(March and Olsen 1998, p. 21), is subject to the duration of the meetings they attend in 
Brussels, the intensity of these meetings, and the density of meeting.  
 
3.2.3.1 Socialization agencies  
The sociological institutional perspective conceives institutions as organizational 
arrangements that bring together roles (and/or identities), accounts of situations, 
resources and prescriptive rules and practices. Institutions generate actors and settings to 
meet and systematize actors’ relations and interactions (March and Olsen 2004, p. 5). 
Their arrangements affect that which their members find just and rational (MacIntyre 
1988). Drawing on insights of cognitive organization theory, the perspective assumes 
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that, if exposed to specific organization structures, actors develop particular role 
perceptions and codes of conduct. This is because organizations force an actor’s attention 
into a specific framework, as also organizations divide complex tasks into subtasks that 
can be performed within relatively independent units. Within this context, actors develop 
cognitive patterns, and subsequently, form cognitive categories and simplified 
representations of events (Johnson 1987; Trondal 2002). As a result, events are taken for 
granted as ‘the way we do things’ (Scott 1995, p. 44). This is how socializing agencies 
socialize their members. Their organizational boundaries have an effect on role 
perceptions because they promote straightforward cognitive search processes and reduce 
cognitive uncertainty (Johnson 1987; March 1994; Simon 1957, p. 288). The cognitive 
scripts they provide, guide actors in making sense out of events and in pursuing 
meaningful action (Scott 1995, p. 44; Trondal 2002; March and Olsen 1995).  
This research assumes that Council working groups have the capacity to socialize their 
members. Next to the more visible agents of national administrations in Brussels - i.e. the 
Permanent Representatives of the member states - national-based officials play an equally 
important role in the main legislative institution of the Community, that is, the European 
Council of Ministers. The decision making process in the Council follows a number of 
stages. Firstly, the Council working groups obtain information about particular policies 
and negotiate a first compromise. Secondly, high-profile committees such as the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) refine the legislative proposals of 
the European Commission and prepare the meeting of the ministers. Finally, the ministers 
who represent the member states decide by casting their vote. Very often this ends up 
with ministers just having to reinforce any decisions made earlier on (Beyers 2005).  
Council working groups play a vital role in negotiations on directives. They examine and 
discuss Commission proposals and may be the only members who have a chance to 
reflect and defend a member state’s view on the proposed legislation. Meetings at the 
working group level do not involve voting. Neither are working group members restricted 
by formal rules that explicitly state that they have to confine their role to purely 
defending the national interest, or to strictly attend to the Community’s interest (Beyers 
2005; Hooghe 2005). It is their task to reduce the number of problem areas COREPER 
and the Council have to deal with (Hayes-Renshow and Wallace 1997, pp. 98-99). The 
working groups cover all areas of EU activity and meet when necessary. Even if 
documentation lacks on the amount and nature of policy issues that is being settled by the 
members of these groups, estimates suggest that they resolve 70 to 80 per cent of all 
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issues (Beyers 2005; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997). Some go as far as to portray 
the many working groups as the backbone of the European system of integration:  
‘Meeting on a weekly or monthly basis to discuss Commission proposals and to negotiate 
acceptable solutions with their European colleagues, they are performing the vital and 
frequently time-consuming technical groundwork for what will eventually become a 
piece of European legislation or policy to which their governments, national industries 
and ordinary citizens will all be subject’ (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, p. 98). 
 
3.2.3.2 National bureaucrats and transposition 
Instead of ideological preferences of players who are formally authorized to block policy, 
expectations following from the sociological view concern the institutionalized 
preferences and subsequent behaviour of national bureaucrats towards a directive. It is 
the national bureaucrats who participate in the Council working groups, and who debate 
and shape the legislative proposals of the Commission (Kassim 2002). Hence, the key 
actors from the sociological perspective are the national bureaucrats who plan 
transposition at the national level and may or may not be directly involved in EU Council 
working groups. They are the policy-makers and lawyers who work for the transposition 
responsible ministry, and they are assigned to prepare legislative adaptations and 
amendments that arise from a directive. 
The level of working group members’ exposure to interaction at the European level 
varies. The Council working groups are created by the COREPER. These working groups 
may be permanent, temporary, or ad hoc, and meet weekly, monthly, irregularly, or just 
once. During these meetings, the participants give their views on the overall content of 
the proposal. Then, they discuss, and where necessary, amend each article. Discussion 
continues until the chairman decides that a consensus in favour has been reached, or until 
he judges that more discussion would not add to further improvement of the proposal.  
To qualify as a member of a Council working group, national officials must have expertise 
in the subject area, and speak at least English and French. Moreover, they need to be 
familiar with the decisionmaking process and procedures in the EU. Most of the working 
group members are technical experts within a specialized field of competence (Wessels 
1991, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997). ‘Meetings of such specialists create an 
atmosphere of mutual understanding and a setting for the deliberations, which makes the 
difference between national and European definitions of interests likely to blur’ (Beyers 
2005, p. 907). 
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3.2.3.3 Council working group members 
Whether or not national officials have authority at both the national and European level 
largely depends on the division of tasks within the lead ministry. Members of a Council 
working group may be representing the relevant national ministry, or may work from the 
Permanent Representations in Brussels. Such divisions of tasks vary from state to state. 
What is more, interviewees and expert reports (Interview Dutch Ministry of Employment 
and Social Affairs 2005; Interview Spanish Permanent Representative 2005; Bellis 2003) 
assert that the organization of the transposition process may vary from ministry to 
ministry, and also may be submitted to radical changes from time to time. Hence, a lack 
of convincing regularities at the state level keeps me from making assumptions about the 
variable attendance. Instead, the research’s point of departure is that all countries are 
equally represented in Council working groups.     
It was not until the mid seventies that the Council working groups started to emerge. 
Until then, EC policies were so limited in number and scope that the impact of Europe 
was hardly felt in domestic politics and national policies. The national executive elites 
exclusively dealt with European issues (Wallace 1971, p. 538; Interview Ter Bals 2005). 
The Working Party of Social Questions was established in 1978. Official lists of 
subgroups flowing from the latter are not available to the public, however. Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace (1997) roughly estimate the number of permanent working groups 
that meet at a regular basis at about 50, while the number of ad-hoc working groups is 
estimated at 50 to 150. The only readily available, published statistics relate to the 
number of total man-days spent in working group meetings each year. To get over the 
lack of available data, I chose to operationalize the duration of members’ involvement, in 
more general terms: i.e. in terms of a country’s membership, but counted from 1978, that 
is, the year in which the Working Party on Social Questions became a formal working 
group. 
 
3.2.3.4 Intensity and density of interaction 
The following factor relates to the qualitative context of the meetings, i.e. the intensity 
and density of interaction. Beyers (2002/2005) operationalizes intensity of a member’s 
involvement in terms of the relative working time officials spent on meeting in Council 
working groups, and the density of meetings of the working group11. In this research, 
intensity will be operationalized in terms of the length of CWG meetings. Scores on this 
variable build on two indicators, i.e. the number of participants, and a directive’s 
complexity. Firstly, it is assumed that the more member states partake in the negotiations 
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on a Commission proposal, the more time national bureaucrats spend together, and as a 
consequence, the more intense the interaction. Date of reference for this variable is the 
date on which the Commission’s proposal was launched. Another indicator for the 
intensity of interaction is a directive’s complexity. On the basis of participatory 
observation, Kaeding (2005) derives a directive’s complexity from the number of recitals, 
that is to say, explanatory notes that precede the section of articles of a directive and 
particularize a directive’s purpose and main provisions. Moreover, the Commission uses 
recitals for normative provisions over which member states could not agree with one 
another, whereas member states use recitals to add clauses which they tried to get in vain in 
a directive’s text (Bellis 2003, p. 13). 
Density of interaction will be operationalized in terms of policy-density. That is, if a 
newly introduced directive is concerned with a specific topic that has been frequently 
addressed in previous years, it is the number of previous directives addressing the same 
topic that stands for meeting density. This is because it is likely that officials who dealt 
with the earlier directive also participate in discussions about similar new directives. Or, to 
put it differently, the density of meetings of a civil servant who deals with employees’ 
protection from hazardous substances, is higher than the density of meetings attended  by a 
civil servant whose expertise is limited to a less commonly addressed topic, for example, 
supplementary pension rights of employed and self employed moving within the 
Community. 
 
3.3 Factors to control 
My theoretical framework focuses on the accurate testing of rational choice 
institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. Yet, until recently, the historical misfit 
thesis was advanced as a major explanation for varying transposition outcomes (e.g. 
Duina 1999; Caporaso and Jupille 2001). Studies providing evidence of other major 
institutional factors playing a central role challenged its dominant status. The historical 
institutional logic will be tested through a factor that approximates its institutional misfit 
argument.  
 
3.3.1 Historical institutionalism and the misfit thesis 
The focus of historical institutionalism is on how prior commitments, institutional 
arrangements and policies condition further action. This logic - referred to as path 
dependency - limits the scope of what is feasible and forces actors to redefine their 
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interests (Pierson 1996; Bulmer 1997; Schneider and Aspinwall 2001). New demands, 
like those following from EU directives, bring along adaptation pressures on a member 
state’s institutions and policy, and member states’ responses to these pressures depend on 
the amount of misfit between domestic traditions and a directive’s provisions.  
In quantitative research, the occurrence of a misfit cannot be adequately operationalized. 
This is because its systematic and profound operationalization, like in the work of 
Falkner et al. (2005), who aggregate data on policy misfits, polity misfits, and economic 
costs of a directive for each member state, is not feasible for a huge number of cases. 
Policy misfits require the establishment of significant misfits between a directive’s 
contents and existing national arrangements. Polity misfit features the incompatibility of 
European administrative demands and domestic administrative routines while the 
economic costs reflect the material consequences for the parties who are addressed by the 
directive. Even a sheer focus on, for instance, polity misfits (e.g. Knill and Lenschow 
1998; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999, 2001) requires a thorough understanding of 
administrative dimensions at the national level vis-à-vis those addressed in a directive. 
Therefore, instead of forcing through a rigorous proposition representing the misfit thesis, 
I am content with a realistic historical institutional one. I assume that - along with new 
national transposing instruments - notification of instruments that existed before the 
Commission proposed the directive is an indication that the member state is acquainted 
with the directive’s topic, so that transposition is likely to take less time. Hence, the level 
of entrenchment of European demands on the national legal system is expected to be a 
decisive factor for timely transposition. The proposition that follows from the historical 
institutional misfit argument reads as follows:   
 
CO-1  
If one or more ‘old’ national instruments precede new transposing instruments, 
transposition takes less time, and it is less likely that transposition will be overdue.  
 
3.3.2 Strategic adaption  
In his 2005 review Checkel introduced a socializing argument rooted in rational choice. 
This socalled strategic calculation mechanism, in this research referred to as strategic 
adaption, may under specific circumstances end in norm following behaviour. Actors’ 
behaviour may be volatile based on the possibility of revenues exceeding the costs of any 
adverse policies (Checkel 2000, 2005; Schimmelfennig 2005). Subsequently, they will 
feel the need to justify their behaviour, irrespective of their original motives for the 
Theoretical framework 
 
55 
 
behavioural change. This results in a cognitive dissonance between behaviour that is 
justified and argued for, and an actor’s beliefs. Actors tend to resolve such a dissonance 
by adapting their preferences to their behaviour (Zürn and Checkel 2005). That which 
starts as a strategic, incentive-based cooperation within international institutions often 
leads to preference shifts at a later stage (Kelley 2004). 
Also, in compliance research, strategic adaption is a mechanism to be reckoned with. 
This is because, in part, improved transposition may be a consequence of more overt and 
rigorous strategies of the Commission, inducing member states to adhere to the 
transposition deadline (e.g. Tallberg 2002). On several occasions, the Commission 
intensified its methods to enforce effective implementation of directives. It is most likely 
that each of these occasions has been an incentive for member states - considering their 
reputation and possible sanctions - to more seriously take future deadlines.  
 
CO-2  
The more severe the Commission’s enforcement strategies are, the more likely it is that 
national authorities transpose directives swiftly and the less probable that transposition 
will be overdue.  
 
3.3.3 Available transposition time 
The final control variable is available transposition time. Generally, each directive 
defines the date by which member states should bring into force the laws, regulations, 
and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the directive. The period between 
adoption of the directive and the transposition deadline may vary from a few months to 
several years. Given that national governments participate in the preparation of a 
directive, the Court considers governments capable of drafting the required provisions 
within the period laid down by the directive. All the more because, if a member state 
considers the period too short, it can request an extension of the period either by the 
Council or the Commission. Hence, it is assumed that member states consider a 
directive’s deadline feasible, so that overdue transposition is not a consequence of 
unreastilic demands of European legislators. Accordingly,    
 
CO-3   
The more time member states have for the transposition of a directive, the more time 
transposition takes.  
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CO-4   
The more time member states have for transposition, the less likely it is that transposition 
will be overdue. 
 
3.4 Theoretical framework  
 
Fig. 3.4 Theoretical framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 summarizes the arguments of the rational choice and sociological institutional 
key mechanisms, and their predicted effects on the speed of transposition. The argument 
flowing from rational choice is likely to positively correlate with the variables 
transposition duration and the seriousness of overdue transposition. That is, the more veto 
RC-1  Rational Choice Institutionalism  
 (number of veto players) 
SI-1 Sociological Institutionalism 
 (civil servants’ exposure to socialization agency) 
Transposition duration and likelihood
that transposition w
ill be overdue 
CO-1 Historical Institutionalism 
 (notification of existing national instruments, 
 next to new transposing instruments)
CO-2  Strategic adaption 
 (severity of Commission’s enforcement 
 strategies) 
CO-3 Available transposition time 
 (above average transposition time) 
  
RC-2  Rational Choice Institutionalism II 
 (government changes) 
CO-4 Available transposition time 
 (above average transposition time) 
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players, the more time a directive’s transposition will take, and the more likely it is that 
transposition will be overdue.  
National bureaucrats who participate in Council working groups are exposed to EU 
socialization. The effect of socialization is likely to negatively correlate with the speed of 
transposition. The more these bureaucrats participate in these meetings, the swifter the 
process, and the less likely it is that transposition will be overdue.  
Similarly, the control variables, one flowing from historical institutionalism, and one 
combining rational-sociological logics, are assumed to enhance the likeliness of swift, 
and timely, transposition. One exception is available transposition time, which is 
expected to positively correlate with transposition duration, but negatively with overdue 
transposition: the more time countries have, the less likely it is that the transposition 
deadline will be exceeded. Chapter 4 elaborates on the operationalization of the 
independent variables following from these various perspectives.  
 
 
Endnotes
                                                     
 
 
1 Some Treaty articles prescribe either the use of a regulation, or the use of a directive. See for example 
Article 39(3)(d), Article 89, concerning workers and state aids respectively, and Articles 44, 46(2), 52, 94, 
96, 132(1), and 137(2) (Consolidated version EC Treaty 2002). 
2 Decisions of the European Court of Justice enforced the consequentiality of this instrument (Craig and De 
Burca 2003, p 114-15). 
3 See also Garrett, Keleman and Schultz (1998) 
4 The radius that goes through X and Y is called the ‘indifference curve’ (Tsebelis 2002, 20). 
5 Table 3.1 considers the type of governments in The Netherlands, and Germany since 1975. The data 
relating to the United Kingdom, Spain and Greece, refer to the time series 1973-2004, 1981-2004, 1986-
2004 respectively.  
6 For online data on election results, see http://www.parlement.com (The Netherlands); 
http://www.parliament.uk (United Kingdom); http://www.congreso.es (Spain); http://www.ypes. 
gr/ekloges/content /gr  (Greece). See also Siaroff (2000).  
7 This rule applies to all periods, except February -October 2004; the February 2004 election results did not 
effect in a winning party producing an overall majority. 
8 The UK general election of February 1974 was the only election which did not produce an overall majority 
for the winning party. 
9 Approaches to better understand the compatibility of domestic, normative settings with EU directives are 
being developed (e.g. Dimitrova and Rhinard 2005). 
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10 Sociological institutional literature produces similar arguments. March and Olsen state that ‘in establishing 
norms of appropriateness, norms and situations are related by criteria of similarity or difference, and 
through reasoning by analogy and metaphor. This process is heavily mediated by language, by the ways in 
which participants learn to talk about one situation as similar or different from another’ (March and Olsen 
1989, p. 26). 
11 Density of meeting ranges from ‘never’ to ‘several times a week’ (Beyers 2002/2005).   
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4 OPERATIONALIZATION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
  
 
‘Economics is all about how people make choices; sociology is all about how  
they don’t have any choices to make’ (Duesenberry 1960) 
 
 
 
This chapter describes the operationalization of the key explanatory concepts, starting 
with the number of veto players (Section 4.1), and the occurrence of government changes 
(Section 4.2). Section 4.3 defines the conditions that encourage social learning and 
socialization. The operationalization of the key control variables - the goodness-of-fit, 
strategic adaption, and available transposition time - is discussed in Section 4.4.  
 
4.1 Operationalization of rational choice concepts 
The operationalization of the number of veto players participating in a directive’s 
transposition involves a step-wise appraisal of factors. To start with, this section specifies 
the legal instruments used for transposition in the five countries. Listing country-specific 
procedures by legal instrument type is crucial, for these procedures largely define which 
authorities are potential veto players in transposition. The section proceeds with the 
operationalization of actors’ preferences vis-à-vis the policy preferences of the agenda 
setter. In the context of transposition, the agenda setter is the minister who runs the lead 
ministry in transposition. It is the lead ministry that issues a first transposition proposal 
and specifies the policy change it considers necessary for transposition. Even though 
directives leave member states the choice of form and methods to legally transpose a 
directive’s provisions, directives are precise as regards the objectives to be met. It is 
assumed that the proposal prepared by the agenda setter meets these objectives, so as to 
avoid an infringement procedure against the state.  
 
4.1.1 National legal instruments 
In all five countries of inquiry the central government takes the lead in the transposition 
of EU law. In Spain, the coordination of this process is left to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. In the other countries coordination is a shared responsibility.1 Usually these 
coordinating bodies appoint the lead ministry in transposition, considering its 
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competences and area of jurisdiction. Hence, as a rule, each cabinet minister is 
responsible for policy proposals that fall under his or her area of jurisdiction, and his or 
her ministry is charged with drafting legislation so as to change the status quo on 
domestic policies in favour of the European standards set in the directive. In his or her 
role as agenda setter, the minister heading the lead department is the first veto player 
entering the process. It is assumed that his or her policy preferences - or rather the 
preferences of the political party he or she represents in government - are expressed in the 
transposition proposal. Therefore, the policy preference of the party represented by the 
agenda setter serves as a yardstick for evaluating the ideological distance between the 
agenda setter and additional veto players. The coming into play of additional veto players 
depends on the legal instrument used for transposition. Conditional upon a directive’s 
requirements, the agenda setter may choose to transpose a directive through primary 
legislation (law), or secondary (delegated) legislation.  
 
 
Table 4.1  National legal instruments according to formal institutions involved2 
Provisions NL DE UK ES EL 
Issued by 
minister  
Ministeriële 
Regeling 
Vorschift 
 
Ministerial 
Orders, 
regulations, 
or rules 
(SI)3 
Orden 
Resolucion 
Instruccion 
Decision 
ministeriel 
Issued by 
government  
Algemene 
Maatregel 
van Bestuur 
(Koninklijk 
Besluit) 
Verordnung Order in 
Council,  
(assigns 
competent 
minister/ 
 state 
secretary 
Real 
decreto 
(legislativo) 
Decret 
presidentiel 
 
Requiring  
parliamentary 
approval  
Wet Gesetz 
 
Act of 
Parliament4 
 
 
Ley 
 
Real 
decreto-ley 
Loi 
 
Loi 
legislative 
Source: Berglund 2004, Gange 2004, Kaeding 2004, Mastenbroek 2003, Romeijn 2004, Steunenberg et al. 2005 
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The legal instruments used for transposition and the formal players involved, vary from 
state to state. However, bearing in mind the key features veto players’ theory is interested 
in, the country-specific legal instruments can be hierarchically ordered, according to the 
formal institutions whose approval is necessary for the instrument’s coming into force. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the main legal instruments member states employ for transposition 
of EU social directives (see annex 2 for their distribution across each country).  
 
Provisions issued by minister(s) 
When the competent minister issues the transposing instrument, he (the agenda setter) is 
the only veto player, unless the instrument is issued on behalf of more than one 
department. Whether or not the additional lead minister adds to the number of veto 
players depends on the ideological distance between the party preferences of the latter 
vis-à-vis those of the agenda setter.  
 
Provisions issued by the government 
Cabinet ministers generally lack expertise in areas over which they have no jurisdiction, 
and therefore are inadequately equipped to contribute substantially to the formation or 
changing of policy in other areas (Gallagher et al. 2001). Nonetheless, in case of 
instruments issued by the government, the proposal needs the approval of all cabinet 
ministers. Again, whether they add to the number of veto players, hinges on their 
preferences vis-à-vis the policy change the competent minister (agenda setter) 
recommends through his transposition proposal. It means that the preferences of 
additional veto players will be weighted against the party political preferences of the 
agenda setter as reflected in the transposition proposal. 
 
Provisions requiring parliamentary approval  
Transposition through law requires the review of parliamentary parties.5 If that is the 
case, political parties which have a seat in the Lower House are considered as potential 
veto players. Generally, the lead department(s) in transposition structures the proposal 
that the cabinet forwards to the Lower House. The agenda setter has a great deal of 
control over policy initiation, if the directive exclusively concerns his or her competence 
area. In that case, the bill presented to parliament is not assumed to deviate substantially 
from the agenda setter’s original draft. However, if apart from his or her department, 
additional ministries are held responsible for transposition, the ideological distance 
between ministers heading these departments and the agenda setter may cause the agenda 
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setter to amend his proposal. The agenda setter will adopt a middle course to satisfy all 
parties involved. Those not involved in the transposition process are likely to accept the 
transposition proposal, and present it as a collective cabinet decision. This is because, in 
practice, the work pressure creates a strict division of labour among cabinet ministers. 
Therefore, from this stage onwards, it is no longer the minister who is the agenda setter, 
but the cabinet as a whole.  
With regard to the resistance from parliament, the research only takes into account non-
governmental political parties in parliament, if and only if, these additional parties are 
together powerful enough to reach the needed majority. Backbench parliamentary 
members who act on behalf of the governing parties are not considered. This is because 
backbench members who disapprove of government proposals, are believed hardly ever 
to express their criticism in parliament, but rather raise their objections behind closed 
doors during party meetings (Gallagher et al. 2001).  
 
Provisions requiring approval of the Upper House 
Among the countries under study, all, except Greece, have bicameral parliamentary 
systems but it is only Germany6 that is a federal state7. In federal states it is quite 
common that upper chambers have the right to veto legislation. In Germany the Upper 
House (Bundesrat) plays a vital legislative role, even if its legislative authority is 
subordinate to that of parliament.  
The government must first of all present all legislative initiatives to the Upper House, 
whereupon it can be passed to parliament. If a bill requires the consent of the Bundesrat, 
the latter may exercise an absolute veto, which the Bundestag cannot override. The 
consent of the Bundesrat is required if the bill substantially affects the interests of the 
Länder (Steunenberg et al. 2005). Besides, the Upper House must give its approval to all 
legislation affecting policy areas for which the Basic Law grants the Länder concurrent 
powers and for which the Länder must administer federal regulations. As a representative 
of regional interests, the preferences of the Bundesrat may be of a different nature than 
those of the Bundestag. This is because the Länder often have to face up to undesirable 
financial burdens (e.g. financing policies, loss of earnings, extra workload) associated 
with the implementation of EU policies (Börzel 2002).  
The political power of the Bundesrat is particularly evident when the opposition party or 
parties in the Bundestag have a majority in the Bundesrat, which has been the case almost 
constantly since 1991. Under these circumstances, the opposition can thwart the 
government’s legislative programme.  
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Provisions requiring the signature of the Head of State 
A review on lawmaking procedures in the member states demonstrates that primary legal 
instruments may require the signature of the Head of State. However, final ratifications of 
primary legislation by Heads of State are to be seen as a mere procedural act. Therefore, 
this research does not consider Heads of States as additional veto players.  
In Germany and Greece it is indirectly elected presidents heading the State. Even though 
the Greek president has the right to veto or suspend a bill, his political role is not 
prominent, neither is the political power of the German president.8 Similarly, if the Head 
of State is a monarch, the latter is not assumed to interfere with day-to-day politics, 
which transposition generally is. This is because in European parliamentary democracies, 
the power division between the political executive and the constitutional Head of State is 
practically always clear-cut, and Heads of State are not assumed to interfere with party 
politics. Those who violate this universal rule jeopardize their position (Gallagher et al. 
2001).  
 
Provisions requiring the signature of the Prime Minister 
National legal systems may stipulate that higher level legislation requires the 
countersignature of the prime minister. Typically, European prime ministers, as well as 
being the chief executive, are also the head of one of the main - often the largest - 
political parties. In keeping with the preference-driven veto players’ theory, his 
preference would not add to the number of veto players, simply because the preferences 
of ‘his party’ do not diverge from the preferences voiced through co-party members in 
the cabinet. Hence, the prime minister will not be considered as an additional veto player.  
 
To sum up, taking as a starting-point political parties’ assumed policy preferences, means 
that the potential veto players are confined to parties in government, parliament, and in 
the German case, the Bundesrat.  
 
4.1.2 Political parties’ preferences 
As opposed to potential veto players, it is only factual veto players who have the power 
and ideological motive to exercise their veto, considering a country’s arrangements in the 
decision making process, and considering their preferences towards the transposition 
proposal. Actors’ preferences, however, are not visible, and cannot be known for sure 
((Shepsle and Bonchek 1997). Thus, it is necessary to make assumptions about actors’ 
preferences.  
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As stated in Chapter 2, Section 2.6, the use of a left-right preference scale (e.g. Treib 
2003; Linos 2004) oversimplifies the political ideologies of the respective governing 
parties. Likewise, left-right wing positions on European integration (e.g. Linos 2004)9 are 
too general and limited in scope.  
A more realistic picture of key actors’ preferences is offered by Budge et al. (2001) who 
provide detailed and extensive data on parties’ policy positions. For evaluating these 
positions, the latter authors analyzed the contents of election programmes, covering a 
variety of themes. The coding procedure - comprising a quantification and classification 
of parties’ statements - generates comparable scores over a long period of time (1945-
1998) and a wide range of countries, irrespective of cultural and socio-economic 
differences (Budge et al. 2001, Section II, p. 2). The method’s main weakness is that it is 
not all-inclusive, i.e. not every party issues an election programme, and not every election 
programme includes statements on all policy areas (Volkens 2007, p. 109).  
 
Table 4.2:  Party political preferences – indicators 
Policy addressed by directive Programmatic data variables(1) 
Information and consultation Corporatism: 
Parties’ favourable mentions of the need for 
collaboration of employers and trade unions in 
economic planning and direction through tripartite 
bodies of government, employers and trade unions. 
Equal treatment Social justice: 
Parties’ attitudes as regards the concept of equality; fair 
treatment of all people; special protection for 
underprivileged; fair distribution of resources; removal 
of class barriers; end of racial or sexual discrimination. 
Social security Welfare state expansion: 
Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or 
expand any social service or social security scheme; 
support for social services such as housing and health 
services. 
Working time, and health and 
safety standards (other than 
standards as regards 
hazardous substances) 
Labour groups: 
Favourable references to labour groups, working class, 
unemployed; support for trade unions; good treatment of 
manual and other employees.  
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Workers’ health and safety 
(only if these involve 
standards as regards 
hazardous substances)  
Environmental protection and improvement: 
Preservation of natural landscape and natural resources 
against selfish interests; environmental improvement. 
Migrant workers Underprivileged minority groups: 
Favourable references to underprivileged minorities 
who are defined neither in economic nor in 
demographic terms, e.g. the handicapped, disabled, 
homosexuals, immigrants, refugees etc. 
(1) Source Budge et al. (2001) 
 
Table 4.2 summarizes six programmatic data variables, each one addressing a social 
policy area considered most fit to measure parties’ changing preferences with respect to 
European social policy issues.  
The left table column shows the different social key issues addressed by the directives 
under study. The right column refers to the statements Budge et al. found in election 
programmes concerning political parties’ preferences towards these key issues. Parties’ 
election programmes are seen as representative statements for the whole party, while they 
allow for identification of changes of parties’ policy positions over time, because parties 
publish them before every election. The estimated values regarding the above variables 
will serve as an indicator for the preferences of the agenda setter and additional potential 
veto players. The data cover the preferences of significant parties in the national 
assembly.  
To discern significant parties from minor ones, Budge et al. cross-refer to Sartori who 
defines party significance as the coalition (governmental) or blackmail potential of a 
party in a given party system (Sartori 1976, p. 121).  
 
4.1.3 Establishment of ideological distances 
A final thought concerns the computation of the ideological distance, which defines 
whether a potential veto player is a factual veto player. There are two alternative methods 
for dealing with the ideological distance.  
One method gives emphasis to the ideological distance itself, while the other method 
highlights the number of factual veto players, considering the ideological distance 
between them. Using the ideological distance itself as an indicator would result in the 
absolute value of the difference between the preferences of the two parties taking the 
most opposite views vis-à-vis each other. The problem with this method is that the 
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outcomes of multiple regression analysis - the changes brought about by each ‘preference 
score’ - are difficult to interpret.  
Therefore, the alternative indicator - the number of factual veto players - is preferred, as 
also - when tested separately - both methods lead to similar conclusions. The number of 
factual veto players can be defined by comparing the preference of the agenda setter with 
the preference(s) of other potential veto players in the process. If the transposing 
instrument requires the consent of additional parties in government, only the preferences 
of these parties will be considered. If the transposing instrument is a law, the preference 
scores of parties in parliament (and in Germany, of the Bundesrat) will be considered. 
According to Tsebelis, only those taking the most opposite views vis-à-vis the preference 
of the agenda setter, are additional factual veto players. However, the ideological distance 
between veto players must be substantial. That is, for exerting one’s veto power, there 
must be a fair amount of controversy over an issue. Therefore, the ideological distance 
between the two most extreme parties involved in transposition has been divided by 3, 
which is an arbitrary value, but avoids exaggerating the number of veto players. The next 
example illustrates the computation of the number of veto players.  
 
 
Example: 
 
Table 4.3  Example: Scores of potential veto players on Council directive 91/533/EEC 
 Party X CDU-CSU FDP Party Y 
(Bundestag) 
 Opposition 
party 
Agenda setter Governing 
party 
Opposition 
party 
 0.2 
(Bundestag) 
0.8 1.3 2.0 
(Bundestag) 
 0.2 
(Bundesrat) 
  2.0 
(Bundesrat) 
No. of veto 
players 
2 1 0 2 
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For the transposition of Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 on an 
employer’s obligation to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or 
employment relationship, Germany notified one transposing instrument. This instrument, 
being a law,10 was signed by the Federal President, the Federal Chancellor, and the 
Minister of Employment and Social Affairs (agenda setter). All signatories were 
members of the CDU-CSU, which, at the time of the directive’s publication, was the 
governing party, together with the FDP.  
As regards the provisions of this directive, the preference of the CDU-CSU scores 0.8, 
and the preference score of the FDP - which is the other governing party - is 1.3. The 
preference scores of the most opposite non-governmental political parties on this issue 
are 0.2 and 2.0 respectively. Hence, the ideological distance between the most extreme 
preference scores is 1.8.  
To judge whether this distance between the agenda setter and the opposite parties is 
sufficiently large to view the latter as additional veto players, the ideological distance has 
been divided by 3 (which makes 0.6). The position of the agenda setter on this variable is 
0.8, while the FDP scores 1.3. Since the ideological distance between the governing 
parties is smaller than 0.6, the FDP does not count as an additional governmental veto 
player.  
Because the transposing instrument is a law, the existence of additional veto players in 
the Bundestag must be established. The preference score of one of the parliamentary 
parties (party X) is 0.2, and another ‘extreme’ parliamentary party, (party Y) scores 2.0. 
Now, the ideological distance of party X vis-à-vis the agenda setter is 0.6, and the 
ideological distance of party Y vis-à-vis the agenda setter is 1.2. Hence, both parties add 
up to the number of veto players. A similar conclusion goes for the Bundesrat. In 1995 
the opposition parties in the Bundestag have a majority in the Bundesrat. As a 
consequence, the Bundestag produces two more veto players. The Bundespräsident and 
Bundeskanzler, to conclude, will not be considered as veto players. In sum, this particular 
transposition case involves five factual veto players (see table 4.3) 
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4.1.4 Range between minimum - maximum factual veto players 
 
Table 4.4 Range between minimum and maximum factual veto players 
 Ministers of 
additional 
line dept’s 
 
 
Government 
 
 
Parliament 
 
Upper 
Chamber(1) 
Minimum (maximum)  
number of veto players 
0 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2) 
Ministerial provision 0 (2)    
Government provision  0 (4)   
Provision requiring 
parliamentary approval 
  0 (6)  
Provision requiring approval 
Upper  Chamber 
   0 (8) 
 (1) Upper Chamber applies to Germany only                Source: own data 
 
Table 4.4 provides an overview of potential additional veto players. The first row relates 
to the minimum and maximum (between brackets) number of veto players each 
individual institution can generate. The subsequent rows list the minimum and maximum 
number of veto players by instrument type. It is to be noted that there is always one veto 
player - i.e. the agenda setter - involved in the transposition process. The agenda setter is 
not included in the above table. 
 
4.2 Operationalization of government changes  
Tsebelis expects that government changes augment the number of additional players. In 
this research, however, the effect of government changes will be tested separately, so as 
to avoid this variable obscuring the effect of factual veto players. The occurrence of a 
government change between a directive’s publication and its transposition deadline was 
documented for each individual transposition case. Transposition cases with a positive 
score on this indicator fall under the category ‘government changes’, but (a) only if the 
directive was not transposed before the change, and (b) only if ideologies of new 
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governing parties significantly differ from ideologies of the governing parties that were 
replaced. Whether or not their respective ideologies significantly differ, this could be 
established by computing the ideological difference (see section 4.1.3) between the new 
governing party or parties and those that were replaced.  
 
4.3 Operationalization of sociological institutional concepts 
 
4 3.1 Socialization: levels and scope conditions 
 
Table 4.5 Socialization levels and scope conditions   
 Interaction 
Variable Duration Intensity Density 
Indicator Duration of EU 
membership(1) 
No. of member 
states(2) 
No. of recitals 
 
No of directives 
addressing same 
policy issue in 
previous 5 years(3) 
 
 
 
Range 
Range Score Range Score Range Score(3) 
1-8 1 Low 1 6-9 1 
9-13 2 Medium 2 10-12 2 
14-21 3 High 3 13-15 3 
 
(1)   Reference date: the year of establishment of the Working Party of Social Questions (1.1.1978). 
(2)   Reference date: the date on which the European Commission issued a proposal for the directive at issue. 
(3)   When a directive is adopted under the co-decision procedure, scores on density have been revised 
 upwards  
 
To examine whether EU Council working groups are supernational sites of socialization, 
encouraging national bureaucrats to internalize European identities and persuading them 
into swift transposition of EU legislation, the variables duration, intensity and density of 
interaction will be combined into a single index. The primary purpose of this index is to 
classify a bureaucrat’s potential level of socialization. Formally, indexes come under the 
category ‘ordinal variables’. However, their use in multiple regression analysis - 
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requiring interval level variables - is generally accepted. Moreover, the constituent parts 
of the socialization index - i.e. duration, intensity, and density of interaction - have been 
measured at the ratio level, so that the actual distance separating the index scores 
expresses meaningful standard intervals.    
Table 4.5 recaps on the scope conditions for socialization. Observed values of each variable 
will be ranked into scores ranging from 1 to 3.  The variable ‘duration of interaction’ 
involves country-specific indicators, while indicators used for measuring the other variables 
vary along with the directive (intensity of interaction) or with the transposition case (density 
of interaction). Accordingly, the final index scores may range from 3 to 9. 
  
4.3.1.1  Duration of interaction  
Duration of interaction refers to the number of years the member state was represented in 
the relevant working party in Brussels, at the time the Commission launched the 
directive’s proposal. The main working party under the Employment, Social Policy, 
Health, and Consumer Affairs of the Council of the EU is the Working Party on Social 
Questions. Kassim11 (2001), who documented the institutional fragmentation and 
sectorialisation of the Council, asserts that it was not until 1978 that a specialized social 
policy unit came into being12. On the assumption that January 1st 1978 is the date from 
which experts in social policies start to meet in Brussels, transposition cases of which the 
transposition deadline is set before that particular date, score 0. Commission directives 
(24 transposition cases) will be excluded from analyses, since these directives are not 
debated in Council working groups. 
 
4.3.1.2  Intensity of interaction  
Intensity of interaction will be operationalized in terms of the length of Council working 
group meetings. Scores on this variable build on two indicators, i.e. the number of 
participants, and a directive’s complexity13. Firstly, it is assumed that the more member 
states partake in the negotiations on a Commission proposal, the more time national 
bureaucrats spend together, and as a consequence, the more intense the interaction. Date 
of reference for this variable is the date on which the Commission’s proposal was 
launched. For social directives published between 1975 and 2000, the scores range from 
9 member states (1975) to 15 member states (1999).  
The second indicator for the intensity of interaction is a directive’s complexity. On the 
basis of participatory observation, Kaeding (2005) derives a directive’s complexity from 
the number of recitals, that is to say, explanatory notes that precede the section of articles 
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of a directive and particularize a directive’s purpose and main provisions. Moreover, the 
Commission uses recitals for normative provisions over which member states could not 
agree with one another, whereas member states use recitals to add clauses they tried to in 
vain get in a directive’s text (Bellis 2003, p. 13).  
  
4.3.1.3 Density of interaction 
The density of Council working group meetings is expressed in terms of the number of 
directive(s) addressing a similar policy issue in the previous five years.14 Finally, 13 out 
of 233 transposition cases bear on directives adopted under the co-decision procedure. 
These transposition cases deserve extra attention, because the co-decision procedure - 
ruling that directives require agreement between the Council, the Commission and the EP 
- complicates the negotiation phase so much (Fouilleux et al. 2005, p. 617), that often a 
second negotiation phase in the Council (and in particular within its working groups) is 
necessary. Therefore, for these cases, scores on density of interaction have been revised 
upwards by 1 point.15  
 
4.4 Control variables  
Three dichotomous (or dummy) control variables complement the theoretical framework 
of chapter 3. Dichotomous variables are generally used to categorize nominal variables. 
In this research dichotomous variables have been used to test the propositions as regards 
the goodness-of-fit, available transposition time, and government changes. This is 
because this research is interested in the occurrence of a condition (national policy that 
matches European policy, above average transposition time, and the occurrence of 
government changes), rather than being interested in the relationship between the (ratio 
level) scores on these variables. 
 
4.4.1 Good fit between policies 
The first control variable relates to the goodness-of-fit between national instruments and 
European provisions, assuming that, if newly endorsed transposing instruments are 
accompanied by existing national instruments, transposition takes less time than if 
member states have to introduce only new instruments. Notifications of existing national 
instruments - instruments that were already part of the national system before the 
Commission’s proposal to adopt the directive - are expressed by a dummy variable. The 
value 1 represents cases in which both old and new instruments have been notified. The 
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value 0 represents cases for which only new national transposing instruments were 
introduced.  
 
Example: 
The Greek government notifies 10 legal transposing instruments to implement Council 
directive 98/655/EEC of 30 November 1989, concerning the minimum safety and health 
requirements for the use of work equipment by workers at work (second individual 
Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC. Only one Greek 
transposing instrument (presidential decree 395 of 17 December 1994) was adopted after 
the date of the Commission proposal relating to directive 98/655/EEC. The other nine 
instruments16 were already part of the Greek legal system before the Commission 
proposed to adopt this directive. Therefore, the score of this transposition case as regards 
the goodness of fit is 1. This is because prior to the negotiations of the directive in the 
Council, one or more of its provisions were already part of the Greek legal system.       
  
4.4.2 Sanction avoidance 
The second control variable relates to strategic adaption. The hypothesis states that the 
more severe the Commission’s enforcement strategies are, the more likely it is that 
directives are transposed within the set time limit.  
In November 1982, the Commission published its first annual report on monitoring the 
application of Community law. Following on from this, that is, since the entry into force 
of the TEU in November 1993, the EU institutions have had the power to impose 
economic penalties under the Article 228 (ex. Art. 171) sanctioning procedure. The 
Commission explicitly designed the sanction as an instrument of deterrence, involving 
daily payments at punitive levels, followed by the first Internal Market Scoreboard in 
November 1997. A date of similar importance is March 2002, on which occasion a zero 
tolerance was announced for directives whose transposition was two years or more 
overdue.  
Each occasion on which the Commission intensified its methods represents an incentive 
for strategic adaptation, so that each successive occasion adds up to the strength of the 
incentive to meet the deadline. The resulting index scores range from 1 (transposition 
cases of which the deadline is set between 1975 and November 1982), 2 (cases of which 
the deadline is set between November 1982 and November 1993), 3 (cases referring to 
directives of which the deadline is set between November 1993 and November 1997) to 4 
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(cases referring to directives of which the deadline is set between November 1997 and 
March 2002). 
 
4.4.3 Generous deadlines 
The third and last control variable is available transposition time, hypothesizing that the 
more time member states have for the transposition of a directive, the more time they use, 
yet the less likely it is that transposition will be overdue.  
The available transposition time has been computed by subtracting the directive’s 
publication date from the directive’s deadline date. Hence, this variable represents the 
difference (in days) between the date on which the directive was published in the Official 
Journal of the European Union and the date indicating the deadline of transposition of the 
directive. Prior to this procedure, relevant dates have been transformed into a time-value 
(ctime.days). On the basis of this variable a dummy variable has been constructed. Cases 
with a below average transposition time (29 months or less) are categorized under the 
reference group and valued 0; cases representing an above average transposition time (30 
months or more) are valued 1.  
 
Endnotes
                                                     
 
 
1 The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are responsible for coordination in The 
Netherlands. In Germany this task is in the hands of the cabinet and the Chancellor’s Office. In the British 
system, it is the European Secretariat (coming under the Cabinet Office), the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, and the British Permanent Representation which have a shared responsibility for EU policy 
coordination. In Greece, it is by turns the Ministry of Coordination (later Ministry of National Economy) and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs taking the lead in EU policy coordination (Kassim et al. 2000; Steunenberg et 
al. 2005). 
2 Quasi-legislative instruments like the German circulars or British codes of practice are not included. The 
Commission does not acknowledge these instruments as transposing instruments.   
3 Provided that Primary Legislation does not determine that parliament should be involved. 
4 If Primary Legislation says so, also ministerial orders, regulations, or rules (Statutory Instruments) may be 
delayed due to the parliamentary procedure. However, in these cases the negative procedure is often 
followed, ruling that instruments are laid before parliament after making. 
5 In the United Kingdom, the parliamentary procedure applies to Acts of Parliament. Statutory instruments 
based on the European Communities Act 1972 are subject to parliamentary procedure, and the government 
decides whether the negative or positive procedure applies. The negative procedure is the most commonly 
used. Instruments subject to the negative procedure are laid before parliament after making. They come 
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into force on the date stated on them, but are subject to cancellation if a member of parliament passes 
within 40 days a motion to annul it. Any member of parliament can put such a motion, but it was rarely 
applied to (draft) statutory instruments implementing EC directives.  
6 Even if the Spanish Constitution recognizes and guarantees the principle of autonomy and regions, 
regional autonomy is not reflected in the Upper Chamber whose parliamentary influence is rather limited. 
It is the Lower House that ultimately approves legislation and in doing so may override concerns from the 
Upper House. Hence, if it concerns their impact on legislation, the power distribution between the Spanish 
Houses does not deviate from parliamentary practice in the UK or in The Netherlands. 
7 Riker (1964, p. 11) attributes the term federal to ‘countries where two levels of government rule the same 
land and people: each level has at least one area of jurisdiction in which it is autonomous, and there is 
some guarantee (even if only by constitutional statement) of the autonomy of each government in its own 
sphere’. 
8 The political power of Presidents may strengthen in times of crisis.  
9 Ray (1999), for example, scored parties on their position on European integration on a 7-point scale for the 
period 1984-1996. See also Castles and Mair (1984), Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (1993), Huber and 
Inglehart (1995), Bohrer and Tan (2000), Müller and Strom (2000). 
10 Gesetz zur Anpassung arbeitsrechtlicher Bestimmungen an das EG-Recht vom 20 Juli 1995. 
11 Similar information was supplied by De Puifferat (interview 2006), and Ter Bals (interview 2006), who 
recall that social working group meetings started in the 1970s.  
12 Whether or not this Working Party generates specialized sub working parties largely depends on the topic. 
The Employment, Social Policy, Health, and Consumer Affairs Secretariat of the Council did not 
document information on the number, nature, and life span of these subgroups (De Puifferrat, 2006).  
13 To calculate the scores for intensity of interaction, the scores of the ‘number of participants’, and the 
scores of ‘a directive’s complexity’ were combined by multiplication.   
14 Point of reference is the date on which the Commission launched the directive’s proposal. 
15 Nine transposition cases ranked under category 1 moved to category 2. Four transposition cases ranked 
under category 3 remain in the same category.   
16 Laws of 1985 and 1989; presidential decrees (1934, 1978 and 1981); royal decrees (dating from 1934 and 1968). 
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5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND SELECTION CRITERIA 
 
 
‘Facts are the air of scientists. Without them you can never fly’ 
(Linus Pauling) 
 
 
 
This chapter deals with the design that structures this research. It accounts for the choices 
made and discusses how the selection criteria used are conducive to answering the central 
research question. Section 5.1 explains why answering the research question requires a 
quantitative approach. Section 5.2 justifies the research’s exclusive focus on European 
social policies and clarifies the criteria used for selecting the countries of inquiry. Section 
5.3 discusses the methods of data collection. From this, the chapter deals with the 
operationalization of the dependent variables (Section 5.4). Section 5.5 presents the 
methods of analyses.  
 
5.1 Research design 
This research proceeds by stating that cross-country variations are not the very essence of 
the implementation puzzle. Time and policy issue are equally significant sources for 
variation. Different policy topics that come under the category ‘social policies’ are likely 
to engender different behaviour. Likewise, implementation behaviour is subject to 
fluctations and affected by conditions that change over time. If it is true that these within-
country variations are as significant as, or even go beyond, cross-country variations, this 
comparatively detailed approach to EU implementation practices poses a challenge to the 
general inference capacity of leading macro institutional explanations. To reveal the 
consequences of all of these dimensions, the data set must be sufficiently large and 
diverse, while the research method must provide certainty and preciseness in its 
explanations. Therefore, this research is a quantitative, albeit accurate, approach to 
transposition on the basis of newly collected, factual transposition scores relating to a 
diverse and long-standing European policy area, i.e. social policies.  
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5.2 Selection criteria  
5.2.1 Why social policy?    
European legislative activity in this field has been sufficiently intense and diverse to 
permit the analyses of variations across countries, across time, and across policy type. To 
be precise, European social policy provisions permit the testing of isolated groups, each 
of them having a different character and history.  
 
Table 5.1 European social directives: adoption over time, by issue 
Core areas 57-75 76-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-04 Total 
Health and safety 3 5 7 10 19 12 11 67 
Equality  3  2  3 4 12 
Employees'’ rights  2 1  3 2 4 12 
Working time     1 4 7 12 
Other provisions 5  1 1  2 1 10 
Total  8 10 9 13 23 23 27 113 
 
Table 5.1 features the distribution of social policy directives across distinctive work-
related areas adopted between 1957 and 2004, either by the Commission (11 directives), 
the Council (82 directives), or by the European Parliament and the Council (20 
directives). 
From the start, countries sought to establish common health and safety conditions. 
Accordingly, 67 out of 113 directives introduce harmonization measures in this particular 
field. Almost half (32) of them are concerned with the protection of workers against 
dangerous physical, biological, or chemical agents, and therefore touch on environmental 
policies. The other areas address a wide range of social issues, including provisions in 
favour of equal opportunity and anti-discrimination (12 directives), working time 
organization (12 directives), employees’ rights in the event of transfers, collective 
redundancies, and employers’ insolvency, as well as their rights on information and 
consultation (12 directives). The few directives issuing social security policies or survey 
and monitoring requirements fall under the category ‘miscellaneous’ (10 directives). The 
latter category also incorporates some provisions (6 directives) for migrant workers. As a 
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rule, however, migrant workers’ provisions cluster under an autonomous category in the 
Eur-lex directory (05.10, freedom of movement for workers). 
 
5.2.2  Health and safety vis-à-vis general social provisions  
The assumed level of national embeddedness of European social provisions is a major 
dividing line between social policies. The continuous flow of European health and safety 
directives means that provisions relating to this category have had more impact on 
national legislation than social directives touching upon a variety of less frequently 
addressed issues. 
Accordingly, this research considers occupational health and safety regulations as a 
homogeneous group, while the remainder of the social issues addressed by the EU 
consists of various kinds mixed together. If it turns out that hypotheses are corroborated 
in both categories, their overarching theories may be derived to be more general. If not, 
these theories call for further refinement.  
Hypothesizing on contrasting regulatory activity is particularly relevant in the light of 
institutional trains of thought. Firstly, arguing from the sociological line of reasoning, the 
effect of ‘social learning’ mechanisms on transposition duration is likely to be more 
pronounced in the area of occupational health and safety, than in areas where Europe’s 
eagerness for harmonization is far less intense. Secondly, from the viewpoint of historical 
institutionalism, the effect of the goodness-of-fit between European legislation and 
national legislation is likely to be more profound in the early days, than in later years. 
Especially in areas such as health and safety, where adjusting to EU legislative standards 
became a regular part of domestic routine, Europe’s presence causes the European 
legislation to have greater importance in being dealt with than domestic law. 
Finally, the nature and scope of European social provisions is likely to be of some 
consequence for the explanatory strength of veto power. Health and safety directives are, 
most of all, concerned with technical - workplace related - issues. This means that 
Council working groups manage these directives, given that the latter primarily deal with 
technical issues (Fouilleux et al. 2005, p. 612). The remainder of social directives bears 
on more general labour conditions, the effect of which goes well beyond the working 
environment alone. These issues may entail important points of controversy. Hence, 
decisions regarding the transposition of health and safety directives are made by different 
key players than those deciding on the transposition of other social issues. Moreover, 
considering that general social provisions are more far-reaching than health and safety 
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provisions, the latter category of directives is likely to involve more key players, and 
more conflicts (Dimitrova and Rhinard 2005). 
 
5.2.3 New provisions vis-à-vis amendments  
 
Table 5.2 European social directives: adoption over time, by newness 
  57-75 76-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-04 Total 
New directive 5 7 7 9 18 11 12 69 
Amendment 3 2 2 4 5 11 10 37 
Consolidation or 
codification 
 1    1 5 7 
Total 8 10 9 13 23 23 27 113 
 
Another distinction relates to how new a directive’s provisions are (table 4.2). The bulk 
of European social directives (61 per cent) is new and introduces autonomous substantive 
provisions. Amendments (33 per cent), on the other hand, replace some of the provisions 
that were enacted in earlier, outmoded, directives (Common guidelines for the quality of 
drafting of Community legislation of 12 December 1998). The need to amend existing 
legislation gradually increased, so that in the last decade the amount of new and 
amending directives is more or less the same. A minor third category (6 per cent), 
labelled consolidations/ codifications, relates to directives that - instead of introducing 
substantial changes - merely consolidate or codify earlier directives. Codification- and 
consolidation processes are part of the Commission’s Better Regulation strategy. They 
bring together provisions of an existing directive and all its amendments in a single 
directive, in order to improve the transparency of European legislation (Commission 
working document /COM 2006/0690 final). In these cases, implementation of new law is 
not required.  
Provided that transposition leaves national officials room for manoeuvre, their 
competence to act is likely to be more certain when amending provisions require 
transposition. In general, amending directives require less substantive changes than new 
ones. Moreover, amending directives are subject to political debate less often.  
Accordingly, it is assumed that the effect of social learning is better felt if directives issue 
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amendments rather than new provisions, while the veto player theory may be a better way 
of explaining varying levels of compliance with new directives. 
 
5.2.4 Why these countries? 
Analyzing The Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Greece, allows 
me to monitor the effects of key macro institutional variables that researchers derived 
from the theories central to this research. These variables vary sufficiently among the five 
countries. Firstly, federal systems (Germany) produce more potential veto players than 
unitary systems (The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Greece). Likewise, 
multiparty governments (The Netherlands, Germany) produce more potential 
governmental veto players than single party governments (United Kingdom, Spain, and 
Greece). Secondly, the countries vary as regards the length of EU membership. The latter 
variation is of importance for assessing the effect of socialization processes among 
national bureaucrats. Socialization takes time. Hence, the effect of socialization would 
prove to be more powerful among representatives of founding member states (The 
Netherlands, and Germany), than among representatives of the three newer member 
states (United Kingdom, Spain, Greece). Together with Portugal and Ireland, these three 
countries entered the Union at a relatively early stage so that the body of transposition 
cases these new countries generate is sufficiently high for the present quantitative 
approach. The diversity among these member states permits generalization, since they 
well represent the EU-15 countries, that is to say, other EU member states manifest 
similar variations on macro institutional variables. An additional consideration for 
choosing these countries is my ambition to contribute to the ‘Transposition of EU 
Directives’ programme, the umbrella research programme under which this study has 
been conducted.  
 
5.3 Data collection 
Bearing in mind the limitations of official sources, this research draws on a new and 
improved dataset. A substantial share of this dataset is an integral part of the overall 
programme. This is why data collection and -input involved an appreciable amount of 
preparation. To attain comparable data, these preparations included frequent meetings 
between the transposition group members so as to warrant total conformity with one 
another as regards data sources, and the (coding of) variables to be included on the basis 
of detailed country reports produced by the researchers. At a later stage, national 
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transposing measures were retrieved and copied. National legal texts could be found in 
university and national libraries, the library of the European Commission, and on the 
national websites of the member states. Finally, key features of national legislation were 
translated.  
The newly created database allows for a detailed quantitative analysis of the transposition 
records of the five research countries. It includes variables at the EU-level and variables 
at the national level. The EU-level variables relate to information on the EU social 
directives. The national level variables refer to the legislative transposing measures 
notified by the member states. The following sections deal with these data and the official 
sources that have been used.  
 
5.3.1 EU directives: data sources and variables  
In order to establish the number and nature of social policy directives that have been 
enforced since the establishment of the EC in 1957, three official sources were consulted 
- EUR-Lex, Europmaat and the Employment and Social Affairs Directorat General. 
EUR-Lex1 is an official EU database, and publishes the whole body of European Union 
law. This service gives access to the directory of Community legislation in force and the 
texts of consolidated legislation. The research database includes all directives that have 
been listed under the category relating to social policy (category 05.20). 
Europmaat - the additional source - is looked after by SDU Publishers. It claims to be the 
most complete on-line source for all EU official publications. In contrast to EUR-Lex, its 
online directory also covers European legislation of which the provisions are no longer in 
force. These directives have been added to the database. A third source is the June 2003 
mid-term review of the social policy agenda, communicated by the Commission (COM 
(2003) 312 final, June 2003). The annex to this review lists all social policy directives in 
force that come under the Employment and Social Affairs Directorat-General’s 
competence.  
The resesarch database includes the official directive code, title and policy category, 
information on the date on which the Commission launched the directive’s proposal, the 
directive’s dates of adoption, publication, enforcement and transposition deadline.2  
The date of adoption follows from the directive’s title, while the date of publication refers 
to a directive’s publication date in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ L 
series)3. As regards the date of entry into force of directives, articles 254(1) and 254(2) of 
the consolidated version of the EC Treaty (2002) stipulate that this is either the date 
specified in the directive, or, in the absence of any such date, the twentieth day following 
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that of publication. The transposition deadline, is usually - but not always - specified in a 
separate article of the directive.4 This article states the date by which member states ‘shall 
bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply 
with the directive’ (official phrasing). Directives do allow the member states a certain 
period, varying from a few months to several years, within which the directive must be 
implemented. Usually, the implementation deadline will be uniform for all addressees. 
However, directives occasionally fix different deadlines for certain member states. For 
example, the transposition deadline of Council directive 89/654/EEC with regard to the 
minimum safety and health requirements for the workplace is December 31, 1992. For 
Greece, the Commission extended the transposition deadline to December 31, 1994.    
 
5.3.2 National measures notified by member states 
For collecting national data, the Celex online database serves as a first source of inquiry.5 
Celex was consulted until 20th May 2006. Celex does not provide full information on 
notified transposing instruments in each and every case. This may be due to inadequacies, 
either on the part of national authorities (who failed to notify the transposition measures), 
or on the part of Celex. Only if notification measures were not available in Celex, 
additional transposition data were gathered from reports of the Employment and Social 
Affairs Directorat General, and national level authorities (governmental and ministerial 
websites, Europmaat).  
The resulting database includes information on the number and nature of instruments 
member states notified to the Commission, including detailed information - e.g. date of 
adoption, signing, publication and enforcement, and signatories - on the first new legal 
implementing measure that has been recorded. Although member states often notified 
more than one implementing measure, for the purpose of this research, data on the first 
instrument suffice. This is because the date of its enforcement mirrors the launch of the 
national initiative to transpose the directive.    
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5.4 Dependent variables - operationalization  
The two central dependent variables in this research are transposition duration and 
overdue transposition. 
 
5.4.1 Transposition duration  
The variable transposition duration reflects the number of days the member states need 
for transposition. The scores on this variable follow from the subtraction of a directive’s 
publication date from the date of enforcement of the first national transposing 
instrument.6  
 
5.4.2 Overdue transposition  
The variable overdue transposition reflects the number of days that the directive was 
transposed after the deadline. The scores on this variable result from the subtraction of 
the directives’ transposition deadline7 from the date of enforcement of the first national 
transposing instrument. This computation results in a positive value in cases of overdue 
transposition, but in a negative value ot 0 if the directive was transposed before the 
deadline, or on time respectively.  
 
Table 5.3  Computation of transposition duration and overdue transposition: an example  
Country Directive’s 
publication 
date 
Directive’s 
transposition 
deadline 
Date of 
enforcement 
of the first 
national 
transposing 
instrument 
Transposition 
duration 
(days) 
Overdue 
transposition 
(days) 
Netherlands 24.05.86 01.01.90 30.11.91 2016 698 
Germany 24.05.86 01.01.90 Missing value 
UK 24.05.86 01.01.90 01.01.90 1318 0 
Spain 24.05.86 01.01.90 01.01.90 1318 0 
Greece 24.05.86 01.01.91 18.03.91 1759 76 
This example refers to Council directive 86/188/EEC of 12 May 1986 on the protection of workers from the 
risks related to exposure to noise at work.  
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5.5 Methods of analysis 
The major objective of this research is to establish the firmness of theoretical 
explanations for variations in transposition duration, and deadline violations, by testing 
them on distinctive populations. Another objective, which is closely connected, and 
consistent with the former theoretical concern, is to describe and compare between-group 
variances in transposition duration and overdue transposition. The methods of analyses 
used to describe and compare the transposition records are univariate and subgroup 
statistics. The focus of these statistics will be on cross-country, cross-time, and cross-
issue comparisons.  
Given the occurrence of substantial within-group variations on the mean, the factual 
scores on overdue transposition have been ranked into ordinal categories. Associations 
between these categories and relevant nominal (countries, policy issues) and interval 
(time) variables, will be summarized percentage-wise in frequency tables.  
For testing the power and robustness of dominant institutional accounts for varying levels 
of compliance, Multiple Regression (Ordinary Least Squares method) will be used.  
 
Endnotes
                                                     
 
 
1 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex. 
2 Additional variables refer to a directive’s newness (new or amending an earlier directive), the enacting 
EU-institution, the decision making rule under which the directive is adopted, and a variable stating 
whether a directive is still in force.  
3 Article 254 (Consolidated version of EC Treaty, 2002).. 
4 Exceptions are directives labelled ‘consolidation/codification’. These directives merely consolidate or 
codify earlier directives, and do not require implementation.  
5 The Office for Official Publications of the European Communities is responsible for the Celex online 
database (http://europa.eu.int/celex). Since 1 January 2005 the Celex website is no longer updated. Instead, 
Celex refers users to the new EUR-Lex website (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex), which incorporates the 
Celex features and provides free access to the EU law database. 
6 In case a member state has not notified implementing measures that were adopted after the date on which 
the directive at issue entered into force, the database includes the latest old instrument that was notified as 
national instrument implementing the directive.    
7 In the absence of the enforcement date of the national instrument, the next available date (date of 
publication, and if absent the date on which the legal instrument was signed or adopted) replaces the 
missing value. A similar procedure applies to the directive data.  
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6 VARIATIONS WITHIN AND AMONG MEMBER STATES  
 
 
‘If we cannot describe a political process or event, we cannot really 
hope to understand or explain it’ (Almond et al. 2004) 
 
 
 
As a first essential step towards a proper understanding of domestic transposition 
behaviour, and the deficits member states generate, this chapter describes how national 
transposition responsible authorities have performed between 1975 and 1999. These 
statistics rely on newly collected, actual transposition scores in the member states, and 
offer a more precise and clearer picture of transposition performance, than do statistics 
gathered from official Commission data. Given that the comparisons comprise cross-
country, cross-time and cross-policy variations, they add new dimensions to the, so far, 
limited inspection of variations based on mere cross-country assessments.  
Before proceeding with these descriptive statistics, the chapter distinguishes potential 
transposition cases from cases free of transposition obligations (Section 6.1). Section 6.2 
employs additional selection criteria to finetune the dataset. As explained in Chapter 5, 
this research draws a distinction between transposition duration and overdue 
transposition. This distinction is functional for the analyses in the next chapter, because 
factors that cause lengthy transposition are not necessarily the same factors associated 
with overdue transposition. Hence, explaining varying levels of compliance requires both 
processes being set apart, and adequately described. Accordingly, Section 6.3 starts with 
a description of average scores on transposition duration, descending from an overall 
cross-country review to cross-policy and cross-time comparisons, the disivion of which is 
justified in Section 6.4. The analyses in Section 6.5 provide similar comparisons, but now 
the focus of attention will be on a special group of cases, i.e. the cases that were 
transposed after the deadline. To distinguish minor deadline violations from major ones, 
transposition cases were grouped into three categories: slightly, moderately, and seriously 
overdue. Section 6.6 summarizes this chapter’s major findings and conclusions.  
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6.1  Selection of potential transposition cases  
The newly created database consists of 565 cases. Each case combines the characteristics 
of one of the 113 social directives in the database with features and transposition data of 
one of the five member states. However, not all of them are potential transposition cases, 
because not all cases brought about a similar transposition burden on all five member 
states. Besides, the transposition deadline that applies to the latest directives is set at a 
date that goes beyond the scope of this research. To be precise, the research is confined to 
directives of which the deadline is fixed on or before December 31st 2005. Therefore, the 
label potential transposition case applies to only 449 out of 565 cases.  
 
Table 6.1 Potential transposition cases - selection criteria   
  Number of cases Total 
Main database  565 
Excluded, cases referring to:   
Directives of which the transposition deadline 
precedes accession of the UK, Greece, and 
Spain respectively 
41  
Directives of which the deadline is set after 
January  1, 2006 
30  
Codification/consolidation 35  
Survey/population census 10  
Potential transposition cases  449 
 
Table 6.1 summarizes the selection criteria. Firstly, the database was corrected for the 
accession dates of the newer member states - United Kingdom 1973, Greece 1981, and 
Spain 1986 -. This is because, even if joining the European Union carries with it 
acceptation of existing European legislation, the process through which the directives 
were implemented under the countries’ respective accession Treaties must be 
distinguished from transposition as a process. For that reason, 41 cases relating to 
directives of which the adoption date was before the countries’ respective date of entry to 
the EU1, will be ruled out. A second category disqualified for further analysis relate to 
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directives (6 directives = 30 cases) published in the period 2000-2004 of which the 
deadline goes beyond the scope of this research. Thirdly, 35 cases referring to 
codifications/consolidations are excluded since these directives do not contain 
transposition duty, but merely reflect on earlier directives. Finally, 10 cases entailing 
survey- and population census obligations are excluded, because these directives contain 
instructions, rather than transposition obligations. Application of these selection criteria 
results in a dataset containing 449 potential transposition cases. The next section 
demonstrates that, among these potential cases, only 385 (86 %) are transposition cases. 
Only these cases contain full data on the first national legal instrument implementing the 
directive. 
 
6.2  Transposed cases - some cross comparisons 
Fig. 6.1: Transposition cases across time (N=449) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: own data 
 
Diagram 6.1 sets apart potential transposition cases from cases for which transposition 
measures could be established. Transposition measures were found for 86 per cent of all 
potential cases. It is in the first period (1957-1974), and in the last period (2000-2004), 
that concentration of transposition cases is far below average. In the first period, almost 
half of the cases (45 per cent) are missing cases; in the last period, it is 36 per cent of the 
cases for which information on notified transposition instruments was lacking in the Eur-
lex database. Eur-lex was consulted until May 2006. From repeated inspections of 
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notifications relating to recent directives, it could be concluded that the database was 
frequently updated. Accordingly, in the case of absence of notification data for directives 
adopted between 2000 and 2004, it is realistic to assume that so far, 64 per cent of these 
directives have not been transposed. 
It is unlikely that a similar conclusion holds for directives adopted between 1957 and 
1974.  In the early years the alertness of member states and the Commission towards 
notification failures was less severe than it is today2. Therefore, it is to be expected that 
directives representing the missing cases in that particular period have been transposed, 
but not adequately notified. Another plausible explanation for the absence of notification 
data is that countries considered the directive not applicable, given exceptions provided 
for in the directive. However, in these cases, the Commission’s database would qualify 
them as ‘MNE pas nécessaire’. This qualification was not found under the database 
sections that refer to these missing cases. 
 
Table 6.2 Transposition cases - selection criteria     
  Number of cases Total 
 
Transposition cases 
 385 
Excluded:    
Periods in which proportion missing cases is 55  
Transposition cases for which the member state 
notified only ‘old’ legislative measure  
 
10 
 
Transposition cases referring to legislation  
63 
 
Total excluded  128 
Condensed database  257 
 
To allow for meaningful comparisons of the time member states need to make substantial 
legislative changes Table 6.2 raises selection criteria for a further fine-tuning of the 
database. Firstly, the database will be pared down to the period 1975-1999. This is 
because the periods 1957-1974 and 2000-2004 generate a comparatively high number of 
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missing cases. Secondly, 10 cases in which only old instruments have been notified, that 
is, instruments which already existed before the directive was published, will be 
excluded. Apparently, the provisions in the related directives have not affected the 
national legal system so much, that new transposing legislation was necessary. Finally, 
63 transposition cases will be removed because their respective national transposing 
measures were also notified as transposing measures for earlier social directives. These 
cases fail to mirror the process of transposition; the adjustments in national legislative 
system have been made independent of the related directive. Application of these 
additional criteria results in a condensed dataset consisting of 257 transposition cases. 
 
6.3  Transposition duration 
Fig. 6.2  Transposition duration across countries (N=257) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
   Source: own data 
 
A first comparison is concerned with the overall transposition duration realized by the 
member states (Figure 6.2). Transposition duration is a clear-cut variable for measuring 
and comparing the pace at which member states have adjusted their national laws to 
European legislative provisions. Scores on this variable start from the directive’s 
publication date, that is, the day on which member states’ obligation to implement starts 
to run (Prechal 1995, p. 21). Accordingly, transposition duration scores render an 
objective account of factual transposition duration, and may provide evidence of 
regularities that develop, independent of transposition deadlines.  
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The bars in figure 6.2 reflect the average duration (in months) for each country. Taken as 
a whole, the five member states need three years (36 months) on average to transpose 
social directives. Germany and the United Kingdom deal with their transposition 
obligations swifter than that. On average, these countries implement social directives 
within 31 months and 33 months respectively. Greece, on the other hand, needed ample 
time. Transposition took the successive Greek governments 44 months on average, which 
is 8 months above the overall country average. With average transposition scores of 37 
and 38 months respectively, The Netherlands and Spain find themselves in between the 
other countries’ extremes.  
 
Fig. 6.3  Transposition duration across time (N=257) 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   Source: own data 
 
Figure 6.3 makes a comparison between the overall transposition duration across time 
realized by the five member states. It shows that legal implementation of social directives 
took the member states more time in early years than in later periods. The most 
substantial difference occurs between the time ranges 1980-1984 and 1995-1999. In the 
former period transposition of only few directives took the member states almost 4 years 
(46 months) on average, while the transposition duration in the latter period is less than 3 
years (31 months). The scores of the surrounding periods fluctuate appreciably, so that 
the above comparison provides no grounds for diagnozing that the time it takes member 
states to transpose European legislation gradually decreases. 
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Fig. 6.4  Transposition duration across time, breakdown by country (N=257) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Source: own data 
 
Figure 6.4 shows that across the member states, the intensity of cross-time fluctuations 
varies considerably. As compared to the other countries, the performance of Germany 
and the United Kingdom remains relatively constant. Hence, only few countries incur the 
cross-time variance. In particular, the transposition conduct of The Netherlands (69) and 
of Greece (67) raises the overall average in 1980-1984. Likewise, Spain (27 months), the 
United Kingdom (30 months), and The Netherlands (31 months) have a major share in 
the relatively low overall score in 1995-1999. In none of the countries does a trend 
towards acceleration of the transposition process show up.  
 
6.4 Social policies and the assumption of unit heterogeneity 
The above comparisons deal with European social policies, as if the directives that are 
classified under this policy field make up one homogeneous group. Arguments stemming 
from new institutionalisms, however, challenge the assumption of unit homogeneity. 
Sociological and rational choice arguments (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1) support the 
decision that occupational health and safety directives are set apart from directives that 
regulate other, more general, social issues. In addition, an argument arising from the 
historical institutional logic defends a separation on grounds of a directive’s novelty. It is 
likely that in comparison with amendments, new directives bring about more adaptation 
pressure on national policy. This is because new directives introduce autonomous, 
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substantive provisions, while amendments merely replace some of the provisions enacted 
in earlier directives.  
 
Fig. 6.5  Transposition duration across policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: own data 
 
On first impression, transposition duration depends on the policy issue and a directive’s 
novelty. Implementation of new occupational health and safety provisions takes more 
time than implementing other social provisions. Also, transposition of new health and 
safety directives seems more time consuming than transposing amendments in this 
category. For directives in the category ‘other’, the novelty of a directive makes no 
difference. Both new and amending directives are transposed within 34 months on 
average. Finally, implementation of amendments in the category ‘health and safety’ is 
generally less time-consuming than implementation of amendments in the mixed 
category.  
 
Fig. 6.6  Transposition duration across countries and policies (N=257) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Health & Safety (new) Health & Safety (amendments)
41
28
40
48 48
41
0
12
24
36
48
60
NL (28) DE (22) UK (25) ES (24) EL (25) Total (124)
m
on
th
s 35
27
20
30
37
30
0
12
24
36
48
60
NL (12) DE (9) UK (13) ES (10) EL (13) Total (57)
m
on
th
s
41
30
34 34
36
0
12
24
36
48
H&S - new
(124)
H&S -
amendment
(57)
Other - new
(70)
Other -
amendment (6)
Total (257)
m
on
th
s
Chapter 6 
 
92 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own data  
 
Figure 6.6 compares the transposition duration scores of the member states in the area of 
health and safety (new versus amendments), with the scores attained in the counter group 
(new versus amendments). From Figure 6.5 it became clear that, on average, transposing 
new health and safety directives takes more time than transposing directives in the other 
categories. Cross-country differences are considerable, though. With an average of 28 
months, Germany could keep the transposition time of new health and safety directives 
comparatively low. By contrast, Spain and Greece need 48 months to transpose them. 
The performance of The Netherlands (41) and the United Kingdom (40 months) is 
consistent with the overall average (41 months).  
Equally substantial are cross-country differences in the category ‘amending health and 
safety’, and in the category ‘new other policies’. In the former category the performance 
of the United Kingdom stands out against the far above-average scores of The 
Netherlands and Greece. The speed by which Spain and Germany transpose amendments 
comes close to the overall average. 
Markedly, Spain’s lagging behind does not concern directives issuing other social 
provisions. New directives in this category are transposed comparatively fast (23 months) 
by the Spanish government, especially vis-à-vis Germany (38 months) and Greece (43 
months). Transposition duration realized by The Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
approximates the overall average. The category amending ‘other’ directives induces 
modest cross-country differences. In the category ‘other’ the average time needed for 
transposing amending directives is not at variance with transposition duration of new 
directives. 
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Fig. 6.7 Transposition duration across time and policies (N=257) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: own data 
 
Figure 6.7 is a breakdown across time and policy. It shows that in the early years scores 
on transposition duration were rather high in all categories, with the exception of the 
category ‘amending other’. High scores remain the trend within the category ‘new health 
and safety’, but amongst ‘amending health and safety’ transposition duration significantly 
decreases over time. In the category ‘other new directives’, transposition duration 
decreases less drastically, while scores on transposition duration of the few amending 
directives in the 1990s show great variety.  
 
Fig. 6.8  Transposition duration across time, policies and countries (N-257) 
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 Source: own data  
 
The cross-time comparisons in Figure 6.8 start with member states’ overall 
accomplishments. The high average scores of The Netherlands, and Greece (1980-1984), 
and of Germany (1975-1979), suggest that, especially in the early years, directives fell 
prey most frequently to long-winded transposition procedures. As time goes by, 
transposition duration stabilizes. Most countries, except for Greece, reduced their average 
transposition duration to less than three years. The opposite applies to new health and 
safety directives. Here, it is Greece reducing the average duration to 27 months, and the 
other countries requiring 3 years or even more. In the category ‘amending health and 
safety directives’, the United Kingdom (16 months) and Spain (24) generate quite low 
scores as compared to The Netherlands, Germany, and Greece.  
As far as other social issues (70 new and 6 amendments) are concerned, it is Spain 
performing well in all periods alike, as opposed to the United Kingdom and Greece, each 
using more than three years to transpose directives in this mixed category. Acceleration 
of transposition across time is not evident within this category. On the contrary, in the 
early years transposition takes less time than in the latest periods. Transposition duration 
remains more constant in the category ‘new health and safety directives’ than in the 
category ‘amendments’, in which a tendency of gradual acceleration is manifest, although 
the latter trend is disrupted in 1995-1999. 
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6.5 Overdue transposition  
 
Fig. 6.9  Time available versus transposition duration and overdue transposition (N=257) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Source: own data 
 
The next series of analyses deal with a special group of cases, i.e. transposition cases that 
were overdue. Unlike transposition duration, the variable overdue transposition departs 
from an external standard: it takes the transposition deadline as a reference point. From 
scores on this variable we can tell whether, and to what degree, member states succeed in 
meeting a directive’s deadline. Figure 6.9 illustrates the relationship between available 
transposition time, transposition duration, and overdue transposition.3   
 
Fig. 6.10  Available transposition time: mean (N=257) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Source: own data 
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Figure 6.10 is a breakdown, by policy issue, of the average time available for 
transposition in successive periods. It shows that, in general, amending directives allot 
less transposition time than new directives. The outcome of a Kendall’s tau correlation 
analysis (τ = -.22; p < .01) confirms this relationship. Another significant correlation is 
that between available time and policy issues. Member states generally get less time for 
the legal implementation of health and safety directives than for implementing the 
remainder of social issues (τ = -.12, p < .01). In the period 1995-1999, the available time 
for amending health and safety directives markedly increases. As a result, a minor 
difference exists between new and amending directives. As time passes, the minimum 
standards with regard to, for example, substances hazardous to health4 become more 
stringent. Member states may insist on more time to transpose amendments concerned 
with improving and extending such standards. However, to fully understand the deviating 
trend of amending directives requires contents analysis of each individual directive, 
which is beyond the scope of this research.  
The observed deviation gives no evidence that, with the passage of time, the available 
transposition time significantly rises or falls. If anything, the scores on this variable show 
an irrregular course.5 Rather than the time factor, it is the EU decision-making process 
(QMV rule instead of unanimity voting, τ = -.12; Council or Council and Parliament 
directive instead of Commission directive, τ = .39) and a directive’s attributes (number of 
articles, τ = .24), that significantly (p < .01) correlate with the available time for 
transposition6.   
 
 
Table 6.3  Proportion overdue transposition cases (N=257) 
 NL DE UK ES EL Total 
Transposition cases (N) 58 46 56 46 51 257 
Overdue (n) 37 24 31 23 41 156 
Overdue (%) 64% 52% 55% 50% 80% 61% 
Source: own data 
 
Table 6.3 summarizes the proportion of transposition cases that member states 
implemented one day or more after the directive’s deadline, hereinafter referred to as 
overdue cases or deadline violations. Strikingly, this label applies to 156 out of 257 
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transposition cases. Concluding that ample time to implement does not necessarily avoid 
the occurrence of violations seems justified. All the more, because Greece proves least 
capable in meeting the deadlines set in the directives, regardless of the longer 
transposition times the Greek government successfully negotiated on several occasions. 
The Netherlands is another country of which the proportion of overdue cases exceeds the 
average. Spain, on the contrary, most often complies with the deadline, closely followed 
by Germany and the United Kingdom.  
 
 
Table 6.4  Overdue transposition cases, breakdown by policy (N=156) 
 NL  
(37) 
DE 
(24) 
UK 
(31) 
ES 
(23) 
EL 
(41) 
Total 
(156) 
Health & safety, new 75% 45% 64% 71% 80% 68% 
Health & safety, amendments 50% 33% 38% 40% 85% 51% 
Other  (new and 3 
amendments) 
56% 73% 56% 17% 77% 57% 
Overdue (%) 64% 52% 55% 50% 80% 61% 
Source: own data 
 
Table 6.4 is a breakdown by policy area of overdue transposition cases. Salient findings 
are that a well-established field like health and safety is more frequently plagued by 
deadline violations than the other social policies. Equally striking is that new directives, 
in spite of their commonly generous transposition deadlines, more often are the subject of 
violations than amending directives. Cross-country differences and within-country 
differences are substantial. For most countries, new health and safety directives were 
especially challenging. For Germany, it is the other social issues frequently causing 
overdue transposition. Particularly striking is the contrast between Spain and Greece in 
the category ‘other social issues’. Where Spain succeeds in transposing 83 per cent of 
these directives on time, Greece generates not more than 23 per cent timely cases.  
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Table 6.5  Overdue transposition cases, three categories (N=156) 
Overdue transposition N Proportion 
Slightly overdue 1 day - 6 months 37 23.7 % 
Moderately overdue 7 - 24 months 74 47.4 % 
Seriously overdue   25 months or more   45 28.8 % 
Source: own data  
 
Vitally, not every deadline violation is equally serious. So as to separate slightly overdue 
cases from serious ones, the cases have been grouped into three categories (see table 6.5 
for their distribution). Through this transformation, the instructiveness of cross-
comparisons for overdue cases improves considerably, as it also removes any possible 
bias caused by ‘variation within subgroups’ going beyond ‘between subgroup variation’. 
A first category - slightly overdue - includes transposition cases which are one day to six 
months overdue. Most likely, deadline violations under this category are caused by 
incidents (for instance, holidays, illness, national elections), rather than, for example, 
structural administrative incapacity or political resistance. The second category - 
moderately overdue - includes all cases transposed 7 to 24 months after the deadline, 
whereas the third category comprises all cases transposed 25 months or more after the 
deadline. In the light of compliance, the latter group is of particular interest. These 
excessively overdue cases are regarded as critical impediments for the European 
enterprise, so much that nowadays, transposing directives 2 or more years after the 
deadline is no longer tolerated (European Council 2002) (see also Haverland and 
Romeijn, 2007).  
 
Variations within and among member states 
 
99 
 
Fig. 6.11 Overdue transposition across countries, across policy issues (N=257) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own data 
 
The cross-country comparison in Figure 6.11 displays the proportional distribution of 
timely transposed cases vis-à-vis overdue cases among new and amending health and 
safety directives and other social policies (6 amendments included). The overdue cases 
are further divided into various levels of seriousness. From among the substantial 
proportion overdue cases in The Netherlands, only few cases represent serious violations. 
In all categories, except amending health and safety, deadline violations of the majority 
of cases are moderate. Spain, on the other hand, in Table 6.3, presented itself as a country 
that is strict in observing the deadlines and stands out for the substantial proportion 
seriously overdue cases in the category ‘new health and safety directives’. Spain’s 
deadline violations in the categories ‘amending health and safety directives’ and ‘other 
social issues’ are generally moderate. Germany, notable for transposing almost half of the 
transposition cases on time, generates - in all categories except ‘amendments on health 
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and safety’ - a relatively high proportion of moderately overdue cases. The late 
transposition cases that are produced by the United Kingdom are generally slightly or 
moderately overdue. Slightly overdue transposition seldom occurs in Greece, despite the 
fact that its government transposes 80 per cent of the cases, including amendments, after 
the deadline. In all categories, the bulk of deadline violations generated by Greece are 
moderately overdue. Be as it may, compared to the other countries the proportion of 
seriously overdue cases produced by Greece is substantial (see annex 3 for a more 
detailed breakdown by policy area). 
 
Fig.6.12  Other social issues: breakdown, excluding miscellaneous   (N=69) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: own data 
 
Figure 6.12 is a breakdown of the category ‘other social issues’.7 Although the number of 
directives in this category is too small to serve as a blueprint for performance in these 
policies, the statistics help us to identify problematic social topics. In all countries, except 
Spain, ‘equal treatment on the workplace’ occasionally caused severe deadline violations. 
In addition, it is directives addressing ‘workers rights’ that bring about lengthy 
transposition processes in Germany, the United Kingdom and Greece, while for the latter 
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country, ‘working time directives’ were also moderately to seriously overdue. The only 
country to which none of the topics seems particularly challenging is Spain.  
 
Fig. 6.13: Overdue transposition cases, across countries, across time (N=257)  
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: own data 
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Figure 6.13 evaluates member states’ performance across time. It is, in particular The 
Netherlands - of which the overall performance is comparatively poor - where the 
seriousness of deadline violations demonstrably decreases over time. Moreover, The 
Netherlands, together with Spain, manages to expand the proportion of timely 
transposition cases in a somewhat irregular manner. If weighted against the other 
countries, the United Kingdom was best able to keep its transposition deficit low. 
However, in the last period, the British generate more overdue transposition cases. With 
this, the United Kingdom sharply stands out against the diligence of Spain, which 
reduced the proportion of overdue cases to 15 per cent. Greece seems to have the most 
difficulties in keeping pace with its implementation duty. Its overall performance is far 
below average.  
 
Fig. 6.14 Cumulative summaries of overdue cases in Health and Safety, new (N=124)    
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own data 
 
Given that the group ‘seriously overdue cases’ includes scores that vary considerably, a 
final assessment deals with the total amount of backlog that arose in the course of the 
years (Figures 6.14 to 6.16). To lay bare the magnitude of deadline violations in the 
various policy categories, the above cumulative summaries reflect the overdue scores of 
successive transposition cases. Each leap in the diagrams stands for an overdue 
transposition case, and each overdue transposition case adds to the full amount of backlog 
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from 0 (if the directive related to the transposition case was transposed on time or before 
the deadline) to sporadic extremes of 100 months or even longer. Hence, the scores 
displayed in 1999 is the total backlog (in months) each country has generated since 1975. 
Especially striking are the overdue scores of The Netherlands and the United Kingdom in 
the area of ‘new health and safety directives’. Both countries owe their striking position 
to some extremely late transposition cases at the beginning of their membership. From 
the early 1980s onwards, the violations produced by The Netherlands remain moderate. 
In the United Kingdom, however, elimination of seriously overdue cases did not happen 
before the 1990s. Germany was better able to keep pace with the directives’ deadlines 
than The Netherlands. From among health and safety legislation Germany notified, only 
few cases - relating to directives of the late 1980s and early 1990s - bring along 
substantial overdue scores. Improvements of Greece are more or less analogous to those 
of Spain. Both countries allow themselves huge overdue scores until the early 1990s. 
Since then, however, the two southern countries transpose new health and safety 
directives on time. 
 
Fig. 6.15 Cumulative summaries of overdue cases in Health and Safety, amendments 
(N=57)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own data 
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transposing amending health and safety directives on time. It has taken the other 
countries some more years to comply with the directive’s deadline, although this 
tendency has been less apparent for Greece.  
 
Fig.6.16 Cumulative summaries of overdue cases in ‘other social issues’ (N=76)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own data 
 
In the category ‘other social fields’, it is again The Netherlands generating one extremely 
belated case, not in the early years, but in the mid 1980s. Since then, The Netherlands no 
longer produces serious violations of the deadline. Compared to the other countries, the 
violations Spain generates are of minor gravity from the outset. The Spanish government 
was successful in implementing on time most transposition cases relating to social 
policies other than health and safety. Only a few seriously overdue cases push up the 
trend lines of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Greece. Moreover, the violations that 
occur are far less severe than in the field of occupational health and safety.  
 
6.6 Summary and conclusions 
The analyses in this chapter examine national management of transposition from two 
different angles, with a first series of comparisons focusing on transposition duration, and 
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For sure, the analyses do not provide a straightforward answer to the question who the 
sprinters are, and who the laggards. Regardless of the perspective taken, the countries 
behave unpredictably and provide insufficient evidence of national regularities.  
Simply comparing how countries perform from a purely objective point of view, that is, 
on the basis of transposition duration, leads one to the conclusion that, in general, the 
United Kingdom and Germany are more alert than The Netherlands, Spain and Greece. 
However, among the latter countries, it is only the Greek government, which performs 
equally sluggish in all areas. 
The performance of the other countries largely depends on the issue at stake. In addition, 
the novelty of a directive’s provisions makes a difference. While European new health 
and safety directives can rely on relatively swift responses by the founder members and 
the United Kingdom, the Dutch government is relatively slow - also if compared to Spain 
- in transposing amending directives in this category. For implementing social policies, 
other than health and safety, Germany needs ample time. In this mixed policy category, it 
is Spain taking the lead.  
Just as analyses of transposition duration, so also do analyses of overdue transposition 
cases yield ambiguous behavioural patterns. If the focus is on member states’ overall 
level of compliance with the deadline set in the directives, it is especially the Spanish 
government behaving most diligently, followed by Germany, and the United Kingdom. 
The Netherlands, together with Greece, lags behind. Greece was not able to transpose 80 
per cent of the social directives on time, despite the fact that the Commission 
occasionally granted prolonged transposition time to the country. For The Netherlands, 
the proportion of overdue cases is lower (64 per cent), but still considerable. The initial 
notion that The Netherlands and the United Kingdom adopt, like Germany, a pro-active 
attitude towards new health and safety legislation, does not stand firm, considering the 
high proportion of overdue cases these countries produce in this area. 
 
Table 6.6  Seriously overdue cases across countries and policies (% of all 257 transposition cases) 
 NL DE UK ES EL Total 
H&S new 14% 14% 12% 42% 24% 21% 
H&S amending 17% 22% 15% 10% 31% 19% 
Other new/amending 6% 13% 11% 0% 23% 11% 
Source: own data 
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As compared to the category ‘other social issues’, the transposition deadlines of health 
and safety directives most often are seriously violated (Table 6.6). The vast proportion of 
long overdue cases occur in Greece (all social policies), Spain (new health and safety 
directives), and Germany (amending health and safety). 
Countries’ patchy transposition records and the huge proportion of overdue cases become 
somewhat of a challenge to the overly optimistic notions of states complying with 
European obligations. 
Firstly, the results contradict Börzel (2001) who denies that non-compliance with EU law 
is a systematic and pathological problem, and meanwhile portrays implementation 
deficits as a product of statistical artefacts.  
Secondly, the observation that member states transposed 61 per cent of the transposition 
cases after the directive’s deadline contradicts the optimistic outcomes of the periodical 
monitors of the Internal Market’s progress. These official deficit scores, ranging from 6.8 
per cent (November 1997) to 1.6 per cent (November 2005), seriously underestimate the 
significance of deadline violations. Thirdly, the actual transposition scores presented in 
this chapter refute official statements that such violations become less of a problem. 
Notably, due to lacking transposition data, the analyses only refer to notified cases, and 
exclude 14 per cent of the transposition cases relating to directives enacted between 1995 
and 1999 and also exclude all cases referring to directives enacted between 2000 and 
2004 of which 36 per cent were not yet notified. Hence, future analyses may reveal that 
these recent periods generate lengthy overdue cases. From among the transposition cases 
that have been analyzed, overdue cases still have a substantial share in the latest report 
period. In Germany 50 per cent of the cases referring to directives adopted between 1995-
1999, were transposed after the deadline, vis-à-vis 62 per cent in the United Kingdom and 
Greece, 47 per cent in The Netherlands, and 6 per cent in Spain. Hence, most member 
states still have serious problems in meeting the transposition deadline set in a directive, 
although deficits may be more persistent if new directives, instead of amendments, call 
for transposition. Transposition deficits are also more serious in the one area, than in the 
other.  
Finally, the results cast doubt on the existence of national regularities. Rather, the 
findings in this chapter provide evidence that cross-country variations are not the only 
puzzle to solve. Beyond variations across countries, huge variations across time and 
policy issues arise. The next chapter examines how much the observed, within-country 
diversity deflates the explanatory power of predictors. 
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Endnotes
                                                     
 
 
1 United Kingdom, 4 cases excluded; Greece 15 cases excluded; Spain, 22 cases excluded. 
2 By way of illustration, it was not before 1982 that the Commission started publishing its annual reports on 
monitoring the application of Community law. 
3 Most often, a uniform transposition deadline is set for all member states. Occasionally, a directive permits 
countries to deviate from the general deadline. Four directives in the database allow Greece more time for 
implementation than the other countries. In four other cases, directives extend provisions in earlier 
directives to other countries (the United Kingdom and Ireland) than those formerly addressed. These 
extensions, adopted after the original directive, contain adjusted deadlines.    
4 Council Directive 1997/42/EC of 27 June 1997, for example, relates to the protection of workers from the 
risks related to exposure to carcinogens at work. Council directive 1999/38/EC of 29 April 1999 amends 
for the second time Directive 90/394/EEC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure 
to carcinogens at work and extends it to mutagens.  
5 In actual fact, the available transposition time ranges even more extreme than the averages presented here, 
varying from 4 months, to 71 months.  
6 Note that these correlation coefficients follow from a Kendall’s tau non-parametric correlation analysis.  
7 Figure 6.12 does not include directives under the subcategory ‘miscellaneous’. These directives are 
directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 December 1996, concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, and Council directive 98/49/EC of 29 
June 1998 on safeguarding the supplementary pension rights of employed and self-employed persons 
moving within the Community. The member states transposed these directives relatively fast.  
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7 EXPLAINING VARYING COMPLIANCE PATTERNS 
 
 
‘Every genuine test of a scientific theory is logically an attempt to refute or to falsify it, 
and one genuine counter instance falsifies the whole theory’ (Karl Popper, 1963) 
 
 
 
Given that within-country variations are substantial, and result in fine-meshed patterns, 
this chapter seeks to answer the second subquestion: Are ‘new institutionalisms’ capable 
of explaining these variations? The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 7.1 
summarizes the dependent variables, while Section 7.2 discusses the nature of the 
explanatory variables. Section 7.3 clarifies the method of regression that will be used. 
Section 7.4 examines the interrelationship between the explanatory variables and 
additional assumptions fundamental to multiple regression analysis. Section 7.5 and 7.6 
present the outcomes of the analyses, whereupon Section 7.7 summarizes the main 
conclusions.  
 
7.1 Dependent variables  
Exact measurement of the dependent variables transposition duration and overdue 
transposition benefits the reliability of outcomes. As opposed to similar quantitative work 
drawing on Commission statistics, this research draws on actual transposition 
achievements. Therefore, the outcomes of the next analyses are more solid than outcomes 
hitherto presented. As in the previous chapter, these analyses make a distinction between 
transposition duration, and overdue transposition, in an attempt to optimize the accuracy 
of prediction. Crucially, a predictor may cause transposition to take more or less time; the 
same predictor does not necessarily have a similar impact on the length of time overdue. 
This is because the scores of timely transposed cases do not vary within the variable 
overdue transposition; timely cases all score zero. Negative values arising from timely 
transposed cases are thus kept from biasing average scores on the latter variable. 
Transposition duration includes actual scores of timely cases, but disregards the time 
European legislative authorities hold fit for transposition. It permits analyzing which 
factors have a significant impact on domestic legislative transposition practices and 
standards. Variations on overdue transposition only arise in case of violations of a 
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directive’s deadline. From the regression outcomes as regards overdue transposition, one 
can tell which predictors are sufficiently powerful to explain why variations occur in the 
length of time overdue.1 
 
 
7.2 Explanatory variables 
The previous chapter demonstrates that within-country variations are the rule rather than 
exception. Their rate of occurrence makes exclusive reliance on macro-institutional 
explanations unrealistic. The scores are by no means a sign that a federal state (Germany) 
or a quasi-federal state (Spain) is less able to adjust their laws than are unitary states (The 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Greece). Nor do the scores produce evidence that 
northern states do better than southern states, or that founder member states outperform 
new members.  
Therefore, the explanations in this research combine nationwide variables with process 
variables that are typical of the transposition case at issue. The key explanations - arising 
from the veto player theory, and socialization theory respectively - and one of the control 
variables, the historical institutional goodness-of-fit thesis, have been selected on the 
basis of their corroboration in past work. Additional variables monitor the effect of 
Commission incentives for the improvement of transposition performance, and the 
available time for transposition.  
Both the veto player mechanism and the social learning mechanism have been precisely 
operationalized. With this, the research distinguishes itself from past large-N inquiries 
into transposition. Rather than relying on the commonly used nationwide veto point 
indexes (Linos 2004), left-right preferences (Treib 2003; Linos 2004), or attitudes 
towards Europe (e.g. Mbaye 2001; Linos 2004), the rational choice hypothesis considers 
only factual veto players, given the type of legal instrument used for transposition, the 
parties involved in their enactment, and the ideological distance between these parties. 
Likewise, the intensity of national bureaucrats’ socialization has been accurately cast in a 
point-6 socialization index (Chapter 4), and goes beyond the more basic 
operationalization of the theory through, for example, the length of a country’s 
membership (e.g. Mbaye 2001). 
In essence, it is the rational choice argument assigning political actors, and their formal 
competencies and preferences a central role in decision-making outcomes, which will be 
tested against the claim that socializing effects of formal and informal interaction among 
- in the present case - national bureaucrats, shape these outcomes. Bearing in mind the 
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amount of time the database covers, and the substantial within-group variations that came 
to the surface in the previous analyses, the one explanation does not exclude the other. 
The seriously overdue transposition cases that often occur at the start of a country’s 
membership, followed by gradual improvements over time, may well be a result of 
historical (policy misfit), and sociological institutional (social learning) mechanisms. 
These mechanisms, however, hardly explain why, occasionally, moderately and seriously 
overdue transposition cases continue to exist. In explaining these cases, the persistence of 
policy misfits and the consequences of rational choice may be better theoretical 
perspectives, as also in many instances, directives overdue for transposition differ from 
country to country. Apart from these leading variables, the analytical model monitors the 
effects of additional explanatory conditions. These so-called control variables include 
government changes, pressures arising from monitoring by the Commission, and 
available transposition time.  
 
The propositions that will be tested read as follows: 
 
Rational choice: veto players  
Provided that a directive requires a change in the status quo with respect to national 
policy, the greater the amount of veto players in the transposition process, the more time 
transposition takes, and the more likely it is that transposition will be overdue. 
 
Rational choice: significant government changes 
Under the assumption that ideologies of new governing parties significantly differ from 
ideologies of the governing parties that were replaced, government changes during the 
transposition process are likely to adversely affect transposition speed, and the more 
probable that transposition will be overdue.  
 
Sociological Institutionalism:  social learning 
The more national bureaucrats responsible for transposition are exposed to socialization 
agencies in Brussels, the more likely it is that a directive will be swiftly and timely 
transposed.  
 
Historical Institutionalism: goodness-of-(policy)fit 
If one or more ‘old’ national instruments precede new transposing instruments, 
transposition takes less time, and it is less likely that transposition is overdue.  
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Rational choice and socialization combined: Strategic adaption 
The more severe the Commission’s enforcement strategies are, the more likely it is that 
national authorities transpose directives swiftly and the less probable that transposition 
will be overdue.  
 
Available transposition time 
The more time member states have for the transposition of a directive, the more time 
transposition takes.  
 
The more time member states have for transposition, the less likely it is that transposition 
will be overdue. 
 
These propositions result in the following general equations: 
 
Durationi =  β0 - Socializationi + Veto Playersi  + Government changei - Existing 
  legislation - Strategic adaption  + Available time + εi   
 
Similarly,  
 
Overdue transpositioni  =  β0 - Socializationi + Veto Playersi  + Government changei  
-  Existing legislation - Strategic adaption  - Avalaible time + εi   
 
These linear equations express a straight line in an X-Y plot, where  β0 is the intercept or 
the constant (the point where the straight line crosses the Y-axis), and  εi is the random 
error term (the error between predicted and actual values of each case).  
 
The analyses reported below make a distinction between health and safety provisions, 
and other social policies on the one hand, and new and amending directives on the other. 
Likewise, the predictors will be tested across time, and across member states. Policy- and 
time-wise distinctions follow from theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter 5. Table 
7.1 summarizes their assumed consequences for the explanatory power of the key 
explanatory variables.  
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Table 7.1  Expected correlations between duration/overdue and the independent variables 
 Health 
& 
Safety 
Other New Amend 
ment 
75-89 90-94 
Socialization  -   -  - 
Existence of relevant law   - -  -  
No. of veto players  + +    
 
Socialization 
The socialization hypothesis predicts that the more national officials are exposed to 
socializing agencies in Brussels, the more likely it is that these officials promote 
compliance with a directive, resulting in a directive’s swift and timely transposition. 
Several arguments make it plausible that the effect of socialization should be significant 
if transposition involves health and safety provisions, while its effect should fail to show 
up in the category ‘others’.  Firstly, directives in the category ‘others’ involve general 
issues, while health and safety directives deal with technical issues. This is important, 
given that studies demonstrate that Council working group members mostly deal with 
technical issues, while COREPER deals with issues involving major points of 
controversy (Fouilleux et al. 2005). As a consequence, if national officials are capable of 
speeding up the transposition process, their influence is most likely to be felt in areas 
where technical - health and safety - issues predominate. For the same reason, the effect 
of social learning may be better felt if directives issue amending rather than new 
provisions. This is because, if national officials have room for manoeuvre, this room is 
more likely if transposition involves amendments of outdated directives.  
Secondly, socialization and social learning are processes that largely depend on 
communication and interaction. Communication and interaction is more likely to happen 
amongst officials frequently dealing with occupational health and safety regulation, than 
amongst officials who occasionally deal with policies that are once in a while subject to 
Europe’s interference.  
Finally, simply because social learning is a process that takes time, it is likely that the 
effect of social learning manifests itself more in the last decade under research, and less 
in the early years.  
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Goodness-of-fit 
It is expected that in an area like occupational health and safety, where national 
legislative authorities cope with a constant flow of European demands, Europe’s 
legislation starts to dominate domestic law, so that policy misfits should cease to exist. 
Therefore, the variable is assumed to be of significance for the transposition speed of 
other social directives, but less for the speed in which the member states transpose health 
and safety provisions. For similar reasons, it is expected that the goodness-of-fit 
hypothesis better explains variations in the category ‘new’ than in the category 
‘amendments’. Likewise, due to major adjustments of national systems to European 
standards over time, the effect of the goodness-of-fit is likely to decrease as years go by.  
 
Number of veto players 
The technicality of health and safety directives may have the result that veto players play 
a less important role in this area, than in social areas the effect of which goes beyond the 
working environment alone.  Likewise, key players involved in the transposition of health 
and safety directives may well differ from key players involved in the transposition of 
other social issues. Finally, given that these other, general, social provisions are broad in 
scope, while health and safety provisions are not, the former category probably involves 
more key players and will more often engender political conflicts. 
 
7.3 Method of regression  
The objective of this research is to establish how general and robust leading explanatory 
factors are. To achieve this, this research compares the outcomes arising from the full 
dataset with the outcomes resulting from isolated datasets based on policy issue, country, 
and decade. All these analyses finish up in the simplest powerful model. The restricted 
number of explanatory variables raises the reliability of outcomes.  
The regression method applied is the backward method of regression. This method does 
not enter all variables in one single step. Rather, stepwise methods involve a series of 
stages and eliminate variables that are of no statistical significance. Because the forward 
selection method may wrongly exclude significant explanatory variables, the backward 
method is preferable. Unlike the forward method, which starts with only a constant and 
then adds single predictors, the backward method starts with all predictors and removes 
in the next steps variables the effect of which is not substantial (Field 2005). In this 
research variables of which the probability level is > 0.05 will be removed.  
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7.4  Assumptions of Multiple Regression analysis 
Multiple regression analysis requires that the variables in the regression model meet a 
number of vital assumptions. Two of them are concerned with the variable type and 
variance. In conformity with the rules of regression, all independent variables in the 
regression model are measured at the interval level or consist of two categories, while their 
values have some variation. The dependent variables - transposition duration and overdue 
transposition are measured at the ratio level. To assure that the regression model is adequate, 
and the outcomes more general, the remainder of the assumptions have been examined.   
 
7.4.1  Outliers  
First case-wise diagnostics on duration show that four transposition cases have a standard 
deviation of 3 or more. Likewise, seven transposition cases with a standard deviation of 3 
or more occur in the variable overdue transposition (see annex 4). These, socalled, 
outliers may cause biased, estimated regression coefficients (Field 2005). Dropping the 
cases could significantly erode even distribution of cases. Instead, the biasing effect of 
outliers was reduced by recoding their respective scores to the third standard deviation 
(De Vaus 2002).2 With this, the proportional contribution of each member state to the 
dataset is kept in balance.  
 
7.4.2 Multicollinearity  
 
Table 7.2  Bivariate (Pearson) correlations between explanatory variables  
 
 
Socia- 
lization 
No. of veto 
players 
Government 
change 
Existence of 
relevant law
Strategic 
adaption 
Available 
time 
Socialization  1 -,031 -,065 -,101 ,780** ,038 
No. of veto players -,031 1 ,016 -,069 -,046 -,050 
Government change -,065 ,016 1 ,056 -,088 -,032 
Existence of relevant law -,101 -,069 ,056 1 -,174** ,036 
Strategic adaption ,780** -,046 -,088 -,174** 1 ,113 
Available time  ,038 -,050 -,032 ,036 ,113 1 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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The assumption of no perfect multicollinearity rules that independent variables should 
not correlate too highly. There are no hard and fast rules about what value is cause for 
concern. De Vaus (2002) maintains that correlations of 0.95 or higher are critical, while 
others find a correlation value above 0.80 (Field 2005) or 0.70 (e.g. Nunnally and 
Bernstein 1994) or higher cause for concern. Similar differences in opinion apply to the 
additional diagnostic statistics for multicollinearity, i.e. the variable inflation factor (VIF) 
and the tolerance score. These statistics take interaction effects into account as well as 
simple correlations. Bowerman & O’Connell (1990) suggest that multicollinearity may 
be biasing the regression model if the average VIF goes beyond 1. Others define 
variables with a tolerance of 0.2 or less problematic, and/or a VIF factor of 4 or more 
(Cohen 1969), since these variables may lead to unstable and unreliable regression 
estimates, significance levels, and confidence intervals (De Vaus 2002; Hutcheson and 
Sofroniou 1999).  
Examination of the bivariate correlations between the explanatory variables (table 7.2) 
shows that the variable ‘strategic adaption’ highly correlates with ‘socialization’ 
(Pearson’s r 0.78). Additional multicollinearity tests run within multiple regression 
establish that within some of the distinctive categories the VIF factor and the tolerance 
score in the other categories also give cause for concern (annex 5). To avoid 
misinterpretation of the variables entered, the explanatory power of socialization and 
strategic adaption will be separately tested.   
 
7.4.3 Normally distributed errors  
The normality of residuals has been tested through histograms and normal probability-
probality (P-P) plots of normally distributed residuals (annex 6) The plots show that for 
all populations, the residuals in the model meet the assumption of randomly, normally 
distributed residuals. As compared to transposition duration, the distribution of overdue 
scores is somewhat skewed. The reason for this is that the scores of timely transposed 
cases were transformed into 0 for the variable overdue transposition. Nonetheless, the 
dots in the normal probability plots of ‘overdue’ are not exceptionally distant from the 
line. Hence, the deviation from normality appears modest. Moreover, violation of the 
normality assumption has little effect on the regression outcomes, especially if the sample 
size is large enough (e.g. 100 or more) (De Vaus 2002, pp. 78-79).  
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7.4.4 Homoscedasticity and linearity of relationships 
Firstly, the relationships between the dependent and independent variables should be 
linear ones. If not, this limits the generalizability of the findings. Relationships have been 
examined through linearity tests. The outcomes illustrate that the relationships are linear 
ones (see annexes 8 to 11). 
Secondly, if the variance of the independent variables on the dependent variable is not 
consistent across all values, the assumption of homoscedasticity is violated. The Levene’s 
tests of homogeneity of variance (annex 12) indicate that violation of this assumption 
applies to four (socialization, strategic adaption, veto players, and time available) out of 
six variables. These outcomes can partly be a result of the sample size. If this is large, 
small differences in group variances can produce a Levene’s test that is significant; this is 
a consequence of the improved power of the test (Field 2005). In the present case, 
heteroscedasticity is inherent to the course of the dependent variable. Launching into 
WLS (Weighted Least Squares), a technique that gives greater weight to the more 
accurate observations (i.e. those with less variability) in establishing the regression 
coefficients, would bring problems of its own. Crucially, the weight transformation 
procedure does not secure that the correct weights are chosen, so that biased estimates of 
the standard errors may result. Besides, heteroscedasticity is a problem if it is an effect of 
omitted variables, measurement errors, or non-constant parameters (Pryce 2002, p. 4). 
Furthermore, only severe heteroscedasticity would cause seriously biased standard errors 
(Allison 1999, p. 128).   
In cases of socialization and strategic adaption, violation of the homoscedasticity 
assumption is an effect of the decreasing variance on transposition duration and overdue 
transposition (see Chapter 6). Similarly, transposition cases of which transposition time is 
below average generate less variance (284.932) than cases relating to above average 
transposition time (814.531). This is because in the former group a minimum acts as a 
barrier. In case of rational choice, violation of the assumption of homoscedasticity is less 
apparent. From a comparison of variances it turns out that the variance on transposition 
duration and overdue transposition decreases along with the number of veto players, i.e. 
the transposition behaviour of a single veto player (variance 609.225) is significantly 
more changeable, than when more veto players (variance 128.809 in case of 4 veto 
players) collectively decide on transposition.  
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7.4.5  Independent errors 
For any observation, the residual terms should be uncorrelated or independent.  
This assumption was tested by means of the Durbin-Watson test for serial correlations 
between errors. Values less than 1 or greater than 3, which are definitely cause for 
concern, were not detected (annex 13). 
 
7.5 Results of Multiple Regression Analysis 
This section discusses the relationships found between transposition duration and overdue 
transposition on the one hand, and institutional behavioural logics on the other. 
Considering the multicollinearity between the variables socialization and strategic 
adaption, the power of these variables will be separatedly tested. Hence, the models 
presented in this chapter, do not take in the variable strategic adaption. Annex 14 and 
Table 7.10 present the regression outcomes as regards this variable. 
The discussion starts off with a comparison of the outcomes, if analyses relate to all 
directives. Following from this, Section 7.6.1 focuses on transposition duration and 
reveals the outcomes of multiple regression analyses on isolated transposition 
populations. The resulting regression outcomes settle how the explanatory variables 
behave in distinct policy areas (Table 7.4), member states (Table 7.5), and successive 
periods (Table 7.6). Section 7.6.2 - now taking overdue transposition as the dependent 
variable - makes similar distinctions.  
Considering the small size of some of the isolated categories, the statistics make 
reference to both the R2 and the adjusted R2. Scores on the latter verify that the case-to-
variable ratio does not inflate the R2. The adjusted R2 takes the number of explanatory 
variables into account. For large samples, the R2 and adjusted R2 will be quite close, but 
in smaller samples where the case-to-variable ratio is low they can differ considerably 
(De Vaus 2002, p. 375). 
 
Chapter 7 
 
118 
 
Table 7.3  Results OLS regression (N=231), transposition duration and overdue 
  transposition 
 Transposition duration Overdue transposition 
 Expected 
correlation 
Original 
model 
Simplest 
powerful 
model 
Expected 
correlation 
Original 
model 
Simplest 
powerful 
model 
(Constant)  1410 
(147) 
1410 
(147) 
 839 
(116) 
821 
(106) 
Socialization  - -51** 
(19) 
-51** 
(19) 
- -53*** 
(15) 
-53*** 
(15) 
No. of veto 
players 
+ -103* 
(51) 
-103* 
(51) 
+ -112** 
(40) 
-110** 
(40) 
Government 
change 
+ 360** 
(109) 
360** 
(109) 
+ 169 
(86) 
172* 
(85) 
Existence of 
relevant law  
- -538*** 
(96) 
-538*** 
(96) 
- -234** 
(75) 
-233** 
(75) 
Available 
time above 
average 
 
+ 
388*** 
(85) 
388*** 
(85) 
- -27 
(67) 
 
R2  ,238 ,238  ,123 ,122 
Unstandardized regression coefficients (rounded off in days); Standard errors in parentheses.  
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
 
The regression outcomes in Table 7.3 draw a comparison between the power of 
explanatory factors in predicting variation in transposition duration on the one side, and 
variation in overdue transposition on the other.  
Forceful corroboration of the available time hypothesis in the duration model raises the 
explained variance within transposition duration (23.8 per cent), vis-à-vis overdue 
transposition (12.3 per cent). If the available time is above average, transposition duration 
increases by 13 months. The variable is not capable of explaining variance in overdue 
transposition. Exclusive corroboration of this hypothesis in the duration model suggests 
that overdue transposition is not a consequence of European legislative authorities 
underestimating the time required for transposition.  
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Importantly, all the relationships, except for the relationship between the number of veto 
players and transposition duration and overdue transposition, behave as hypothesized.  
From among the key variables, socialization significantly affects the length of the 
transposition process and with more confidence, the magnitude of deadline violations. 
Each additional score on socialization - ranging from 0 to 8 - causes both transposition 
duration and violations of the deadline to decrease by almost 2 months.   
Apparently, European social policies are not a source for political conflicts between veto 
players, given that the veto player hypothesis is not corroborated. Markedly, the effect of 
the number of veto players is contrary to the one the theory predicts: Instead of delaying 
the process, each additional veto player speeds up the process.  
Other variables capable of explaining variances in transposition duration are major 
government changes, and the existence of relevant national law. Major government 
changes prolong transposition duration. In the event of one or more government changes 
between the directive’s date of publication and its deadline, transposition takes almost 
one year (360 days) more. The occurrence of government changes is of minor 
significance for the overdue scores. Also, the existence of relevant law is highly 
significant for the duration of the transposition process. If member states notify new 
transposing instruments in concert with legislation that was already part of national 
legislation at the time the Commission proposes the directive, transposition duration is 
reduced by almost one-and-a-half year (538 days). Likewise, the existence of relevant old 
legislation brings about 8 months less backlog. Corroboration of the latter hypothesis 
indicates that policy misfits may seriously hinder swift transposition. Most likely, newly 
adopted legal instruments (if accompanied by old instruments) introduce (minor) 
adjustments or mere supplements to existing national legislation.  
The following sections discuss the outcomes of partial analyses relating to transposition 
duration (Section 7.6.1), and overdue transposition (Section 7.6.2) respectively, so as to 
establish whether distinctive groups of cases yield dissimilar outcomes. 
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7.5.1 Transposition duration 
 
Table 7.4 Results OLS regression: dependent variable DURATION across policies 
 Expected 
correlation 
Total 
(N=231) 
H&S 
(N=157) 
Other 
(N=74) 
New 
(N=192) 
Amending 
(N=39) 
(Constant)  1410 
(147) 
1444 
(151) 
1108 
(72) 
1221 
(140) 
2083 
(253) 
Socialization  - -51** 
(19) 
-90** 
(26) 
  -268*** 
(55) 
No. of veto 
players 
+ -103* 
(51) 
    
Government 
change 
+ 360** 
(109) 
385** 
(133) 
 326** 
(122) 
 
Existence of 
relevant law  
- -538*** 
(96) 
-551*** 
(117) 
-439** 
(154) 
-496*** 
(104) 
-621* 
(249) 
Available 
time above 
average 
+ 388*** 
(85) 
501*** 
(107) 
 420*** 
(95) 
1067*** 
(241) 
R2  ,238 ,281 ,102 ,223 ,447 
Adjusted R2  ,221 ,262 ,090 ,207 ,400 
Unstandardized regression coefficients (rounded off in days); Standard errors in parentheses.  
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
 
Table 7.4 is an assessment of the contribution to transposition duration of each variable 
within theoretical meaningful groups of cases. Column 3, relating to all transposition 
cases, makes reference to the simplest powerful model in Table 7.1. The subsequent 
columns display the outcomes of the backward regression method if health and safety 
policies and other social issues are set apart. Likewise, the final columns distinguish new 
and amending directives.  
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7.5.1.1 Duration: cross-policy comparison 
For implementing health and safety directives, socialization turns out to be a significant 
accelerating factor. Each additional score on socialization brings about a decrease in 
transposition time of 90 days (3 months).  
Congestion, due to major government changes only occurs in the category ‘health and 
safety’. The incidence of one or more government changes between a directive’s 
adoption and deadline holds up transposition of these directives by almost 13 months. 
Government changes do not significantly affect transposition duration of other social 
policies.  
The existence of relevant national law affects transposition in all policy categories alike. 
If a member state notified existing law along with new transposing law, its time-reducing 
effect varies, ranging from 14 months in the category ‘other social policies’ to 18 months 
in the category ‘health and safety’.   
The time available does not alter scores on transposition duration if directives relate to 
directives, other than health and safety. Transposition of health and safety directives takes 
16 months more if the available time is above average. 
 
7.5.1.2 Duration: cross-directive type comparison 
The effect of socialization is highly significant if transposition relates to amendments, the 
major part of which deals with health and safety provisions. Each stage in the process 
reduces the transposition duration by nearly 9 months (268 days). Socialization does not 
significantly affect the transposition duration of new directives.  
The regression outcomes do not back up the assumed effect of veto players. The 
occurrence of government changes is significant, though. When directives are new, the 
occurrence of a government change causes transposition to take 11 months longer. 
Existence of relevant national law significantly reduces transposition duration in both 
categories, yet with most confidence in the category ‘new’ (496 days = 16 months).  
The time available for transposition is highly significant: in the category ‘new’, the 
variable adds more than a year (378 days) to transposition duration; the transposition 
duration of amending directives is affected by almost three years (1067 days).  
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7.5.1.3 Duration: cross-country comparison 
 
Table 7.5 Results OLS regression: dependent variable DURATION across countries 
 Expected 
correlation 
NL 
(N=52) 
DE 
(N=42) 
UK 
(N=49) 
ES 
(N=42) 
EL 
(N=46) 
(Constant)  1148 
(210) 
1157 
(121) 
1017 
(101) 
1476 
(136) 
1396 
(89) 
Socialization  - -95* 
(37) 
    
No. of veto 
players 
      
Government 
change 
+      
Existence of 
relevant law  
-  -522* 
(210) 
 -735** 
(220) 
 
Available 
time above 
average 
+ 817*** 
(176) 
    
R2  ,343 ,134 ,000 ,219 ,000 
Adjusted R2  .317 ,112 ,000 ,199 ,000 
Unstandardized regression coefficients (rounded off in days); Standard errors in parentheses.  
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
 
The transposition duration model was also separately tested at the country level (all social 
policies included). Most notable are the high correlation coefficients for The Netherlands 
(R2 .343, and .317 if adjusted), and Spain (R2 .219, and .199 if adjusted). It is only in The 
Netherlands where one of the key propositions is corroborated. In this country, each 
additional score on the socialization index reduces transposition duration by 3 months. In 
none of the countries the number of veto players significantly adds to the duration of the 
transposition process. In Germany (P < 0.05) and Spain (P < 0.001), the existence of old 
transposing instruments significantly correlates with transposition duration. If newly 
introduced instruments come with old legislation, transposition duration decreases by 24 
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months in Spain and by 17 months in Germany. In The Netherlands, the time available 
causes transposition to slow down by 27 months.  
 
7.5.1.4 Duration: cross-time comparison 
 
Table 7.6 Results OLS regression: dependent variable DURATION across time 
  Expected 
Correlation 
1975-1989 
(N=91) 
1990-1999 
(N=140) 
(Constant)  978 
(141) 
1565 
(229) 
Socialization  -  -96** 
(36) 
No. of veto players +   
Government  
change 
+ 495* 
(208) 
270* 
(120) 
Existence of 
relevant law  
- -663*** 
(177) 
-477*** 
(114) 
Available time 
above average 
+ 566** 
(169) 
343*** 
(93) 
R2  ,237 ,256 
Adjusted R2  ,211 ,244 
Unstandardized regression coefficients (rounded off in days); Standard errors in parentheses.  
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
 
The breakdown by decade (table 7.6) is a cautious indication that, over time, the 
significance of predictors and the amount of variance they explain, may alter. 
This expectation is especially true for socialization. Whereas socialization was of no 
significance in the early years, the factor gains in explanatory strength in the last period. 
Each score on the socialization index accelerates the transposition process by 3 months. 
In both periods, the existence of national legislation is significant, although the amount of 
variance this variable explains is considerably reduced in the 1990s. Likewise, the 
amount of variance explained by government changes and the time available for 
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transposition is lower in the 1990s than in the previous period. Markedly, the available 
time hypothesis is corroborated with increased confidence in the 1990s.  
 
7.5.2 Overdue transposition  
 
Table 7.7 Results OLS regression: dependent variable OVERDUE TRANSPOSITION across 
 policies  
 Expected 
correlation 
Total 
(N=231) 
H & S 
(N=157) 
Other 
(N=74) 
New 
(N=192) 
Amending 
(N=39) 
(Constant)  821 
(106) 
897 
(111) 
237 
(46) 
862 
(121) 
1021 
(182) 
Socialization  - -53*** 
(15) 
-84*** 
(21) 
 -45** 
(17) 
-124*** 
(31) 
No. of veto 
players 
+ -110** 
(40) 
  -137** 
(47) 
 
Government 
change 
+ 172* 
(85) 
    
Existence of 
relevant law  
- -233** 
(75) 
-205* 
(94) 
 -260** 
(82) 
 
Available 
time above 
average 
-      
R2  ,122 ,123 ,000 ,101 ,297 
Adjusted R2  ,106 ,111 ,000 ,086 ,278 
Unstandardized regression coefficients (rounded off in days); Standard errors in parentheses.  
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
 
7.5.2.1 Overdue transposition: cross-policy comparison 
Socialization materializes into a significant relationship with the overdue length, but only 
in the category ‘health and safety’. Each additional score on the socialization index 
reduces the delay by 3 months. Likewise, the existence of relevant law only affects the 
overdue score in the category ‘health and safety’. If existing national law backs up new 
transposing legislation, delays decrease by 7 months in this category.   
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7.5.2.2 Overdue transposition: cross-type comparison 
Similar to earlier observations as regards duration, the regression model explains less variance 
in the category ‘new directives’ (10.1 percent), than it explains in the category ‘amendments’ 
(29.7 per cent). Splitting the data according to a directive’s novelty, results in corroboration of 
two hypotheses. Socialization is especially significant, if directives entail amendments. The 
factor is corroborated with less confidence and explains less variance in overdue transposition 
if directives are new.  The existence of old legislation is of relevance, but only in the category 
‘new’.  The variable decreases the length of violations in this category by 8.5 months (260 
days). The effect of veto players is again opposed to the expectations.   
 
7.5.2.3 Overdue transposition: cross-country comparison 
 
Table 7.8 Results OLS regression: dependent variable OVERDUE TRANSPOSITION across 
  countries 
 Expected 
correlation 
NL 
(N=52) 
DE 
(N=42) 
UK 
(N=49) 
ES 
(N=42) 
EL 
(N=46) 
(Constant)  1201 
(208) 
313 
(75) 
290 
(74) 
435 
(94) 
975 
(179) 
Socialization  - -98** 
(28) 
   -64* 
(31) 
No. of veto 
players 
+ -160* 
(79) 
    
Government 
change 
+      
Existence of 
relevant law  
- -467* 
(220) 
    
Available 
time above 
average 
-      
R2  ,310 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,089 
Adjusted R2  ,267    ,068 
Unstandardized regression coefficients (rounded off in days); Standard errors in parentheses.  
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
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Socialization and the existence of old legislation significantly reduce the overdue time in 
The Netherlands. Each additional score on socialization makes the overdue score 3 
months less, while the existence of old legislation decreases the seriousness of overdue 
transposition in The Netherlands by more than a year. Socialization also decreases the 
seriousness of overdue transposition in Greece. Finally, and as opposed to their assumed 
effect, the number of veto players reduces the overdue score in The Netherlands. 
Markedly, none of the variables entered has a significant impact on the overdue 
transposition cases generated by the other countries. 
 
7.5.2.4 Overdue transposition: cross-time comparison 
 
Table 7.9 Results OLS regression: dependent variable OVERDUE TRANSPOSITION across 
time 
  Directive’s year of adoption 
 Expected 
correlation 
1975-1989 
(N=91) 
1990-1999 
(N=140) 
(Constant)  539 
(74) 
1185 
(196) 
Socialization  -  -109*** 
(29) 
No. of veto players +  -101* 
(42) 
Government change +   
Existence of 
relevant law  
- -331* 
(131) 
-205* 
(93) 
Available time 
above average 
-   
R2  ,067 ,133 
Adjusted R2  ,056 ,113 
Unstandardized regression coefficients (rounded off in days); Standard errors in parentheses.  
*  P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
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A final analysis is concerned with the firmness of explanatory factors for the seriousness 
of deadline violations, if tested for different periods. Notably, the effect of socialization 
on the variable ‘overdue transposition’ is only significant in the latest period. In addition, 
the existence of national law relating to the directive affects the variable ‘overdue’. This 
factor is not highly significant, though, and explains less variation in the 1990s (7 
months), than in the former period (11 months).  
 
7.6  Time related factors 
Socialization 
Without monitoring the effect of strategic adaption, socialization is the only key variable 
the explanatory power of which is occasionally confirmed. For a true understanding of 
the socialization process, it is necessary to dismantle the applied socialization index, and 
examine whether duration, intensity and density of interaction are equally important. This 
is not the case. The socialization proposition largely owes its corroboration to the length 
of a country’s membership. Apparently, acceleration of the process does not necessarily 
require dense and intense interaction. It is only in the category ‘amendments’, where both 
duration of interaction and intensity of interaction are significant predictors. For 
transposition outcomes the density of interaction seems of little consequence.  
 
Strategic adaption  
The previous analyses were rerun to establish the effect of strategic adaption. The factor 
socialization was excluded, and replaced by strategic adaption. For the results of the 
regression analyses reference is made to annex 14.  
 
 
Table 7.10 Strategic adaption, summary of OLS regression results  
 Transposition duration Overdue transposition 
All social policies -135** 
(39) 
-146*** 
(29) 
Health & safety  -180** 
(53 ) 
-185*** 
(42 ) 
Other   
Chapter 7 
 
128 
 
New directives -117* 
(45) 
-147*** 
(35 ) 
Amending directives -349*** 
(88) 
-304*** 
(65 ) 
1975-1989   
1990-1999 -185** 
(54) 
-201*** 
(41) 
The Netherlands -230** 
(71) 
-203** 
(56) 
Germany   
United Kingdom   
Spain -257* 
(100) 
-323*** 
(75) 
Greece  -171** 
Unstandardized regression coefficients (rounded off in days); Standard errors in parentheses.  
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
 
Table 7.10 summarizes the consequences of strategic adaption for the transposition 
scores. It shows that the relationship between strategic adaption and duration (and 
overdue) behaves as expected. Strategic adaption significantly reduces the length of 
transposition duration and the seriousness of deadline violations. Importantly, in 
populations where the relationship between strategic adaption and the dependent variable 
is statistically significant, the direction of the relationship is consistent and in conformity 
with the hypothesis.  
Each successive occasion on which the Commission intensifies its enforcement strategy - 
November 1982, November 1993, November 1997, March 2002 - is an incentive for 
member states - considering their reputation and costly sanctions - to reduce the average 
transposition time. This effect is especially evident in the category ‘amendments’, where 
each successive strategic adaption score reduces transposition duration by almost one 
year. Likewise, and with more confidence, strategic adaption significantly reduces the 
length of deadline violations. Again, its effect is best felt in the category ‘amendments’. 
Each additional score on strategic adaption reduces the scores on the variable ‘overdue’ 
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in this category by 10 months. Strategic adaption has no impact on transposition 
behaviour in the category ‘other social policies’. Moreover, its effect is limited to the 
transposition scores in the 1990s.  
As for the countries, strategic adaption significantly alters the scores in The Netherlands 
(duration and overdue), Spain (duration and overdue) and Greece (overdue). The German 
and British transposition responsible authorities appear to be less sensitive to the 
incentives of the Commission.  
 
7.7 Summary and conclusion  
 
Table 7.11 Results OLS regression combined 
 All H&S Other New Amen
dment 
75-89 90-99 
Socialization Duration - ** **   ***  ** 
Overdue - *** ***  ** ***  *** 
No. of veto 
players 
Duration  (*)       
Overdue  (**)   (**)   (*) 
Government 
change 
Duration + ** **  **  * * 
Overdue + *       
Existence of 
relevant law 
Duration - *** *** ** *** * *** *** 
Overdue - **   **  * * 
Strategic 
adaption 
Duration - ** **  * ***  ** 
Overdue - *** ***  *** ***  *** 
Available 
time above 
average 
Duration  + *** ***  *** *** ** *** 
Overdue         
* P < .0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001; Significance levels placed between brackets denote effects opposed to 
expectations. 
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This chapter dealt with the question of how much new institutionalist explanations add to 
our understanding of varying levels of compliance in the area of European social policies. 
To mount a challenge to the dominance of new institutionalism in EU law compliance 
literature, the explanatory power of leading institutional accounts on transposition 
duration and overdue transposition was tested across various populations drawn from the 
dataset. This chapter summarizes the outcomes.  
Notably, predictors explaining transposition duration have a different or no effect on the 
overdue scores, and vice versa. It means that an exclusive concentration on only one of 
the dependent variables makes that important causal relationships remain invisible. As 
explained elsewhere, the computation of the variable duration warrants that not only 
scores of overdue cases vary, but also the scores of timely cases. The variable overdue 
transposition transformed scores of timely cases into 0. Apparantly, hypotheses that were 
corroborated in the duration models, but not in the overdue model, are most fit to explain 
variations among timely transposed cases.  
Table 7.11 summarizes the levels of confidence of the relationships found. From among 
the two key propositions, only the socialization thesis was corroborated. Applied to the 
implementation practice of European social policies, the general belief that political 
players’ interference causes lengthy procedures and overdue transposition comes to a 
dead end. Contrary to the veto player thesis, additional veto players’ involvement speeds 
up the process, at least in some of the categories. The accelerating effect of veto players 
relates to directives that were transposed in the 1990s, and also occurs when new 
directives require transposition. The number of veto players, moreover, cuts down the 
overdue scores in the category ‘health and safety’. This remarkable outcome may be 
partly due to the technical nature of health and safety directives. Even if social directives 
occasionally change the status quo, the lack of expertise of factual veto players may 
prevent them from obstructing the process. In addition, key players might pay more 
attention to timely implementation of new directives, because they believe that the 
Commission monitors transposition of the latter more closely than transposition of 
amendments, and more severely in the 1990s than in earlier days (see also Haverland and 
Romeijn 2007).   
The remainder of regression outcomes calls for refinement of at least some of the 
institutional theories. That is, socialization has an effect on transposition duration, but 
only in the category ‘health and safety’. However, it is only in the category ‘amendments’ 
the majority of which (33 out of 39 cases) deals with health and safety provisions, where 
its effect is highly significant. Markedly, it is only in this category where both the length 
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of membership and intensity of interaction are corroborated. Corroboration of the 
socialization hypothesis in the other categories largely hinges on the length of a country’s 
membership, which is, viewed apart, no guarantee for interaction between members of 
Council working groups. Considering that the high regulatory activity in the field of 
health and safety implies that officials frequently meet in Brussels, the effect of 
socialization in the category ‘health and safety amendments’ meets the expectation. The 
finding is also in line with observations documented by Fouilleux et al. (2005).  
The delaying effect arising from government changes on legislative adaptation was tested 
separately. This variable significantly affects transposition duration, but the occurrence of 
government changes does not alter the length of overdue transposition. Hence, it is likely 
that government changes are a likely reason for the postponement of the implementation 
of timely cases, but they do not necessarily cause or worsen deadline violations. It is only 
in the category ‘health and safety’ that government changes cause congestion. In 
addition, government changes slow down transposition of new legislation, rather than 
transposition of amendments. Again, ministers may be more attentive if it comes to new 
directives, but may give priority to other issues in the event of a government change. This 
may also be the reason that government changes affect transposition of health and safety 
directives more than other - more salient - social directives.  
Strategic adaption is a significant explanation for the reduction in duration and the length 
of overdue transposition in all categories but one (other social issues). The Netherlands, 
Spain, and Greece are more susceptible to European enforcement strategies, and the 
threat of high fines, than Germany and the United Kingdom are. Bearing in mind that the 
hypothesis was corroborated in the period 1990-1999 and not in the earlier years, the 
coming into force of the TEU, the internal market scoreboards, and the zero tolerance 
resolution were major incentives for reducing transposition duration and the seriousness 
of overdue transposition. Apparently, the publication of annual reports on monitoring the 
application of Community law, starting from November 1982, was a less successful 
incentive for speeding up the process.  
Existing national legislation is the only predictor that significantly reduces transposition 
duration in all categories alike. This factor also significantly reduces transposition 
duration in Germany and Spain. Policy misfits do not cease to exist, given that this factor 
is of similar significance in the 1990s, as it was in the 1980s. The goodness-of-fit 
hypothesis is less well capable of explaining variances in the length of overdue 
transposition. Its effect on transposition is only evident in the category ‘new directives’, 
and in The Netherlands.   
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Finally, if the available transposition time is above average, transposition duration is 
significantly affected. The more generous the deadline is, the longer transposition takes. 
Available transposition time has no effect on transposition duration of directives 
addressing ‘other social policies’. From among the countries, it is only in The 
Netherlands where its impact on transposition duration is convincingly strong. Again, the 
variance explained by this factor decreases over time.  
Vitally, the regression outcomes show that characteristics of both time and policy make a 
difference. Their effect on the individual country scores strongly diverge. Predictors that 
explain a vast amount of the variation found in The Netherlands and Spain are of little or 
no significance if applied to Germany, Greece or the United Kingdom. These outcomes 
provide no evidence for maintaining that macro institutional variables make the 
difference. The behaviour of northern countries does not differ from southern countries, 
nor does a federal state (Germany) markedly differ from unitarian states, or founding 
member states from new members.  
 
Endnotes
                                                     
 
 
1 Transposition cases with a deadline prior to the establishment of the Working Party on Social Questions. 
2 There are several options to solve outlier problems, i.e. by transforming the variable, by changing the 
scores of the outlier, or by dropping the case. The latter decision, however, must be taken with care (De 
Vauss 2002, p. 94). 
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8 SOCIAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: A DYNAMIC 
PROCESS  
 
‘Without comparisons to make, the mind does not know how to proceed’ 
(Alexis de Tocqueville) 
 
 
 
The ongoing process of European integration and national systems being overwhelmed 
by Community law stirred up the scholarly interest in EU compliance research. Notable 
are the many case studies, many of them emphasizing the consequences of institutions for 
the diverse compliance levels among the member states. Equally notable are the 
conflicting conclusions these studies generate. Rather than resolving whether the theories 
advanced by these small-N studies have a general explanatory power, quantitative 
comparisons aggravated the theoretical confusion. Most likely, and alongside their 
reliance on systematically biased official data, the sometimes glaring contradictions 
between the outcomes of large-N studies have their origins in inconsistencies in the 
construction of independent variables. Yet, their emphasis on cross-country differences, 
combined with a sole reliance on macro institutional factors as a way of explaining these 
differences are also debatable. Gaining a clearer understanding of implementation 
practices, within-country variations deserve similar attention. Ignoring these variations is 
likely to be the cause of potential accounts for varying levels of compliance mounting up. 
This research does not suggest novel causal relationships. Instead, it evaluates the 
strength of institutional explanations included in earlier implementation studies. The 
central question it seeks to answer is: Do major new institutional theories provide 
general explanations for varying levels of compliance with European policies? This 
question was divided into two subquestions. Firstly, how much do implementation 
records vary across time and across social policies? Secondly, are new institutionalisms 
capable of explaining these variations? 
These questions could be answered by analyzing the transposition records of five member 
states - The Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain and Greece - in European 
social policies, considering that this is an established and diverse policy field.   
To gain new insights into transposition practices, this research has been focusing on the 
day when the first transposing instrument - counting from the directive’s publication date 
- was passed. Doing so, the research makes a distinction between two processes - i.e. 
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transposition duration, and overdue transposition -. Scores on duration allow for 
inferences on how behavioural regularities develop independent of transposition 
deadlines. To monitor their effect, scores on overdue transposition factor in the deadline 
set in a directive, that is, the date on which the addressees should have officially 
transposed the directive into their legal systems. Overdue scores allow for inferences at 
the degree to which national legislators transpose directives on time, and if not, how 
frequently, and how much, they violate the transposition deadline.   
 
8.1 How do transposition records vary within the member states?  
Judged from the overall comparisons between the five member states, it is true that some 
countries (Germany and the United Kingdom) transpose EU social policies substantially 
faster than the other countries, while the performance of Greece generally lags behind. 
However, above and beyond variations across the member states, large variations occur 
across time, across policy issue and across policy type. How countries respond to their 
transposition duty, varies over time and also depends on the policy type and how new the 
provision is.  
 
8.1.1 Cross policy variations 
Compared to The Netherlands, Germany, and Greece, the behaviour of Spain and the 
United Kingdom is most variable. Spain’s average transposition duration ranges from 2 
years (new directives issuing general social issues) to 4 years (new health and safety 
directives). Likewise, the duration averages achieved by the British vary from 1.5 years 
(amending health and safety directives) to 3.5 years (new health and safety directives). 
Also, if the focus is on a country’ s level of compliance with a directive’s deadline, the 
frequency of deadline violations largely depends on the issue at stake. Such cross-policy 
variations are least marked in Greece and most extreme in Germany and Spain. Germany 
transposes 73 per cent of the transposition cases relating to general social provisions late, 
as opposed to 33 per cent in the category ‘amending health and safety’. In Spain, new 
health and safety directives form a stumbling block. In this category 71 per cent of the 
cases are transposed after the deadline. Exceptionally modest then is the proportion of 
overdue cases that Spain produces in the category ’general social provisions’ (17 per 
cent). Even if less extreme, the records of the other countries show a similar variability 
across policies.  
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Looking at overdue scores strengthens the impression that the transposition performance 
of the member states is patchy. Of particular interest, then, are seriously (that is, two or 
more years) overdue cases, and which label applies to 29 per cent of all overdue cases. 
Among them, the vast proportion relates to health and safety directives. Within this 
category, especially Germany (amending directives) and Spain (new directives) allow the 
backlogs to build up. National authorities generally have less difficulty with 
implementing directives issuing general social provisions. If severe deadline violations 
occur in this category, they relate to equal treatment policies (all member states, except 
Spain), workers’ rights (Germany, Greece and the United Kingdom) and working time 
(United Kingdom).   
 
8.1.2 Cross time variations 
Alongside cross-policy variations, substantial variations arise over time. By way of 
illustration: It took The Netherlands almost 6 years on average to transpose social 
directives issued in the early 1980s. This outcome sharply contrasts with the Dutch 
average of 2 years and 4 months in the early 1990s. Likewise, the Greek government has 
never been able to reach the average duration of 12 months, which was realized in the 
late 1970s. Since then, the Greek averages range from 5.5 years (early 1980s) to 3 years 
(late 1990s). The records of the other countries show similar, though less extreme, cross-
time differences. As time goes by, the differences within and between the countries grow 
smaller. In general, most countries, except Greece, could bring the average duration down 
to less than three years in the late 1990s. However, this downward tendency does not 
apply to all social policies. In the late 1990s all countries, except Greece, still needed 
three years or more for transposing new health and safety directives. In the same period, 
it takes the United Kingdom and Greece three years or more to transpose general social 
provisions. Although the target deadlines set in most directives issued in this period were 
relatively generous, the frequency of violations was still substantial in the latest report 
period. From among the directives adopted between 1995 and 1999, Germany transposed 
50 per cent late, against 62 per cent (United Kingdom, Greece), and 47 per cent (The 
Netherlands). Only Spain (6 per cent late transposition cases) maintained a high standard.  
 
8.1.3  Transposition deficits: facts and fiction 
Taking a long-term view of national transposition achievements in European social 
policies, demonstrates that the compliance scholars’ tendency to prioritize cross-country 
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differences over variations within the countries leads to unfair conclusions. In all 
countries, both transposition duration and overdue transposition show substantial 
variations across time, across social policy issue, and finally, the scores on these variables 
vary along a directive’s novelty. Given their rate of occurrence, these within-country 
variations may be consequential for the alleged power of institutional accounts in 
providing general explanations for varying levels of compliance. 
 
8.2 New institutionalism and EU compliance research  
To resolve the second research question - are ‘new institutionalisms’ capable of 
explaining these variations - partial regression analyses were carried out, so as to 
establish whether leading institutional explanations hold, when tested on distinctive 
groups of transposition cases. Cases transposing health and safety provisions were set 
alongside cases transposing general social provisions. Moreover, transposition cases 
relating to new directives were separated from those relating to amending directives. A 
final comparison relates to the regression outcomes for each country and for different 
time spans.  
The key theories that were tested are Tsebelis’ veto player theory and the socialization 
theory. In addition, the analytical framework includes two alternative institutional 
perspectives: The (legal) misfit theory, and the strategic adaption theory. Basically, the 
latter assumes that strategic action induces internalization of norms when actors decide to 
adopt unpreferred, yet cost-effective policies. A final control variable is concerned with 
the effect of the available transposition time.  
   
8.2.1 Accelerators of implementation   
 
8.2.1.1 Socialization  
The socialization or social learning hypothesis was measured through an index, the 
scores of which range from 0-9. This index combines three elements which are believed 
to be fundamental for socialization, i.e. duration, intensity and density of interaction. 
Assuming that bureaucrats have the power to speed up the transposition process, the 
index scores represent the level of exposure of national bureaucrats to European Council 
working groups. It is expected that the higher the level of exposure is, the more likely 
national bureaucrats are to promote a directive’s swift and timely transposition.  
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The regression outcomes show that socialization has no effect whatsoever on 
transposition cases relating to general social provisions. However, the level of 
socialization of bureaucrats does affect the speed of transposition of health and safety 
directives, especially if these directives amend previous provisions. A plausible reason 
for these differences in outcomes is the amount of European regulatory activity. A 
collective desire to harmonize occupational health and safety regulations has generated, 
since the 1960s, a constant stream of European provisions. The EU has been less pushy in 
the remainder of social policies.  
Secondly, it is said that the Council working groups are entrusted to limit the number of 
problematic issues. In doing so, they predominantly solve technical issues. They deal far 
less with provisions of a general and far-reaching nature (Fouilleux et al. 2005). Health 
and safety directives are frequently concerned with technical aspects,1 while the 
remainder of social directives bears on more general labour conditions, the effect of 
which goes well beyond the working environment alone. Therefore, the division of labour 
between the Council working groups, COREPER and the Council (the latter bodies 
resolve controversial issues), may explain how socialized working group members can 
speed up the transposition of health and safety directives, but have no effect whatsoever 
on the transposition pace of the oher social provisions.  
Markedly, it is only in the category ‘amending health and safety’, where both the length 
of membership and intensity of interaction corroborate a significant relationship with 
transposition duration and overdue transposition. Measured separately, the density of 
interaction - which was assumed to be the third scope condition for socialization - does 
not add to the transposition pace.  
In the other categories, corroboration of the socialization hypothesis largely hinges on the 
length of a country’s membership. Apparently, the passage of time is a sufficient 
condition for speeding up the transposition process. However, viewed separately, the 
passage of time is no guarantee for socialization. Factors other than socialization may 
explain the increased transposition rate. For example, a Dutch expert in this field (Ter 
Bals, interview 2005) expects national bureaucrats’ close involvement in European 
policies to broaden their knowledge, expertise and awareness of Europe. 
Finally, from among the countries, it is only in The Netherlands (duration and overdue) 
and Spain (overdue), where socialization accelerates the transposition process. 
Socialization has no effect on the scores of the other countries. The capability of the 
socialization hypothesis to generate general results remains uncertain. Its effect has its 
limits, but may well increase over time. The fact that socialization significantly reduces 
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overdue scores in the period 1990-1999, but does not affect duration or overdue scores in 
the early years (1975-1989) is an indication to take note of.  
 
8.2.1.2 Goodness-of-fit   
The first control variable, the historical goodness-of-fit argument, assumes that 
transposition of a directive is less consequential and less time-consuming, if existing 
national law approximates its legislative provisions. A dummy variable was created for 
testing the strength of this argument. Transposition cases, for which both old (legislation 
that was already part of the national system prior to the Commission proposal of the 
directive) and new instruments were notified, were given a value of 1. The value 0 
represents transposition cases for which the member states notified only new national 
instruments.  
If member states can revert to existing laws, to the extent that these laws become part of 
the transposing legislation, transposition duration decreases substantially. Markedly, if 
directives amend earlier European legislation, the significance of this factor is relatively 
modest. Likewise, transposing a directive through new and existing national law 
significantly reduces the severity of deadline violations, but only if directives introduce 
new provisions. A ‘good policy fit’ has no effect on overdue scores of amending 
directives, possibly because the changes proposed in amending directives challenge 
existing national law less than new directives. Unlike the provisions introduced in new 
directives, which introduce autonomous substantive provisions, amendments modify or 
further specify provisions which were introduced in preceding directives.  
Comparisons across countries show that a goodness-of-fit between European and national 
policies significantly reduces transposition duration in Germany and Spain. However, it 
is only in The Netherlands, where the existence of relevant Dutch law significantly 
reduces the length of overdue transposition. The factor is not capable of explaining 
variations in the United Kingdom and Greece. In the period 1990-1999, the effect of the 
goodness-of-fit between European legislation and national legislation is as profound as it 
was in the period 1975-1989. Apparently, the goodness-of-fit thesis has not lost its 
strength.   
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8.2.2 Factors slowing down implementation 
 
8.2.2.1 Veto players 
The veto player hypothesis predicts that the higher the number of veto players in the 
transposition process the longer the transposition of a directive takes, and the more likely 
it is that transposition will be overdue. For testing the rational choice view on 
policymaking, this research adheres to the hypotheses that are the result of the work of 
Tsebelis. Crucially, the latter theory makes a clear distinction between potential and 
factual veto players. As opposed to potential veto players, (which label applies to each 
political actor involved in attempts to change the status quo), it is only factual veto 
players who have the power and ideological motive to exercise their veto. Accordingly, 
factual veto players add to the number of veto players; potential veto players do not. To 
identify factual veto players, one needs to consider a country’s arrangements in the 
decision making process, and also its preferences towards the transposition proposal. 
The actual effect of the number of veto players on transposition duration and overdue 
transposition is puzzling. As opposed to the effect predicted, the outcomes indicate that 
each additional veto player substantially reduces overdue transposition, at least in some 
of the categories. This accelerating effect exclusively applies to transposition of new 
directives and to transposition cases relating to directives adopted in the 1990s.  
Given that laws - as compared to lower instruments in the legislative hierarchy - involve 
more veto players, it is likely that, if adaptation to EU standards requires law, 
transposition takes priority over other matters. In addition, veto players may pay more 
attention to new directives, because they believe that the Commission monitors the 
transposition of newly introduced provisions more closely, while repercussions for 
transposing them late are more serious in the 1990s, than in earlier days (see also 
Haverland and Romeijn 2007).  
 
8.2.2.2 Government changes 
According to Tsebelis, government changes add to the number of factual veto players, 
provided that ideologies of new governing parties significantly differ from ideologies of 
the governing parties that were replaced.  
This variable was tested, assuming that government changes only have an effect if they 
occur prior to the transposition of a directive. The hypothesis predicts that significant 
government changes during the transposition process slow down transposition, and 
enhance the incidence of deadline violations.  
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Obstructions due to government changes, while corroborated if tested on all policies, are 
especially evident for the transposition duration of health and safety directives. Likewise, 
the effect of government changes is significant for the speed of transposition of new 
directives. Government changes do not affect the transposition speed of amending 
directives. This outcome is supportive of the earlier conjecture. Apparently, ministers are 
more closely engaged in the transposition of new directives than in the transposition of 
amendments. Their awareness of economic (or social) repercussions does not prevent 
them from occasionally becoming preoccupied with their own priorities, due to 
government changes obstructing the daily procedures. At the country level, the 
government change proposition is not corroborated. 
 
8.2.2.3 Available time 
The control variable available transposition time hypothesizes that, the more time 
member states have, the longer transposition takes. On the other hand, if member states 
have ample time for transposition, deadline violations are less likely.  
Indeed, it generally takes longer to transpose directives with deadlines above the average 
(30 months or more). The more time countries have, the longer the process takes. Again, 
the category ‘other social issues’ is an exception to this rule.  
It is only in The Netherlands where available time significantly boosts transposition 
duration. The time available does not affect the achievements of the other countries. Nor 
is the variable of sufficient significance for explaining variance in the length of overdue 
transposition. Exclusive corroboration of this hypothesis in the duration model suggests 
that violations are not a consequence of European legislators underestimating the time 
needed for transposition.  
 
8.3 Institutions’ limited generalizability 
The relationships found are solid and robust, that is, if corroborated, the direction taken 
by the explanatory variables remains constant across all subpopulations. They allow me 
to answer the central research question: Do leading institutional explanations have a 
general inference capacity, or is their explanatory power limited and incidental?  
This research demonstrates that the latter is true. The regression outcomes provide 
evidence of their incapacity to produce general explanations. In addition, the explanatory 
power of institutional accounts is limited. 
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The outcomes are definitely a sign that dimensions varying at the meso level need to be 
considered, along with dimensions that vary nationwide. Above and beyond cross 
country variations, substantial variations occur, both across policy and directive type, and 
across time. These variations are of consequence for the explanatory power of the 
variables that have been tested.  
Although its impact on overdue transposition is of little significance, the goodness-of-fit 
hypothesis is the only predictor from among six that has been put to the test, and which 
significantly correlates with transposition duration in all categories alike. The remaining 
predictors fail to yield general outcomes. Their power is limited to selective policies 
(health and safety), directive types (either new or amending) and time ranges (1980s or 
1990s).  
On the whole, the capability of new institutionalisms for explaining varying levels of 
compliance is restricted. Together with the variable available transposition time, different 
institutional factors all together explain 24 per cent of the variation in transposition 
duration. The explained variance in the length of overdue transposition, where available 
transposition time does not add to the amount of variance, is only 12 per cent. 
Subsequently, the question arises whether new institutionalism deserves its present 
dominant position in transposition literature. Either other major factors are better capable 
of explaining varying transposition behaviour or the transposition process involves few 
regularities, and barely allows for general explanations.  
 
8.4 How Europe affects the member states  
The regression outcomes help us to better understand the occurrence of incompatible 
outcomes resulting from cross-country comparisons. The transposition behaviour of the 
member states is changeable, and it requires dynamic factors - hinting at the interaction 
between Europe and the member states - to explain their volatile behaviour.  
Though corroborated and highly significant for transposition duration in both periods, the 
goodness-of-fit explains more variance in the early years, than in the 1990s. Europe’s 
influence on the member states is furthermore supported by the corroboration of the 
socialization proposition. Another dynamic factor, the outcomes of which have not yet 
been discussed, is strategic adaption. Its effect was tested separately, so that 
multicollinearity problems could be avoided. Strategic adaption mirrors a socializing 
argument rooted in rational choice. It assumes a behavioural switch. Governments 
anticipating that the benefits from their EU membership and the costs for non-
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compliance, could outrun the costs of compliance (Checkel 2000, 2005; Schimmelfennig 
2005), may decide to comply with unpreferred European demands. This results in a 
cognitive dissonance between behaviour that is justified and argued for, and an actor’s 
believes. Actors tend to resolve such a dissonance by adapting their preferences to their 
behaviour (Zürn and Checkel 2005). Strategic adaption was measured by giving identical 
scores on each occasion the Commission intensified its methods, in order to enforce 
effective implementation of directives. It is expected that the more severe the 
Commission’s enforcement strategies are, the more likely directives are transposed 
swiftly and timely. 
Though its effect on overdue scores is confirmed with a higher level of confidence, 
strategic adaption is of significance for both transposition duration and overdue 
transposition. This factor significantly reduces the severity of violations arising from 
transposing health and safety directives, but it does not significantly alter the length of 
overdue transposition among the general social provisions. As opposed to socialization, 
strategic adaption affects transposition of both new and amending directives. Moreover, 
strategic adaption induces all member states - except Germany and the United Kingdom - 
to downsize their violations. It is in The Netherlands, Spain, and Greece, where strategic 
adaption significantly correlates with the variable overdue transposition. Finally, strategic 
adaption was an effective accelerator in the 1990s; in the early years this factor was of no 
significance. This indicates that its explanatory power depends on the authority of the 
Commission to penalize the member states. Apparently, the strategy used in the 1980s, 
i.e. the blaming and shaming through monitoring and reporting transposition and 
infringement scores, did not suffice to procure compliance.  
The reverse effect of veto players reinforces the impression that key players’ 
attentiveness toward their transposition duties increases through their fear being 
penalized. Contrary to the effect we would expect, veto players support swift 
transposition of new directives and particularly in recent years. It seems that living up to 
European demands has priority over veto players’ party political preferences. Markedly, 
socialization and strategic adaption (and also the number of veto players) are highly 
influential in reducing the seriousness of violations. When related to transposition 
duration, the explanatory power of these factors is relatively weak or absent. Notably, it 
is only in the category ‘amendments’ where socialization and strategic adaption 
significantly affects both transposition duration and overdue transposition.  
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8.5 Suggestions for future research 
The question as to how much member states continue to experience serious problems in 
meeting implementation deadlines requires future research. With the focus on European 
social policy directives adopted between 1975 and 1999, this research shows that, overall, 
in around 61 per cent of the transposition cases, the deadline could not be met. These 
outcomes seriously challenge the low deficit rates found in the official publications of the 
European Commission. Fluctuating around two per cent in recent years, the latter greatly 
underestimate the nature and magnitude of implementation deficits.  
The research outcomes, moreover, call into question statements of whether transposition 
deficits become less of a problem. From the 1995-1999, of cases referring to notified 
implementation measures, 45 per cent were not transposed on time. This relatively low 
average overdue score is especially due to the Spanish government, who transposed only 
6 per cent of the cases after the deadline. The other countries transposed 50 per cent or 
more of the 1995-1999 cases after the deadline. Importantly, from among the 
transposition cases relating to the latest report period, 14 per cent lack implementation 
data. Further research is required in order to disclose the more recent developments in 
transposition.  
The research findings validate the testing of theories in isolated categories. The procedure 
was conducive to a proper appreciation of member states’ changeable transposition 
management, and also, for comparing the power of the regression model, in order to 
explain variations in distinctive samples. Nonetheless, a high amount of variation remains 
unexplained, leaving many questions open for future researchers.  
The implementation of European law is a complex process, ruled by dynamics occurring 
simultaneously, which are therefore difficult to grasp. Research into different policy 
fields is necessary so as to establish whether the distinctions made are useful for all 
policy areas, or whether additional distinctions, typical of the policy field, cause 
dissimilar transposition strategies and procedures.  
The outcomes of this inquiry suggest that the European venture is not only stirred up by 
behavioural changes among bureaucrats (if directives provide for technical amendments). 
Apparently, political actors undergo similar changes. It requires case studies to examine 
whether it is indeed interaction effects that induce both bureaucrats and politicians to 
behave appropriately, and/or the increased power of the Commission to penalize incorrect 
or late implementation that causes key actors in transposition to change course.  
Assuming that their respective logics intermingle seems realistic. After all, both the 
socialization process and the process of strategic adaption proved to have statistical 
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significance. Both perspectives believe that behaviour arising from rational consequential 
logics adapts to behaviour steered by logics of appropriateness. In the event of 
socialization, it is interaction and normative suasion that persuade actors to internalize 
arguments and make them behave appropriately (Checkel, 1999, 2002), irrespective of 
the nature of their standards prior to socialization. Such prior standards can be rational or 
ruled by norms that were previously internalized. The link between rational choice and 
socialization is more explicitly made when Zürn and Checkel 2005 (see also Checkel 
2000; Schimmelfennig 2005; Kelley 2004) speak of strategic adaption. Strategic adaption 
stands for a norm change resulting from prior strategic, incentive-based, cooperative 
actions. A similar integrative approach, though from a different angle, is offered by 
Beach (2005). His model combines instrumental costs (domestic impact of EU law or the 
benefits from an effective EU legal system) and normative costs of (non-) compliance. 
The latter vary depending on whether EU law conflicts with key domestic norms,  the 
level of acceptance of EU law among domestic actors, the respect for the ‘rule of law’ in 
the political system, and, finally, on the visibility of the potential violiation.2  
Vitally, if scholars choose to examine the explanatory power of these theories 
quantitatively, their effects largely depend on the time-range their dataset covers. Unlike 
rational choice, of which the assumed effect on a transposition case is straightforward, 
social learning and norm-internationalization takes time. Hence, the effect - if at all - of 
socialization may remain invisible if the time range covered by the research is limited. 
Similarly, if socialization has an effect on the speed of transposition, its effect would 
become invisible as soon as a member state arrives at a point (conditioned by the time 
granted for transposition) when it can no longer improve the speed of transposition.  
Testing for the effect of socialization requires caution, though. For it is not just national 
strategies that are changeable; the strategies of European legislators may change too. 
Recent and future EU enlargements, for example, may be of consequence for the 
implementation outcomes. The more member states take part in EU law negotiations, the 
tougher and lengthier these negotiations become. Experts in the field report on a newborn 
tendency to cut directives into separate, manageable, pieces, if only to counteract 
inactivity and to accommodate successive presiding countries leaving ‘their mark’ 
through concrete European law.  
Basically, the effect of sociologically informed hypotheses remains uncertain as long as 
the theoretical model fails to control for other factors at the European level or national 
level (such as the occurrence of polity or policy misfits) that are likely to change over 
time. Quantitative researchers who manage to come to more precise terms than hitherto 
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realized in large N-studies, as regards the existence of a misfit, could acquire a better 
understanding. Unfortunately, it is the precise scanning of the directives’ requirements so 
as to measure them against national reference data - like, for instance, the national 
regulatory style and structures, as suggested by Knill and Lenschow - that remains a 
barrier.  
 
 
Endnotes
                                                     
 
 
1 The technicality of health and safety directives follows from the relatively high number of annexes - 
generally used to elaborate on technical aspects.  
2 Considering the instrumental costs for the British government to transpose the Working Time directive 
(93/104/EC), non-compliance with the directive would have been a valid choice. The British government 
nonetheless decided to implement the directive, as key officials in the government found it unacceptable 
and illegal to disobey the European Court of Justice (Beach 2005).  
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SAMENVATTING 
 
NALEVING VAN EU SOCIAAL BELEID WERK IN UITVOERING 
 
Vergelijkend onderzoek naar de impact van instituties op de implementatie 
van Europees sociaal beleid 
 
 
Inleiding 
De wetenschappelijke belangstelling voor de wisselwerking tussen de Europese Unie en 
de lidstaten heeft een omvangrijke reeks publicaties voortgebracht. Eén van de 
aandachtsgebieden van onderzoek is de omzetting van Europese richtlijnen in nationale 
wet- en regelgeving, de vertragingen die daarbij optreden en de factoren die op dit proces 
van invloed zijn. Doordat richtlijnen door de lidstaten zelf moeten worden omgezet, 
onderscheidt dit wetgevingsinstrument zich van de overige wetgevingsinstrumenten die 
Europa hanteert, dat wil zeggen, de Europese verordeningen en beschikkingen. 
Laatstgenoemde instrumenten hebben een directe rechtsgeldigheid in alle lidstaten 
(verordening), of uitsluitend in de lidstaten waarop zij zich richten (beschikking). Een 
soortgelijke directe rechtsgeldigheid is niet van toepassing op richtlijnen. Bij de 
inwerkingtreding van richtlijnen vervullen nationale wetgevingsinstanties een actieve rol. 
Op grond van hun EU lidmaatschap zijn zij verplicht de richtlijnen die de Europese Unie 
vaststelt, tijdig en correct op te nemen in de nationale rechtsorde.  
 
Wetenschappelijke studies naar de omzetting van richtlijnen 
Studies naar de omzetting van richtlijnen geven blijk van een eenzijdige interesse in de 
verschillen in omzetting tussen lidstaten en in factoren op macro-niveau die van invloed 
zouden zijn op de kwaliteit en/of de snelheid van omzetting. Het neo-institutionalisme 
neemt in deze onderzoeken een centrale plaats in. Deze stroming, die vanaf het midden 
van de jaren negentig snel aan populariteit won, onderscheidt drie afzonderlijke 
perspectieven op politiek handelen.  
Het economische perspectief gaat ervan uit dat aan beleidsuitkomsten rationele 
overwegingen ten grondslag liggen. Gegeven de middelen en mogelijkheden die zijn 
voorgeschreven door de instituties waarvan hij (of zij) deel uitmaakt en ter beschikking 
staan, en gegeven de opties waaruit hij kan kiezen, is het streven van een rationele actor 
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gericht op beleid dat hem het maximaal haalbare optimale resultaat oplevert. Centrale 
begrippen binnen de rationele keuze benadering zijn regels (instituties), preferenties en 
vetorecht.  
Anders dan in de rationele keuze benadering, waar de preferenties van de actor vooraf en 
door hem zelf (dus los van instituties) zijn bepaald, zijn binnen de sociologisch 
institutionele stroming instituties bepalend voor de keuzes die de actor maakt. De normen 
van instituties waar een sociale actor deel van uitmaakt, zijn doorslaggevend voor zijn 
voorkeuren en handelen. Uitgangspunt is dat de leden van een institutie zich de 
institutionele normen eigenmaken. Interactie-effecten, socialisatie en het internaliseren 
van die normen vormen dan ook de kern van deze handelingsvisie.  
De historisch institutionele benadering is een derde perspectief op instituties. Deze 
variant vestigt de aandacht op de problemen die actoren ondervinden als gevolg van 
beslissingen die zijzelf of hun voorgangers in het verleden maakten. Bestaand beleid en 
gevestigde structuren vormen een belemmering voor de keuzes die zij kunnen maken. Dit 
leidt tot suboptimale beleidsbeslissingen. De bekendste theorie die van het historische 
perspectief op instituties is afgeleid, is de goodness-of-fit theorie.  
De verklaringskracht van de institutionele perspectieven op politiek handelen is 
veelvuldig onderzocht. Echter, tot op heden leveren deze studies verdeelde, vaak 
tegenstrijdige, antwoorden op. Voor een deel volgt dit uit de heersende 
onderzoeksmethode op dit terrein. Veel onderzoekers kiezen voor een kwalitatieve 
benadering. Deze gedetailleerde onderzoeksmethode levert waardevolle inzichten op, 
maar staat niet garant voor de algemene geldigheid van de onderzoeksbevindingen. 
Hiervoor zijn de observaties waarop de bevindingen zich baseren, te specifiek en te 
beperkt in aantal.  
De uitkomsten van kwantitatieve (statistische) benaderingen van het 
implementatievraagstuk boeten om andere redenen in aan overtuigingskracht. Het 
merendeel van statistische onderzoeken naar nationaal omzettingsgedrag baseert zich op 
de periodieke cijfers die de Europese Commissie publiceert. Deze cijfers hebben 
betrekking op het door de Commissie geconstateerde omzettingsdeficit - het percentage 
richtlijnen dat nog niet in nationaal recht is omgezet maar waarvan de uiterste 
omzettingsdatum al wel is verstreken -. Doordat in deze berekening alle richtlijnen 
worden meegenomen die op het moment van meting van kracht zijn (in mei 2007 zijn dit 
er 1628) vertonen de landenpercentages slechts geringe verschillen. Bovendien valt uit de 
officiële totaalscores niet af te leiden welke richtlijnen vertraging opleveren en al 
evenmin hoe ernstig (een dag of meerdere jaren) de opgelopen vertragingen zijn. 
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Sommige onderzoekers wijken dan ook uit naar de statistieken waarmee de Commissie 
de inbreukprocedures die tegen een land lopen, in kaart brengt. Echter, ook deze 
gegevens leveren een vertekend beeld op. Immers, niet alle inbreuken leiden tot een 
procedure, terwijl de richtlijnen die wel tijdig en juist zijn omgezet, buiten het bereik van 
het onderzoek blijven. Kortom, veel statistici nemen genoegen met gebrekkige 
empirische data. Daarenboven bieden de neo-institutionele handelingsperspectieven 
ruimte voor vrije interpretaties. De indicatoren die onderzoekers hanteren om de 
theoretische uitgangspunten te toetsen, lopen dan ook sterk uiteen. Nog een andere 
mogelijke oorzaak voor de groeiende reeks potentiële - maar niet per definitie robuuste - 
verklaringen voor variabel omzettingsgedrag, is de eenzijdige gerichtheid op 
landenvergelijkend onderzoek. De invloed van andere factoren, zoals type richtlijn 
(nieuw of amendement) en beleidsspecifieke kenmerken, blijft hierdoor onopgemerkt. In 
landenvergelijkend onderzoek blijft bovendien de factor ‘tijd’ buiten beeld. Echter, het is 
niet ondenkbaar dat het omzettingsgedrag van lidstaten aan verandering onderhevig is.  
 
Onderzoeksvraag en onderzoeksopzet 
Aan de hand van de feitelijke data waarop vijf lidstaten - Nederland, Duitsland, het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk, Spanje en Griekenland - de Europese sociale richtlijnen hebben 
omgezet - is onderzocht of van de twee nu overheersende visies op variabel 
omzettingsgedrag (rationele keuze institutionalisme en sociologisch institutionalisme) 
een algemene verklaringskracht uitgaat. Deze vraag wordt beantwoord aan de hand van 
twee deelvragen:  
 
 Hoezeer varieert de omzettingssnelheid van Europese lidstaten naar type 
richtlijn, naar beleidsthema en tijdvak? 
 
 Kunnen het rationele keuze institutionalisme en het sociologisch 
institutionalisme deze variaties verklaren?  
 
De bovenstaande vragen zijn beantwoord aan de hand van een nieuw opgezet databestand 
dat - naast andere relevante gegevens - de exacte data bevat waarop de vijf lidstaten de 
omzetting van de richtlijnen in gang hebben gezet. Deze informatie is verzameld voor 
alle Europese sociale richtlijnen die tussen 1960 en 1999 zijn afgekondigd.  
De lange geschiedenis van Europees sociaal beleid maakt vergelijkingen in de tijd 
mogelijk. Europees sociaal beleid is bovendien een divers beleidsgebied.  
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Dit onderzoek maakt - op grond van theoretische overwegingen - onderscheid tussen 
gezondheids- en veiligheidsrichtlijnen en richtlijnen die betrekking hebben op meer 
algemene sociale voorzieningen. Onder de laatste categorie vallen bijvoorbeeld 
richtlijnen met betrekking tot gelijke behandeling, werktijden en arbeidsduur of 
richtlijnen die het recht op sociaal overleg en inspraak van werknemers regelen. 
Gezondheids- en veiligheidsrichtlijnen zijn voor het merendeel technisch van aard en 
nemen bovendien een dominante plaats in op de sociale agenda van de Europese Unie. 
Naar verwachting zijn bij de omzetting van gezondheids- en veiligheidsrichtlijnen andere 
procedures van kracht en andere actoren betrokken dan bij de overige sociale thema’s. 
Deze meer algemene sociale thema’s brachten afzonderlijk maar ook gezamenlijk slechts 
een bescheiden hoeveelheid richtlijnen voort en raken, naast de werkomgeving, andere 
sociale sferen. Een tweede onderscheid dat is aangebracht betreft het type richtlijn. Naar 
verwachting reageren de nationale wetgevende instanties anders op richtlijnen die geheel 
nieuw zijn, dan op amendementen, dat wil zeggen, richtlijnen die een wijziging inhouden 
van een richtlijn die al eerder werd uitgevaardigd.  
 
Variabel omzettingsgedrag 
Op basis van het eerste wettelijke instrument waarmee een land de betreffende richtlijn 
verheft tot nationaal beleid zijn twee variabelen berekend. Allereerst de omzettingsduur, 
het aantal dagen tussen de publicatiedatum van de richtlijn en de dag waarop het eerste 
wettelijke instrument in werking treedt. De tweede variabele heeft betrekking op de 
overschrijding van de omzettingstermijn, dat wil zeggen, het aantal dagen dat een land de 
officiële omzettingslimiet van de betreffende richtlijn heeft overschreden.  
Op basis van de totaalscores van de onderzochte landen ontstaat de indruk dat het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk en Duitsland de sociale richtlijnen sneller omzetten dan Nederland, 
Spanje en Griekenland. Echter, van de drie laatstgenoemde landen reageert alleen 
Griekenland op alle sociale richtlijnen relatief traag. De prestaties van de overige landen 
zijn afhankelijk van beleidsthema en de nieuwheid van de voorzieningen in de richtlijn.  
Hoewel gezondheids- en veiligheidsrichtlijnen in het algemeen kunnen rekenen op een 
relatief snelle respons van Nederland, Duitsland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk, blijkt de 
Nederlandse overheid relatief traag over te gaan op omzetting van amendementen binnen 
deze sociale beleidscategorie. Voor de omzetting van de algemene sociale richtlijnen 
neemt Duitsland ruim de tijd. Binnen de laatstgenoemde categorie is het Spanje die 
voorop loopt.  
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De analyses die zijn gewijd aan de overschrijding van de omzettingstermijn geven 
evenmin blijk van eenduidig nationaal gedrag. Uit een vergelijking tussen de landen 
blijkt dat vooral de Spaanse overheid de toegestane omzettingstermijn serieus neemt 
maar nog altijd 50 procent van de sociale richtlijnen te laat omzet. Dit 
overschrijdingspercentage is nog altijd lager dan dat van het Verenigd Koninkrijk (52 
procent), Duitsland (52 procent), Nederland (64 procent) en Griekenland (80 procent). 
In veel landen worden vooral de omzettingstermijnen van nieuwe gezondheids- en 
veiligheidsrichtlijnen overschreden. Zo overschrijdt Nederland in 75 procent van de 
gevallen de omzettingstermijn van laatstgenoemde richtlijnen. Ook in Spanje lopen 
richtlijnen binnen deze categorie vaak (in 71 procent van de gevallen) vertraging op. 
Duitsland daarentegen heeft moeite met het tijdig omzetten van de algemene sociale 
richtlijnen. Maar liefst 73 procent van de algemene sociale richtlijnen zijn door Duitsland 
na de uiterste omzettingstermijn omgezet.  
De ernst van de overschrijdingen varieert. Vooral de omzetting van gezondheids- en 
veiligheidsrichtlijnen lopen ernstige vertragingen op, dat wil zeggen vertragingen van 
twee jaar of zelfs langer. Ernstige vertragingen komen vaker voor in Griekenland (binnen 
alle categorieën), in Spanje (nieuwe gezondheidsheids- en veiligheidsrichtlijnen) en in 
Duitsland (amendementen op gezondheids- en veiligheidsrichtlijnen) dan in Nederland en 
in het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Naast de bovengenoemde verschillen, vertonen de nationale 
scores bovendien aanmerkelijke verschillen door de de tijd heen. Kortom, tijd, 
beleidsthema, en de nieuwheid van de richtlijn zijn van invloed op de snelheid waarmee 
nationale wetgevende instanties de sociale richtlijnen omzetten en op de vertragingen die 
daarbij ontstaan. De uitkomsten van de vergelijkende statistieken vormen geen aanleiding 
om te spreken van typisch nationaal omzettingsgedrag. Hiervoor zijn de verschillen 
binnen de landen te groot.  
Van de sociale richtlijnen die tussen 1975 en 1999 zijn afgekondigd, is 61 procent met 
vertraging omgezet. Beweringen als zouden overschrijdingen geleidelijk aan afnemen 
worden door dit onderzoek niet gestaafd. In de laatste periode (1995-1999) is nog altijd 
45 procent van de van de sociale richtlijnen te laat omgezet (voor Spanje is dit percentage 
6 procent; voor de overige landen is het percentage 50 procent of meer).  
 
De beperkte verklaringskracht van het neo-institutionalisme  
Voor de beantwoording van de tweede deelvraag - in hoeverre zijn de op het neo-
institutionalisme gebaseerde theoriëen in staat om het onregelmatige omzettingsgedrag 
tussen en binnen de lidstaten te verklaren - is een theoretisch kader ontwikkeld. Het 
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rationele keuze institutionalisme en het sociologisch institutionalisme staan hierin 
centraal. De rationele keuze variant is getoetst aan de hand van Tsebelis’ theorie over 
besluitvorming en formele veto spelers. De van deze theorie afgeleide hypothese luidt: 
Op voorwaarde dat een richtlijn een verandering van de nationale sociale status quo 
vereist, neemt, met het aantal veto spelers, de duur van het proces en de kans op 
overschrijding van de omzettingstermijn toe. 
Een tweede hypothese die volgt uit de theorie van Tsebelis heeft betrekking op het effect 
van regeringswisselingen, dat wil zeggen: wanneer de ideologieën van de nieuwe 
regeringspartij(en) significant afwijken van die van de vertrekkende regeringspartij(en), 
zullen regeringswisselingen het omzettingsproces vertragen en neemt de kans op 
overschrijding van de omzettingstermijn toe. 
De sociologisch institutionele variant is uitgewerkt aan de hand van de ideëen van 
Checkel over socialisatie en norm-internalisatie als gevolg van regelmatige interactie en 
communicatie tussen de leden van een institutie. De verwachting is dat naarmate 
nationale ambtenaren die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de omzetting van de richtlijn vaker 
worden blootgesteld aan socialiserende instanties in Brussel, de kans toeneemt dat zij 
tijdige omzetting van de richtlijn bevorderen. Om deze hypothese te toetsen is gekeken 
naar de intensiteit, de dichtheid en de duur van interactie tussen nationale ambtenaren die 
zitting hebben in de werkgroepen van de Europese Raad. 
Het theoretisch kader is aangevuld met drie controlevariabelen. Deze variabelen zijn 
afgeleid van achtereenvolgens de historisch institutionele goodness-of-fit hypothese, de 
strategische aanpassingstheorie en tot slot, de omzettingstermijn van de richtlijn.  
Om de goodness-of-fit theorie te toetsen is onderzocht of de lidstaat al dan niet beschikt 
over passende wetgeving: wanneer een lidstaat een of meer reeds bestaande 
wetsinstrumenten notificeert als zijnde instrumenten die deel uitmaken van de 
omzettingsmaatregelen, zal de omzetting naar verwachting minder tijd in beslag nemen 
en tot geringere vertragingen leiden, dan wanneer bestaande wetgeving ontbreekt.       
Uitgangspunt van de strategische aanpassingstheorie is dat actoren hun gedrag om 
strategische redenen - en ongeacht de eigen voorkeuren - aanpassen aan institutionele 
normen. Om de dissonantie tussen handelwijze en overtuigingen op te heffen, ontstaat de 
behoefte om de strijdige voorkeuren in harmonie te brengen met de strategische 
handeling. In het kader van dit onderzoek luidt de bijbehorende hypothese dat nationale 
authoriteiten richtlijnen sneller zullen omzetten (en met minder vertraging ten opzichte 
van de omzettingstermijn), naarmate de handhavingsmaatregelen waarover de 
Commissie beschikt strenger worden.  
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De laatste controlevariabele, de beschikbare tijd, resulteert in de volgende aannamen: 
Hoe ruimer de omzettingstermijn van de richtlijn, hoe langer het proces duurt, maar ook: 
hoe geringer de kans op overschrijding van de omzettingstermijn.  
Op basis van de regressieanalyses kan worden geconcludeerd dat socialisatie geen effect 
heeft op de omzetting van richtlijnen die betrekking hebben op sociale richtlijnen van 
algemene aard. De mate van socialisatie van nationale ambtenaren is wel van belang voor 
de snelheid waarmee gezondheids- en veiligheidsrichtlijnen worden omgezet. In het 
bijzonder de amendementen binnen deze beleidscategorie worden, als gevolg van 
socialisatie, sneller in behandeling genomen en worden met minder vertraging omgezet  
dan de overige richtlijnen. Kennelijk hebben ambtenaren binnen dit min of meer 
technische en overwegend werkgerelateerde segment meer handelingsbevoegdheid.  
Van de vijf onderzochte landen, lijken alleen Nederland en Spanje gevoelig voor 
socialisatie. Op de scores van de overige landen heeft de factor geen invloed. Gegeven 
deze uitkomsten, is de verklaringskracht van socialisatie beperkt. Echter, het is zeer wel 
mogelijk dat deze factor wint aan betekenis, ook omdat socialisatie een lange termijn 
proces is. Het feit dat socialisatie in de periode 1990-1999 de ernst van overschrijdingen 
aanzienlijk heeft doen afnemen, maar geen invloed heeft op de omzettingsduur en ernst 
van overschrijdingen in de periode 1975-1989, wijst hierop.  
Ook een goodness-of-fit tussen nationaal beleid en Europees beleid maakt dat het 
transpositieproces aanmerkelijk wordt versneld. Het effect van de goodness-of-fit is 
relatief zwak binnen de categorie amendementen. Hetzelfde geldt voor haar invloed op de 
ernst van overschrijdingen. Deze neemt binnen alle categorieën significant af, behalve in 
de categorie amendementen.  
Het verband tussen strategische aanpassing en omzettingsduur cq. overschrijding van de 
omzettingstermijn is eveneens significant. Richtlijnen worden sneller en met minder 
vertraging omgezet. Wederom beperkt de verklaringskracht van deze factor zich tot de 
gezondheids- en veiligheidsrichtlijnen (zowel de nieuwe richtlijnen als de 
amendementen). Op de omzettingssnelheid van de overige sociale richtlijnen heeft deze 
factor geen invloed. Van de vijf landen zijn het Nederland, Spanje en Griekenland die 
zich gevoelig tonen voor de incentives van de Commissie. Wanneer een onderscheid 
gemaakt wordt tussen tijdvakken, blijkt strategische aanpassing uitsluitend een gunstige 
uitwerking te hebben op de omzettingssnelheid van richtlijnen die in de jaren 1990 zijn 
afgekondigd. In de beginjaren is de factor niet significant. Hieruit volgt dat vooral de 
boetebevoegdheid van de Commissie aanspoort tot naleving. De strategie die de 
Commissie in de jaren 1970 en 1980 heeft toegepast, het door middel van rapporten en 
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scoreborden publiekelijk maken van de afzonderlijke prestaties en inbreuken van de 
lidstaten, sorteert geen effect. 
De verwachting dat de betrokkenheid van veel veto spelers leidt tot oponthoud en 
overschrijdingen is door dit onderzoek niet bevestigd. Een groter aantal veto spelers 
veroorzaakt niet meer stagnatie. In enkele categorieën - nieuwe richtlijnen en richtlijnen 
die in de jaren negentig zijn uitgevaardigd - is het zelfs zo dat transpositieduur en de ernst 
van de overschrijding afnemen naarmate er meer veto spelers betrokken zijn bij de 
omzetting van de richtlijn. Deze tegenstrijdige uitkomst heeft wellicht te maken met de 
aard van het nationale wetsinstrument. Mogelijk heeft een richtlijn meer prioriteit, zodra 
deze moet worden omgezet met gebruikmaking van één of meerdere nieuwe wetten. Bij 
de vaststelling van een wet zijn vaak meer veto spelers betrokken dan bij instrumenten 
van een lagere rangorde. Het is daarnaast niet uitgesloten dat veto spelers meer aandacht 
besteden aan nieuwe richtlijnen dan aan amendementen, in de veronderstelling dat de 
Commissie naleving van nieuwe richtlijnen nauwlettender in de gaten houdt. Aan de 
gunstige invloed van het aantal veto spelers op de omzettingsnelheid van de meest 
recente richtlijnen ligt mogelijk een soortgelijke reden ten grondslag. De kans op 
economische gevolgen bij het niet tijdig nakomen van omzettingsverplichtingen is 
immers groter in de jaren negentig, dan in de beginjaren. 
Een ruime omzettingstermijn en regeringswisselingen veroorzaken wel stagnatie. Beide 
factoren zijn echter alleen van invloed op de categorie nieuwe richtlijnen en op de 
categorie gezondheids- en veiligheidsrichtlijnen. Voor de omzettingsscores van de 
algemene sociale richtlijnen zijn deze factoren niet van betekenis. Deze uitkomsten 
onderschrijven de aanname dat ministers (veto spelers) een grotere betrokkenheid tonen 
bij nieuwe richtlijnen dan bij amendementen. Dit laat niet onverlet dat zich van tijd tot 
tijd andere prioriteiten voordoen - waaronder regeringswisselingen - die de dagelijkse 
procedures verstoren.  
Aan de hand van de analyses kan worden geconcludeerd dat de neo-institionele 
verklaringen geen algemene geldigheid hebben. De geldigheid van institutionele factoren 
beperkt zich tot enkele categorieën en zelfs dan verklaren zij vaak slechts een geringe 
hoeveelheid van de variantie. Hiermee leveren de uitkomsten van dit onderzoek een 
plausibele verklaring op voor de tegenstrijdige resultaten van landenvergelijkende 
analyses. Het omzettingsgedrag van de lidstaten is veranderlijk en het zijn vooral 
dynamische factoren die op dit onbestendige gedrag van invloed zijn.  
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 Distribution of parliamentary seats: The Netherlands 
 
 
1967 
1977 
1981 
1982 
1986 
1989 
1994 
1998 
2002 
2003 
Parties: 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
KVP 
42 
28.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARP 
15 
10.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHU 
12 
8.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CDA 
 
 
49 
32.67 
48 
32.00 
45 
30.00 
54 
36.00 
54 
36.00 
34 
22.67 
29 
19.33 
43 
28.67 
44 
29.33 
D66 
7 
4.67 
8 
5.33 
17 
11.33 
6 
4.00 
9 
6.00 
12 
8.00 
24 
16.00 
14 
9.33 
7 
4.67 
6 
4.00 
LPF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
17.33 
8 
5.33 
PvdA 
37 
24.67 
53 
35.33 
44 
29.33 
47 
31.33 
52 
34.67 
49 
32.67 
37 
24.67 
45 
30.00 
23 
15.33 
42 
28.00 
VVD 
17 
11.33 
28 
18.67 
26 
17.33 
36 
24.00 
27 
18.00 
22 
14.67 
31 
20.67 
38 
25.33 
24 
16.00 
28 
18.67 
AOV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
4.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CPN 
5 
3.33 
2 
1.33 
3 
2.00 
3 
2.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ChristenUnie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
2.67 
3 
2.00 
GroenLinks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
4.00 
5 
3.33 
11 
7.33 
10 
6.67 
8 
5.33 
Leefbaar NL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
1.33 
 
 
RPF 
 
 
 
 
2 
1.33 
2 
1.33 
1 
0.67 
1 
0.67 
3 
2.00 
3 
2.00 
 
 
 
 
PSP 
4 
2.67 
1 
0.67 
3 
2.00 
3 
2.00 
1 
0.67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PPR 
 
 
3 
2.00 
3 
2.00 
2 
1.33 
2 
1.33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
1.33 
5 
3.33 
9 
6.00 
9 
6.00 
SGP 
3 
2.00 
3 
2.00 
3 
2.00 
3 
2.00 
3 
2.00 
3 
2.00 
2 
1.33 
3 
2.00 
2 
1.33 
2 
1.33 
Others 
8 
5.00 
3 
2.00 
1 
1.00 
3 
2.00 
1 
1.00 
3 
2.00 
6 
4.00 
2 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
150 
100 
150 
100 
150 
100 
150 
100 
150 
100 
150 
100 
150 
100 
150 
100 
150 
100 
150 
100 
Seats GovP 
 
57%
 
 
51%
 
 
73%
 
 
54%
 
 
54%
 
 
69%
 
 
61%
 
 
65%
 
 
62%
 
 
53%
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Distribution of parliamentary seats: Germany 
 
 
1972 
1976 
1980 
1983 
1987 
1990 
1994 
1998 
2002 
2005 
Party 
seats 
%
 
Seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
CDU 
177 
35.7 
190 
38.3 
174 
35.0 
191 
38.4 
174 
35.0 
268 
40.5 
244 
36.3 
198 
29.6 
190 
31.5 
180 
29.3 
CSU 
48 
9.7 
53 
10.7 
52 
10.5 
53 
10.6 
49 
9.9 
51 
7.7 
50 
7.4 
47 
7.0 
58 
9.6 
46 
7.5 
SDP 
230 
46.4 
214 
43.1 
218 
43.9 
193 
38.8 
186 
37.4 
239 
36.1 
252 
37.5 
295 
44.1 
251 
41.6 
222 
36.2 
FDP 
41 
8.3 
39 
7.9 
53 
10.7 
34 
6.8 
46 
9.3 
79 
11.9 
47 
7.0 
43 
6.4 
47 
7.8 
61 
9.9 
The Greens 
  
  
  
  
0 
0.0 
27 
5.4 
42 
8.5 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.0 
Alliance ‘90/ 
The Greens 
(East) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
8 
1.2 
49 
7.3 
47 
7.0 
55 
9.1 
51 
8.3 
 (PDS) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
17 
2.6 
30 
4.5 
36 
5.4 
2 
0.3 
  
0.0 
The Left 
Party 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
54 
8.8 
All others 
0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
  
0.0 
  
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
Totals 
496 
100.0 
496 
100.0 
497 
100.0 
498 
100.0 
497 
100.0 
662 
100.0 
672 
100.0 
669 
100.0 
603 
100.0 
614 
100.0 
Seats GovP 
  
54,6 
  
51,0 
  
54,6 
  
55,6 
  
54,2 
  
60,1 
  
50,9 
  
87,7 
  
91,8 
  
73,0 
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  Distribution of parliamentary seats: United Kingdom 
   
1970 
1974 (feb) 
1974 (oct) 
1979 
1983 
1987 
1992 
1997 
2001 
2005 
Parties 
Seats 
%
 
Seats 
%
 
Seats 
%
 
Seats 
%
 
Seats 
%
 
Seats 
%
 
Seats 
%
 
Seats 
%
 
Seats 
%
 
Seats 
%
 
Conservative 
330 
52.5 
297 
46.8 
277 
43.6 
339 
53.4 
397 
61.1 
376 
57.8 
336 
51.6 
165 
25.0 
166 
25.2 
198 
30.7 
Labour 
287 
45.6 
301 
47.4 
319 
50.2 
269 
42.4 
209 
32.2 
229 
35.2 
271 
41.6 
418 
63.4 
412 
62.6 
356 
55.1 
Liberal 
6 
1.0 
14 
2.2 
13 
2.0 
11 
1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SDP-Liberal 
Alliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
3.5 
22 
3.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
Democrats 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
3.1 
46 
7.0 
52 
7.9 
62 
9.6 
Others 
6 
1.0 
23 
3.6 
26 
4.1 
16 
2.5 
21 
3.2 
23 
3.5 
24 
3.7 
30 
4.6 
28 
4.3 
30 
4.6 
  
629 
100.0 
635 
100.0 
635 
100.0 
635 
100.0 
650 
100.0 
650 
100.0 
651 
100.0 
659 
100.0 
658 
100.0 
646 
100.0 
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  Distribution of parliamentary seats: Spain 
  
1982 
1986 
1989 
1993 
1996 
2000 
2004 
Parties: 
seats 
(%
) 
Seats 
(%
) 
seats 
(%
) 
seats 
(%
) 
seats 
(%
) 
seats 
(%
) 
seats 
(%
) 
Partido Socialista de 
Catalunya (PSC-PSOE) 
177 
50.6 
163 
46.6 
155 
44.30 
141 
40.3 
122 
34.9 
125 
35.71 
164 
46.86 
Alianza Popular ( AP); 
since 1989 Partido 
Popular (PP) 
107 
30.57 
105 
30 
101 
28.86 
138 
39.43 
146 
41.71 
183 
52.29 
146 
41.71 
Partido Socialista de 
Catalunya (PSC-PSOE) 
25 
7.14 
21 
6 
20 
5.71 
18 
5.14 
19 
5.43 
 
 
 
 
Convergencia i Unió 
(CiU) 
12 
3.43 
18 
5.14 
18 
5.14 
17 
4.86 
16 
4.57 
15 
4.29 
10 
2.86 
Izquierda Unida (IU) 
  
 
6 
1.71 
14 
4.00 
15 
4.29 
19 
5.43 
8 
2.29 
2 
0.57 
Centro Democrático y 
Social (CDS) 
2 
0.57 
19 
5.43 
14 
4.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Others 
27 
7.72 
18 
5.15 
28 
8.00 
21 
5.99 
28 
8.00 
19 
5.42 
28 
8.00 
Total 
350 
100.03 
350 
100.03 
350 
100.01 
350 
100.01 
350 
100.04 
350 
100 
350 
100 
seats governing parties 
  
58%
 
 
47%
 
 
44%
 
 
40%
 
 
42%
 
 
52%
 
 
47%
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 Distribution of parliamentary seats: Greece 
 Parties 
1977 
1981 
1985 
1989 
1990 
1993 
1996 
2000 
2004 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
seats 
%
 
New Democracy (ND) 
171 
57.0 
115 
38.3 
126 
42.0 
Elections in 
Jun, Oct 
and Nov. 
No details 
available 
150 
50.0 
111 
37.0 
108 
36.0 
126 
42.0 
117 
39.0 
Panhellenic Social 
Movement (PASOK) 
93 
31.0 
172 
57.3 
161 
53.7 
123 
41.0 
170 
56.7 
162 
54.0 
157 
52.3 
165 
55.0 
Communist Party of 
Greece (KKE) 
11 
3.7 
13 
4.3 
12 
4.0 
19 (1) 
6.3 
9 
3.0 
11 
3.7 
11 
3.7 
12 
4.0 
Others 
25 
8.3 
0 
0.0 
1 
0.3 
8 
2.7 
10 
3.3 
19 
6.3 
6 
2.0 
6 
2.0 
  
300 
100.0 
300 
100.0 
300 
100.0 
300 
100.0 
300 
100.0 
300 
100.0 
300 
100.0 
300 
100.0 
seats governing parties 
 
57 
 
57,3 
 
53,7 
 
50 
 
56,7 
 
54 
 
52,3 
 
55 
(1) Coalition of the Left and Progressive parties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
. 
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Annex 2 Transposing legal instruments across-countries  
 
 
NL 
(58) 
DE 
(46) 
UK 
(56) 
ES 
(46) 
EL 
(51) 
Total 
(257) 
Law 22 19 7 9 6 63 
Government decree 27 22 0 30 35 114 
Ministerial decree 9 2 49 7 10 77 
Other (1) 0 3 0 0 0 3 
(1)  The category ‘other’ refers to one Vorschrift enacted by a German Public Business Organization 
(Hauptverband der Gewerblichen Berufsgenossenschaften), one Bekanntmachung of which information 
with respect to contents lacks, and one case in which instrument type was not defined. 
 
Source: own data 
 
The above table replicates the hierarchal division of legal transposing devices. The type 
of legislation is a reliable indicator for the nature and number of potential veto players. In 
all member states, the enactment of a law requires the consent of Parliament. In the case 
of Germany, the enactment of a law also requires the approval of the Upper Chamber or 
Bundesrat. Parliamentary involvement can be by-passed if the lead ministry chooses to 
enforce European provisions by means of governmental or ministerial decrees. Under the 
former circumstance, the minister needs the consent of other ministers. If the transposing 
instrument is a ministerial decree, it is likely that the minister is an independent player, 
entitled to enforce the decree without interference of additional parties. Exceptions to this 
rule were found in Greece (9 transposition cases), and in the UK (10 transposition cases). 
In these cases ministerial instruments were co-signed by additional parties. Theoretically, 
the preferences of these parties are of import, at least, if ministerial decrees are signed 
under a multiparty government, and the co-signer belongs to another governing party. 
However, in Greece, and in the UK, single party governments prevail, so that in these 
countries - in theory - the enactment of ministerial decrees does not involve additional 
veto players. 
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Annex 3 Overdue transposition, by policy issue (N=257) 
   Overdue  
  On time Slightly 
 
Moderately Seriously 
 
Total 
 Netherlands Health and safety 13 6 15 6 40 
  Working time 1 1 1 0 3 
  Equality 4 1 1 1 7 
  Workers rights 2 1 3 0 6 
 Miscellaneous 1 1 0 0 2 
   21 10 20 7 58 
 Germany Health and safety 18 2 6 5 31 
  Working time 1 1 1 0 3 
  Equality 1 1 3 1 6 
  Workers rights 1 1 2 1 5 
 Miscellaneous 1 0 0 0 1 
   22 5 12 7 46 
United Kingdom Health and safety 17 7 9 5 38 
  Working time 0 3 2 0 5 
  Equality 5 1 0 1 7 
  Workers rights 2 2 0 1 5 
 Miscellaneous 1 0 0 0 1 
   25 13 11 7 56 
 Spain Health and safety 13 3 7 11 34 
  Working time 4 0 0 0 4 
  Equality 3 0 0 0 3 
  Workers rights 1 0 2 0 3 
 Miscellaneous 2 0 0 0 2 
   23 3 9 11 46 
 Greece Health and safety 7 4 17 10 38 
  Working time 1 0 2 1 4 
  Equality 1 1 1 1 4 
  Workers rights 1 1 1 1 4 
 Miscellaneous 0 0 1 0 1 
   10 6 22 13 51 
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Annex 4 Outliers  
DURATION: Casewise Diagnostics – 7 outliers outside 3 standard deviations  
Case Number Std. Residual Duration (days) Predicted 
Value 
Residual Duration 
(adjusted) 
19 3,529 4089 1529 2560 3454 
35 3,010 3614 1431 2183 3229 
58 3,900 4259 1431 2828 3277 
121 5,297 5174 1333 3841 2930 
 
 
OVERDUE TRANSPOSITION: Casewise Diagnostics – 19 outliers outside 3 standard 
deviations  
Case Number Std. Residual Overdue (days) Predicted 
Value 
Residual Overdue 
(adjusted) 
9 3,110 2295 769 1526 2214 
19 3,010 2226 766 1460 2217 
35 3,024 2085 618 1467 2069 
38 3,619 2462 634 1828 2041 
58 3,017 2082 618 1464 2070 
120 3,027 1939 470 1469 1922 
121 3,027 1939 470 1469 1922 
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Annex 5 Multicollinearity statistics 
5A Breakdown by policy issue 
 All social 
policies 
Health and 
Safety 
Other New Amendment 
 Tolerance 
V
IF 
Tolerance 
V
IF 
Tolerance 
V
IF 
Tolerance 
V
IF 
Tolerance 
V
IF 
Socialization ,397 2,520 ,345 2,901 ,231 4,328 ,404 2,477 ,351 2,852 
No. of veto 
players 
,969 1,032 ,912 1,097 ,815 1,226 ,919 1,088 ,921 1,086 
Government 
change 
,982 1,018 ,971 1,029 ,874 1,144 ,975 1,026 ,771 1,297 
Existence of 
relevant law  
,952 1,051 ,934 1,071 ,755 1,324 ,919 1,088 ,926 1,079 
Strategic adaption ,375 2,664 ,350 2,855 ,236 4,234 ,389 2,569 ,200 4,993 
Available time 
above average 
,925 1,081 ,954 1,048 ,792 1,262 ,916 1,092 ,267 3,752 
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5B  Breakdown by member state 
 Netherlands Germany UK Spain Greece 
 Tolerance 
V
IF 
Tolerance 
V
IF 
Tolerance 
V
IF 
Tolerance 
V
IF 
Tolerance 
V
IF 
Socialization ,311 3,219 ,312 3,205 ,272 3,679 ,404 2,472 ,266 3,754 
No. of veto 
players 
,931 1,074 ,731 1,368 ,794 1,260 ,732 1,366 ,861 1,161 
Government 
change 
,885 1,130 ,857 1,167 ,830 1,205 ,859 1,164 ,689 1,451 
Existence of 
relevant law  
,891 1,123 ,750 1,333 ,882 1,133 ,701 1,427 ,666 1,501 
Strategic 
adaption 
,300 3,330 ,290 3,447 ,249 4,012 ,404 2,474 ,238 4,196 
Available time 
above average 
,879 1,137 ,853 1,173 ,828 1,208 ,881 1,135 ,779 1,284 
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Annex 5  Multicollinearity statistics (continued) 
 
5C  Breakdown by decade  
 
1975-1989 1990-1999 
 Tolerance 
V
IF 
Tolerance 
V
IF 
Socialization ,690 1,450 ,634 1,577
No. of veto 
players 
,827 1,209 ,924 1,082
Government 
change 
,946 1,057 ,940 1,063
Existence of 
relevant law  
,917 1,091 ,862 1,160
Strategic 
adaption 
,610 1,639 ,574 1,741
Available time 
above average 
,841 1,189 ,831 1,203
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Distribution of variable ‘duration’ (continued)  
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Distribution of variable ‘overdue’ (continued)    
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Distribution of variable ‘overdue’ (continued)    
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Test for linearity, partial regression plots ‘duration’  
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Annex 11  Test for linearity, partial regression plots ‘overdue’  
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Annex 12  Test for homogeneity 
 
Dependent variable ‘Duration’: Levene Statistic based on mean  
 Levene Statistic Df 1 Df 2 Sig 
Socialization 3,513 8 224 ,001 
No. of veto 
players 
3,230 3 250 ,018 
Government 
change 
,324 1 255 ,570 
Existence of 
relevant law 
,141 1 254 ,707 
Strategic 
adaption 
6,729 4 252 ,000 
Time available 7,752 1 255 ,006 
 
 
Dependent variable ‘Overdue’: Levene Statistic based on mean  
 Levene Statistic Df 1 Df 2 Sig 
Socialization 3,430 8 224 ,001 
No. of veto 
players 
6,445 3 250 ,000 
Government 
change 
,159 1 255 ,691 
Existence of 
relevant law 
5,142 1 254 ,024 
Strategic 
adaption 
12,186 4 252 ,000 
Time available 2,750 1 255 ,098 
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Annex 13 Durbin-Watson test for serial correlations between errors   
 
 Duration Overdue 
All  policies 1,960 1,970 
H&S 1,844 1,782 
Other 2,119 2,093 
New 2,023 1,974 
Amendment 1,548 1,921 
Netherlands 2,604 2,630 
Germany 2,254  
UK 2,314  
Spain 1,503 1,080 
Greece  1,659 
1975-1989 2,167 2,056 
1990-1999 1,595 1,779 
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Annex 14 Model summaries, strategic adaption included   
 
Table 14.1  Results OLS regression: dependent variable DURATION  
 Expected 
correlation 
Total 
(N=231) 
H&S 
(N=157) 
Other 
(N=74) 
New 
(N=192) 
Amending 
(N=39) 
(Constant)  1118 
(93) 
1176 
(118) 
1108 
(72) 
1460 
(167) 
1270 
(171) 
No. of veto 
players 
+    -133* 
(59) 
 
Government 
change 
+ 401*** 
(107) 
448** 
(130) 
 -289* 
(120) 
511* 
(232) 
Existence of 
relevant law  
- -505*** 
(94) 
-541*** 
(115) 
-439** 
(154) 
-587*** 
(105) 
-487* 
(241) 
Strategic  
Adaption 
- -135** 
(39) 
-180** 
(53) 
 -117* 
(45) 
-349*** 
(88) 
Available time 
above average 
+ 539*** 
(80) 
647*** 
(98) 
 383*** 
(95) 
1041*** 
(189) 
R2  ,256 ,299 ,102 ,250 ,447 
Adjusted R2  ,244 ,283 ,090 ,229 ,409 
Unstandardized regression coefficients (rounded off in days); Standard errors in parentheses. * P < 0.05; ** P < 
0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
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Table 14.2 Results OLS regression: dependent variable DURATION across countries 
 Expected 
correlation 
NL 
(N=52) 
DE 
(N=42) 
UK 
(N=49) 
ES 
(N=42) 
EL 
(N=46) 
(Constant)  1015 
(157) 
1095 
(120) 
945 
(95) 
1932 
(248) 
355 
(164) 
No. of veto 
players 
      
Government 
change 
+     349* 
(164) 
Existence of 
relevant law  
-  -450* 
(212) 
 -693** 
(208) 
 
Strategic  
adaption 
 -230** 
(71) 
  -257* 
(100) 
 
Available time 
above average 
+ 928*** 
(159) 
   349 
(164) 
R2  ,419 ,101 ,000 ,272 ,152 
Adjusted R2  ,398 ,079 ,000 ,238 ,116 
Unstandardized regression coefficients (rounded off in days); Standard errors in parentheses. * P < 0.05; ** P < 
0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
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Table 14.3 Results OLS regression: dependent variable DURATION across time 
  Expected 
correlation 
1975-1989 
(N=91) 
1990-1999 
(N=140) 
(Constant)  980 
(130) 
1240 
(139) 
No. of veto  
players 
+   
 
Government  
change 
+ 494* 
(203) 
298* 
(120) 
Existence of 
relevant law  
- -664*** 
(174) 
-376** 
(110) 
Strategic  
Adaption 
-  -185** 
(54) 
Available time 
above average 
 565** 
(162) 
570*** 
(90) 
R2  ,237 ,283 
Adjusted R2  ,212 ,265 
Unstandardized regression coefficients (rounded off in days); Standard errors in parentheses. * P < 0.05; ** P < 
0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
 
 
 
Annexes and references 
 
200 
 
Table 14.4  Results OLS regression: dependent variable OVERDUE across policies 
 Expected 
correlation 
Total 
(N=231) 
H & S 
(N=157) 
Other 
(N=74) 
New 
(N=192) 
Amending 
(N=39) 
(Constant)  803 
(92) 
785 
(87) 
237 
(46) 
951 
(113) 
829 
(124) 
No. of veto 
players 
+ -96* 
(38) 
-221* 
(91) 
 -150** 
(46) 
 
Government 
change 
+ 171* 
(83) 
-    
Existence of 
relevant law  
- -246** 
(73) 
  -313*** 
(82) 
 
Strategic  
adaption 
- -146*** 
(29) 
-185*** 
(42) 
 -147*** 
(35) 
-304*** 
(65) 
Available time 
above average 
-     357* 
(137) 
R2  ,142 ,114 ,000 ,146 ,274 
Adjusted R2  ,129 ,104 ,000 ,132 ,249 
Unstandardized regression coefficients (rounded off in days); Standard errors in parentheses. * P < 0.05; ** P < 
0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
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Table 14.5 Results OLS regression: dependent variable OVERDUE across countries 
 Expected 
correlation 
NL 
(N=52) 
DE 
(N=42) 
UK 
(N=49) 
ES 
(N=42) 
EL 
(N=46) 
(Constant)  509 
(123) 
340 
(88) 
273 
(67) 
1254 
(187) 
804 
(129) 
No. of veto  
Players 
      
Government 
change 
+      
Existence of 
relevant law  
-    -404* 
(157) 
 
Strategic  
adaption 
 -203** 
(56) 
  -323*** 
(75) 
-171** 
(59) 
Available time 
above average 
- 335* 
(124) 
    
R2  ,245 ,000 ,000 ,348 ,145 
Adjusted R2  ,218 ,000 ,000 ,318 ,128 
Unstandardized regression coefficients (rounded off in days); Standard errors in parentheses. * P < 0.05; ** P < 
0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
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Table 14.6  Results OLS regression: dependent variable OVERDUE across time 
  Directive’s year of adoption 
 Expected 
correlation 
1975-1989 
(N=91) 
1990-1999 
(N=140) 
(Constant)  552 
(72) 
721 
(100) 
No. of veto  
players 
 
+   
Government  
Change 
+   
Existence of 
relevant law  
- -343* 
(130) 
 
Strategic  
Adaption 
-  -201*** 
(41) 
Available time 
above average 
-  150* 
(71) 
R2  ,070 ,134 
Adjusted R2  ,060 ,123 
Unstandardized regression coefficients (rounded off in days); Standard errors in parentheses. * P < 0.05; ** P < 
0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
 
 
